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Winning Hearts and Minds'?

The Roman Army in the Eastern Provinces under the Principate (27 BCE - 284 CE)

Ban, Kee Hyun

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Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’?
The Roman Army in the Eastern Provinces
under the Principate (27 BCE - 284 CE)

by
Kee-Hyun Ban

Thesis submitted for Ph.D.

King’s College London

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Abstract

My thesis investigates whether the Roman authorities had any policies or practices in employing and deploying their armed forces to win the hearts and minds of the population in the eastern provinces under the Principate (27 BCE - 284 CE) as kind of military strategy for exploiting their human and material resources to confront the Arsacid - Sassanid empire.

Chapter 1 explains this aim with reference to previous scholarship.

In chapter 2, I update and review the data for the provenance of soldiers. I argue that the hypothesis of increasing 'localisation' in the pattern of recruiting soldiers is wrong. Military units in the eastern provinces always depended largely on the recruits from Italy, Africa and the Danube, as well as from the other eastern provinces.

Chapter 3 investigates the processes of recruitment and veteran settlement, and argues that the Romans had a strategic aim to strengthen social integration between soldiers and civilians. This is supported by a case study of the Roman garrison at Syene in Egypt.

Chapter 4 argues that the logistics system of the Roman armed forces and their military presence within or near urban areas did not hinder the economic growth of the eastern provinces. The Roman government took action against the abuse of requisitions. As in the West, Roman military occupation brought some economic benefit.

Chapter 5 shows the changing image of Roman soldiers in imperial Greek literature from invaders to guardians. Greek elites began to view themselves as part of the empire and to distinguish between insiders (Romans) and outsiders (barbarians). Provincials thought of Roman soldiers as more effective and reliable than their municipal police.

Chapter 6 argues that, as part of their military strategy, the Romans used the propaganda that their emperor was a Roman Alexander who confronted the Parthian threat to protect his subjects in the East. This seems to have had some success in uniting the various eastern nations to support and serve in Rome's military domination of their territories.

All these actions would have been impossible without a strategic intention to win the hearts and minds of the population in the eastern provinces.

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Kee-Hyun Ban

Abbreviations

AE - *L'Année Épigraphique* (1922-). Paris.

ANRW - *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (1972-). Berlin.

BGU - *Berliner Griechische Urkunden (Ägyptische Urkunden aus den Kgl. Museen zu Berlin)* (1895-). Berlin.

CEWCES - *Center for East - West Cultural and Economic Studies*. Bond University.

ChLA - *Chartae Latinae Antiquiores* (1954-). Basel.

CHS - *Center for Hellenic Studies*. Havard University.

CIL - *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (1863-). Berlin.

CPL - R. Cavenaile (ed.) *Corpus Papyrorum Latinarum* (1958). Wiesbaden.

DOP - *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*.

EJ - V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955) *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius*. Oxford.

FIRA - S. Riccobono et al. (eds.) (1940-3) *Fontes iuris Romani Anteiusianiani*. Florence.

IGLS - *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie* (1929-). Paris.

IGR - R. Cagnat et al. (eds.) (1906-27) *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes*. Paris.

ILS - H. Dessau (ed.) (1892-1916) *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*. Berlin.

JRA - *Journal of Roman Archaeology*.

JRS - *Journal of Roman Studies*.

P. Dura - C. Bredford-Welles et al. (eds.) (1959) *The Excavations at Dura-Europos. Final Report V 1. The Parchments and Papyri*. New Haven.

P. Fouad - A. Bataille et al. (eds.) (1939) *Les papyrus Fouad*. Cairo.

P. Mich. - *Papyri in the University of Michigan Collection* (1931-). Ann Arbor.

- P. Oxy.* - *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (1989-). London.
- P. Panop. Beatty* - T. C. Skeat (ed.) (1964) *Papyri from Panopolis in the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin*. Dublin.
- P. Ryl.* - M. Johnson et al. (eds.) (1911-52) *Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library at Manchester*. Manchester.
- P. Thmouis* - S. Kambitsis (ed.) (1995) *Le Papyrus Thmouis 1: Colonne 68-160*. Paris.
- P. Wisc* - P. J. Sijpesteijn (1967, 1977) *Wisconsin Papyri*. Leiden.
- PSI* - *Pubblicazioni della società italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto: Papiri greci e latini* (1912-). Florence.
- RMR* - R. O. Fink (1971) *Roman Military Records on Papyrus*. Cleveland.
- SB* - *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten* (1915-). Wiesbaden.
- SEG* - *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (1923-). Leiden.
- SP* - A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar (1932-4) *Select Papyri*. Cambridge.
- Tab. Vindol.* - A. K. Bowman and J. D. Thomas (1983, 1994, 2003) *The Vindolanda Writing Tablets*. London.
- TRAC* - *Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference*.
- W. Chr* - U. Wilcken (1912) *Chrestomathie*. Leipzig.
- ZPE* - *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* (1967-). Bonn.

Ch.1: Introduction

1.1: The historical question

The principal question of this thesis is whether the Romans had any policy or practice of winning ‘hearts and minds’ in support of their deployment and use of armed forces in the eastern provinces from Asia to Egypt. Because we do not have any direct statements of policy, and it may have been more a question of habit and practice rather than conscious policy, I will investigate aspects of both Roman and local behaviour and thought which could indicate to us whether the Romans did, or did not, have any such ideology: that is, how far Roman army units behaved and were perceived as alien oppressors, or as a beneficial presence, and were drawn from and integrated with local civilian society. Campbell, to take one influential example, has argued that: “there is no sign that the government had any deliberate or consistent policy using serving soldiers or veterans to further Romanisation. If the soldiers made a contribution here, it will have been limited, indirect and largely accidental”.¹ However, it is hard to believe that all the actions of the Roman army have been taken *ad hoc*, without any strategic planning or preparation.² While we should be careful not to apply modern concepts of military strategy directly to the ancient world, we should not assume that the Romans lacked the cognitive ability to make strategic decisions.

Most discussions about the role of the Roman army in the East have focussed on two fields: on the one hand, warfare and strategy against the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, and on the other, the maintenance of law and order in the provinces. Luttwak’s *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* and Isaac’s critique of it in his *The Limits of*

¹ Campbell 2002: 104.

² For discussions of decision-making at Rome, see also Millar 1982: 1-23, Isaac 1990: 377-87, and Mattern 1999: 5-18.

Empire made outstanding progress in the discussions of both fields.³ It is clear that the eastern policy of Rome under the Principate was centred on its diplomatic and military relations with the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, while in peacetime the Roman army was required to act as a police force to maintain law and order and enforce, when necessary, the collection of taxes in the provinces.⁴ However, these explanations still conform to the stereotype of the Roman army as an alien occupying force imposed the provincials. It is worth trying to go beyond these bounds to investigate whether the Roman army might have also been a beneficial force which contributed to social and economic evolution.

This study does not aim to re-evaluate Luttwak's theory of a 'defensive grand strategy' or Isaac's counter-theory of 'continued aggressive expansion'. Luttwak's view of the eastern policy of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius still deserves consideration, and Isaac's bottom-up approach to researching the role of the Roman army in the eastern provinces is also, or maybe more, relevant to the goal of this study. My objective is to examine the interactions between Roman soldiers and local civilians, and to see how far they conduced to the integration of the empire. Based on this, I shall seek to investigate whether there were any policies or practices commonly shared among the Roman authorities which seem to have been designed to win the support of the civilian population in the eastern provinces.

The impact of the Roman army on provincial communities has already been studied in various aspects: politics, economy, society, religion and culture.⁵ While its impact on the western provinces has earned positive judgements, that on the eastern

³ Luttwak 1976; Isaac 1990: 372-418, supported by Whittaker 1997: 49-97. Alston (1995, 1999b) is a rare exception.

⁴ War and diplomacy: Millar 1988: 345-77 (in general); Campbell 1993: 213-40; 2001: 10-9; Ferguson 2005. Law and order: Bagnall 1977: 67-86; Fuhrmann 2012: 147-238 (in general).

⁵ Erdkamp 2002a; De Blois and Lo Cascio 2007.

provinces has been suspected to have been negative or trivial because of the great tradition of Hellenistic civilisation there. The Roman army has been viewed as an advance guard for spreading Roman culture, and therefore the idea that divides the empire into Latin West and Greek East has also been used to deny so-called 'Romanisation' in the East. The Hellenised East did not need 'civilising', and so there was no positive role for the Roman army to fulfil.

Contrary to the concept of Hellenisation, which is still generally accepted to mean the spread of Greek culture, notwithstanding its inventor Droysen's definition of it as a cultural fusion between 'Greek' and 'Oriental', Romanisation has become a controversial term, especially by the archaeologists of Roman Britain who adopt postcolonial perspectives.⁶ It is often challenged by the alternative vocabularies used by cultural and sociological theories, such as acculturation, creolisation, discrepant identity and globalisation.⁷ The old concepts of Hellenisation and Romanisation were ultimately based on a belief in the superiority of Greek and Roman culture, and the assumption that the Greeks and Romans had a conscious 'mission civilisatrice' like modern European imperial powers. However, rejecting this analogy does not mean we have to deny any cultural or ideological influence, either conscious or incidental, of the Roman government and army on the populations of the eastern provinces. In any case, my concern is not with the general question of 'Romanisation' but the more pragmatic question to what extent relations between the Roman army and the local populations were positive or negative.

An obvious initial question is, if the Roman army was viewed by provincials as an alien occupying force for the entire time of Roman rule, how was it possible for the

⁶ Hellenisation: Mair 2012. Romanisation in postcolonial perspective: Millet 1990:1-2, and Webster and Cooper 1996.

⁷ Acculturation: Webster 1997: 324-38. Creolisation: Webster 2001: 209-25. Discrepant identity: Mattingly 2004: 12-22 and 2011: 213-8. Globalisation and beyond: Gardner 2013: 1-25.

empire to maintain the imperial order and ideology in its provinces across several centuries? The question can also be put in a positive form: what was it that enabled the longevity of the empire? This was the question posed by Ando in 2000 in his *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire*. Against earlier postcolonial views, he argues that the legitimacy of laws and institutions guaranteed by the emperors' charisma and imperial bureaucracy did attract provincial consensus.⁸ He also briefly discusses the uses of triumphal ceremonies and imagery, and of military standards, for propaganda purposes to attract the loyalty of civilian provincials.⁹ However, he does not consider the role of the army in the relationship between the Roman state and its subjects.

My study seeks to assess how far the Roman army was an element in maintaining loyalty to Rome in the eastern provinces. Of course violence, crime and destruction committed by Roman soldiers in the era of conquest is undeniable, and their aggression and corruption are still detectable in the subsequent long period of peacetime rule. The image of Roman soldiers might have been close to that of foreign occupying troops in more recent imperial situations, with conflicts between soldiers and civilians. Thus, one important topic for us to investigate will be whether the imperial government had any serious desire, or established any policy, to control such abuses by soldiers, or indeed to make subjects adopt an image of the local presence of imperial troops as acceptable and even beneficial. In so doing, I hope to be able to assess to what extent the Roman authorities had a strategic intention of using the army to win the hearts and minds of the diverse subject peoples for the purpose of imperial integration.

The time-span of this study covers the first three centuries, principally from Augustus to the Severan emperors, when the Roman empire is believed to have been at

⁸ Ando 2000: 406-12.

⁹ Ando 2000: 253-69.

the zenith of its power. It is well known that Roman territorial expansion had occurred mostly during the middle and late Republic, and conquest under the Principate was limited to a few additional provinces such as Britain, Dacia, Arabia and Mesopotamia. Thus, the Principate should have been a period of adaption and blending. If the Roman authorities were in practice conscious of the problem of integration, we might expect to find some indications in actions undertaken to ensure the continuance of their rule over the provinces during the Principate.

Under the Principate most Roman soldiers rarely experienced battlefield operations throughout the twenty-five years of their service. The total period of warfare involving the eastern provinces was about fifty years out of the three hundred (30 BCE - 284 CE): Corbulo's Parthian war in 58-63 CE, the first Jewish revolt and civil war in 66-73, Trajan's Parthian war and subsequent Jewish revolt in 114-7, the Bar Kokhba revolt in 132-5, Verus' Parthian war in 161-6, the civil war after the fall of Commodus in 193, Severus' Parthian war in 197-8, Caracalla's Parthian war in 216-7, Alexander's Persian war in 232-3, the wars against Shapur I in 242-4 and 250-60, Aurelian's war against Zenobia's Palmyrene empire in 270-3, Carus' Persian war in 283, and the civil war between Carinus and Diocletian in 284-5. For most of the three hundred years the soldiers were engaged in minor border actions, maintaining law and order, administrative support, and military and civilian construction projects.

The sources for this study are various. The Latin authors used include the Augustan poets, Pompeius Trogus, Livy, Velleius Paterculus, Suetonius, Tacitus, the authors of *Augustan History* and some novelists. More Greek authors are cited because of the focus on the eastern provinces: Josephus, Plutarch, Epictetus, Pausanias, Arrian, Appian, Aelius Aristides, Cassius Dio, Herodian and some Greek novelists. Some sources of the late Republic and the Dominate are also cited, when it is necessary to look at the origins of the imperial system and its later legacy. Archaeology, epigraphy

and papyrology are complementary, and help to fill in gaps in the literary evidence. For example, gravestones and military diplomata tell us much about patterns of recruitment and service, while archaeology reveals the physical relationship between military and civilian settlements.

1.2: Winning hearts and minds

The term ‘hearts and minds’ has been used and understood in various ways. In the age of modern imperialism, the phrase has had a specific sense in military strategy as part of psychological operations, to encourage and develop emotional and intellectual support or commitment on the part of the natives of colonies or protectorates to occupying military forces engaged in fighting insurgency or external threats. During the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, some British armed forces began a counter-insurgency campaign to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Malays and other indigenous peoples in British Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, a British general, first used the phrase in a strategic context in his argument that: “The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people”.¹⁰ By training the Federation army and supplying food and medical equipment to the locals, the British army was able to gain their support and thus carry out successful operations against the communists.¹¹

¹⁰ Ramakrishna 2001: 79-92; <http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/hearts-and-minds-malayan-campaign-re-evaluated> (31/7/15).

¹¹ This strategic consideration of British armed forces has previously been detected in their policy for the civilians of Hong Kong and Port Hamilton (거문도, Geomundo) at the end of the nineteenth century. When British Royal Navy occupied Port Hamilton, a Korean isle, between 1885 and 1887 to counterbalance the advance of Russian power in the Far East, its marines developed friendly relations with the civilians. About three hundred Korean islanders were employed and paid for the fortification of the isle, and some local landowners even wanted to lease their land and property for military use. For the reports on these relations between the British soldiers and Korean civilians, see Park 1982: 641-4 (no. 201.2), 653-4 (no. 2.2), 683-6 (no. 46.2, 46.4). The residents of Geomundo had preserved the soldiers’

During the Vietnam war from 1955 to 1975, the United States government also conducted a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, which was popularised by the documentary film *Hearts and Minds* directed by Peter Davis in 1974. Gaining support from the southern Vietnamese was a pivotal element for the United States army in its war strategy against the People’s Army led by Ho Chi Minh. The United States army provided military training and medical service to the people of South Vietnam. A huge amount of budget and manpower were invested in developing the economic and social infrastructures of South Vietnam, and winning hearts and minds seems to have reached its zenith with the creation of a military and civilian organisation, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), although it is still a matter of dispute whether the campaign had much success.¹² Between 2003 and 2010 the United States government again used ‘winning hearts and minds’ as a slogan during its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹³

More recently, although the phrase has disappeared after its general failure, a considerable number of army units under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are still providing aid to maintain public health and other facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to train their national forces.¹⁴ The concept of integrating military and civilian cooperation is one of the main concerns of NATO in planning its military strategy, which was discussed in the NATO Defence College Forum at Rome in 2011, leading to the publication of a book, *Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of*

cemetery, and rededicated it in April 1998 with the members of the British embassy in Seoul.

¹² Hunt 1995: 252-79.

¹³ Iraq: <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/win-iraq/p8847> (01/08/15). Afghanistan: Beath et al. 2013.

¹⁴ UN: <http://www.uniraq.org/>, <http://unama.unmissions.org/>.

NATO: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51978.htm,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm? (01/08/15).

Strategy.¹⁵

Winning the hearts and minds of populations still occupies an important part in the military strategy of the Western powers to strengthen solidarity with their allies and to confront their potential enemies. On 13th May 2015, the United Kingdom and New Zealand media reported that ‘the soldier prince’ Harry had mastered and performed the Haka, a traditional Maori dance, with other soldiers at Linton military camp in New Zealand.¹⁶ Some United States army units, still stationed in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to implement the Asia-Pacific strategy of their Department of Defence, are occasionally seconded for local aid to the civil authorities, in cooperation with the local national forces. Peoples of the three countries accept the presence of foreign military force because they appreciate that it benefits the local economy and symbolises the close alliance with the United States.

The idea of a policy to win the hearts and minds of the locals in occupied areas is not a modern invention, but a similar idea or practice is also seen in some ancient sources. The Chinese strategist Sun Wu of the late sixth century BCE promoted the importance of winning hearts and minds to facilitate military logistics and to gain intelligence in his treatise on strategy, titled *The Art of War*.¹⁷

(2) One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the people twice or transport provisions a third time. If you obtain your equipment from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the army’s foodstuffs will be sufficient. (善用兵者，役不再籍，糧不三載；取用於國，因糧於敵，故軍食可足也。)

The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far off.

¹⁵ Schnaubelt 2011.

¹⁶ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32717034>; <http://www.stuff.co.nz/manawatu-standard/news/68517251/prince-harry-masters-haka-at-linton-camp> (22/06/15).

¹⁷ Sun Wu, *The Art of War* 2, 9.

When provisions are transported far off, the subjects are impoverished.
(國之貧於師者遠輸，遠輸則百姓貧。)

Those in proximity to the army will sell their goods expensively. When goods are expensive, the subjects' wealth will be exhausted. When their wealth is exhausted, they will be extremely hard-pressed to supply their village's military impositions. (近於師者貴賣，貴賣則百姓財竭，財竭則急於丘役。)

... Therefore, a general who understands warfare is Master for the people, ruler of the state's security or endangerment. (故知兵之將，生民之司命，國家安危之主也。)

(9) If orders are consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the people will submit. If orders are not consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the people will not submit. One whose orders are consistently out has established a mutual relationship with the people. (令素行以教其民，則民服；令素不行以教其民，則民不服。令素行者，與眾上得也。)

His descendant Sun Bin of the fourth century BCE also pointed out the same strategic value in his treatise of the same title, which has been discovered recently in Shandong province of China. His intention is clear despite his abstract writing style.¹⁸

(7) He who has mastered the way (Tao) understands the course of the heaven above and the topography of the earth below. Within his own state he wins the hearts and minds of his people, and beyond its borders he is fully aware of the enemy's situation. ... (知道者，上知天之道。下知地理之理，內得其民之心，外知敵之情，...)

(11) The way (Tao) to employ the military and win the allegiance of the people is the same as weighing something on a set of scales and balances.

¹⁸ Sun Bin, *The Art of War* 7, 11, 22, 26.

A set of scales and balances should be used to select and promote superior and good men. (用兵移民之道，權衡也。 權衡，所以纂(選)賢取良也。)

(22) If an army loses the people, it does not know about excesses. (兵失民，不知過者也。)

An army that is unable to overcome great adversity is unable to unite the people's minds. (兵不能勝大患，不能合民心者也。)

(26) Sixth, if the people regard the army with bitterness, he (a general) can be defeated. (六曰：民苦其師，可敗也。)

Similar ideas can be found among the Romans under the Principate. In his *Agricola*, Tacitus introduced how his father-in-law had managed to gain the hearts and minds of provincials in the first year of his governorship of Britain before his campaign in the province (78 CE).¹⁹

Be that as it may, Agricola was aware of the temper of the provincials, and took to heart the lesson which the experience of other suggested, that little was accomplished by force if injustice followed. He decided therefore to eliminate the causes of war. He began with himself and his own people: he put in order his own house, a task not less difficult for most governors than the government of a province. He transacted no public business through freedmen or slaves: he admitted no officer or private to his staff from personal linkings, or private recommendation, or entreaty: he gave his confidence only to the best. He made it his business to know everything; if not, always, to follow up his knowledge: he turned an indulgent ear to small offences, yet was strict to offences that were serious: he was satisfied generally with penitence instead of punishment: to all offices and positions he preferred to advance the men not likely to offend rather than to condemn them after offences. Demands for grain and tribute he made

¹⁹ Tacitus, *Agricola* 19.

less burdensome by equalising the burdens: he abolished all the profit-making dodges which were more intolerable than the tribute itself. (*Ceterum animorum provinciae prudens, simulque doctus per aliena experimenta parum profici armis, si iniuriae sequerentur, causas bellorum statuit excidere. a se suisque orsus primum domum suam coercuit, quod plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere. nihil per libertos servosque publicae rei, non studiis privatis nec ex commendatione aut precibus centurionem militesve adscire, sed optimum quemque fidissimum putare. omnis scire, non omnia exsequi. parvis peccatis veniam, magnis severitatem commodare; nec poena semper, sed saepius paenitentia contentus esse; officiis et administrationibus potius non peccaturos praeponere, quam damnare cum peccassent. frumenti et tributorum exactionem aequalitate munerum mollire, circumcisis quae in quaestum reperta ipso tributo gravius tolerabantur.*)

The military system of the Roman empire in the second century CE was glowingly presented by Aelius Aristides, a Greek orator, as an ideal plan of the imperial authorities for provincial civilians.²⁰

So these men (i.e. provincial recruits to the Roman army), once you eliminated the morally and the socially base, you <introduced into> the community of the ruling nation, not without the privileges I mentioned nor in such a way that they would envy those who stay in the city because they themselves were not of equal rights at the start, but in such a way that they would consider their share of citizenship as an honour. Having found and treated them thus, you led them to the boundaries of the empire. There you stationed them at intervals, and you assigned areas to guard, some to some, others to others. (τούτους δὴ ἄρα καθάραντες καὶ φυλοκρινήσαντες τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οὐ χωρὶς ὧν εἶπον οὐδ' ὥστε φθονεῖν ἐξεῖναι μᾶλλον τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως μένουσιν, ἅτε οὐκ οὕσιν ὁμοτίμοις τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ἀλλ' ἐν τιμῇς αὐτοὺς μέρει λήψεσθαι τὴν μετουσίαν τῆς

²⁰ Aelius Aristides, *Regarding Rome* 78. This passage will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.

πολιτείας, οὕτως εὐρόντες τε καὶ διαθέντες αὐτοὺς ἡγάγετε ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα
τῆς ἀρχῆς, κἀνταῦθα διαστήσαντες ἄλλοις ἄλλα φυλάττειν ἀπενείματε.)

Vegetius, a Roman writer of the late fourth century CE, wrote a book of military strategy, *The Epitome of Military Matters*, in which he also emphasised the importance of civilian cooperation in terms of logistics and intelligence. Although he did not directly mention the ‘hearts’ or ‘minds’ of people, we can read the implication from some paragraphs that suggest the right way of employing subjects for successful military operations.²¹

(3.3) If the provinces can not raise their quotas in kind, they must commute for them in money to be employed in procuring all things requisite for the service. For the possessions of the subjects can not be kept secure otherwise than by the defence of arms. (*Quod si tributa deficiunt, prorogato auro comparanda sunt omnia. Neque enim diuitiarum secura possessio est, nisi armorum defensione seruetur.*)

(3.6) If any difficulty arises about the choice of roads, he should procure proper and skilful guides. He should put them under a guard and spare neither promises nor threat to induce them to be faithful. They will acquit themselves well when they know it is impossible to escape and are certain of being rewarded for their fidelity or punished for their perfidy. (*praeterea (sub periculo eligendum) viarum duces idoneos scientesque praecipere eosque custodiae mancipare addita poenae ostentatione vel praemii. Erunt enim utiles, cum intellegant nec fugiendi sibi copiam superesse et fidei praemium ac perfidiae parata supplicia.*)

It is true that we should not apply the concept of winning ‘hearts and minds’ in modern strategic theory to the military policy of the Roman empire. First, the size of military strength and the geographical scope of military operations in the two periods

²¹ Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Matters* 3.3, 6.

are enormously different. Second, more significantly, the modern concept of human rights can not be applied to the Romans' way of thinking about people, especially provincials. However, as I have showed above, modern imperialists and the Romans shared a common idea or sense of winning the hearts and minds of people to achieve their military purposes. I will argue that the Roman authorities of the Principate did, in fact, employ strategic practices and policies to create and maintain provincial loyalty and consensus to their armed forces in the eastern provinces.

1.3: Structure of the thesis

The structure of this study, after the introduction, is as follows:

Chapter 2 is an analysis of the changing pattern of Roman military deployment in the East and of the known *origines* of the Roman soldiers who served there during the first three centuries CE. I list the legionary, auxiliary, and navy units which were stationed in the eastern provinces for whatever purposes. All the epigraphic sources for the origins of soldiers, including Forni's sources and all those since published up to 2014, are analysed to examine whether the pattern of recruitment, in fact, supports the theory of increasingly local recruitment which is believed by most scholars. I argue for a rather different, more regional, pattern of recruitment, and discuss its implications.

Chapter 3 investigates the processes of recruitment and of the veteran settlement, and to what extent those contributed to the integration of soldiers in the eastern provinces. As serving in the army was the most common way of obtaining Roman citizenship, how a soldier and his family were practically reborn as Roman citizens is an important topic. Whether they formed a privileged class isolated from the provincial societies, with a growth of recruits 'from the camp (*e castris*)', or functioned as a bridge connecting local people to the Roman state is also considered. I argue that it is necessary to understand the procedures for recruitment and for veteran settlement in

the perspective of a policy of social interaction and integration. I include a special case study of Syene.

The aim of chapter 4 is to examine the material relations between soldiers and civilians in the eastern provinces. I investigate to what extent military bases were located in or by existing cities, and to test the idea that relations in such contexts differed significantly between the eastern and western provinces. In the less urbanised West many cities developed out of the civilian settlements (*vici* and *canabae*) which grew up around military camps, and the army is typically seen as a driver of urbanisation and economic growth. In the East it made sense to station army units in or near already existing cities in order to facilitate supply. However, soldiers stationed in eastern cities are often criticised by ancient authors for their lax discipline and low morale, and numerous complaints are attested about abuses of the requisition system. Using the available archaeological evidence from Cappadocia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Judaea, Arabia and Egypt, I examine whether the army camps (legionary and auxiliary) were located inside or outside the city walls, and if they were within it, to what extent the army was encroaching on civilian space. I also reconsider the evidence for abuses of the requisition system to re-assess the idea that, unlike in the West, the Roman army in the East had a negative effect on civilians.

Chapter 5 re-investigates the image of Roman soldiers revealed in Greek literature of the imperial period, including some Latin literature set in the Greek East. Rather than excerpting accounts or stories of abuses committed by them against provincials, I investigate the evidence for a positive image among provincials of soldiers as a beneficial presence. First, I give a general description of the change in the Greek elite's view about Roman rule and military force. Second, through analysis of the portrayals of soldiers in the ancient novels, I suggest that their image among ordinary provincials was often closer to protectors than villains. Lastly, the cases of Aelius

Aristides and Lucius Flavius Arrianus enable us to appreciate two different ways in which Romanised provincials could contribute to imperial integration, as an orator formulating an ideal function of soldiers for imperial defence and as an actual military commander.

Chapter 6 investigates what Roman propaganda there was in the eastern provinces as part of the military strategy against the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, and to evaluate its impact on provincials by investigating the reaction of Greeks. First, I suggest that the Roman claim that the Parthians were a constant threat to the eastern provinces of the Roman empire offered a useful means to identify the security needs of the local populace with those of the imperial power, justifying the deployment of the Roman army in the area. Second, I suggest that the Romans exploited the legacy of Alexander the Great, because of his enduring appeal to many eastern peoples, as a way of uniting provincials in the Greek East to confront a mythical Parthian threat. I note that in fact there were few wars on the eastern frontier, and most of those few were provoked by Rome. The anti-Parthian propaganda - which included displays of Armenian and Parthian embassies, and the myth of the military danger of the 'Parthian shot' - thus seems to have been deliberately designed to reinforce peacetime loyalty.

In my concluding chapter, I review the results of my researches, and argue that in various ways the Roman state did seek to embed and integrate its military forces among the civilian populations of the eastern provinces, and that there is sufficient continuity and coherence to these practices to suppose that the Romans had, in effect, a policy of winning hearts and minds.

Ch. 2: Recruits to the Roman armed forces in the East: the data

2.1: Introduction

In discussions about the recruitment of the Roman armed forces, historians traditionally believed that the legionaries were recruited solely from Roman citizens and the auxiliaries were recruited from *peregrini* (non-citizens), mostly provincials but occasionally from outside the empire. Non-citizen soldiers could become citizens only after they had been discharged from the armed forces. But the rigid application of this principle is no longer believed by scholars. At the end of the nineteenth century, Mommsen found various exceptions in inscriptions and, more importantly, suggested that the legionaries and the auxiliaries gradually came to depend on local recruitment.²² Since then, many scholars have endeavoured to discover a pattern in the nature of recruitment. However, their studies were biased toward the legionary recruitment in the West, where Roman and Latin citizenship were more common, and only a rough agreement was reached that there were differences in the patterns of recruitment between the West and the East. Added to this, few studies have looked on the pattern of auxiliary recruitment, although there is no doubt that in the East the role of auxiliaries was of equivalent importance to that of legionaries.

Thus there are two important questions to which I try to provide answers. First, was the pattern of recruitment in the East different from that in the West, and if so, how substantial was it? Second, to what extent did the pattern of recruitment in the East become localised, and what does the 'localisation' mean? Answering these questions will contribute to our understanding of imperial military policy and strategy in the East since these issues came to the fore in terms of the relationship with the Arsacid -

²² Mommsen 1884: 1-79, 210-34.

Sassanid empire, which competed with the Roman empire for dominance over Mesopotamia through the first to third centuries.

The pattern of recruiting soldiers for the first three centuries is an important mean of accessing Romanisation in the eastern provinces and its strategic effect. First, I will investigate the origins and movements of the legions, auxiliary units and fleets deployed in the eastern provinces, and represent the increasing number of those units during the Principate. Second, I will introduce the views of previous scholars about the pattern of recruitment. Third, based on epigraphic evidence, I will illuminate whether there was a different nature in the pattern of recruitment to the eastern units, and how far it supports the theory of ‘localisation’.

2.2: The origins and movements of the Roman military units

2.2.1: The legions

Table 1: The Roman legions in the eastern provinces²³

<i>Legio</i>	Aug.-Gaius 27BCE- 41CE	Claud.-Nero 41 - 68	Flavians 69 - 96	Trajan 98 - 117	Hadrian 117 - 138	Antonines 138 - 193	Severans 193 - 235
<i>III Gallica</i>	Syria	Syria Armenia ²⁴ Moesia	Syria (Samosata)	Syria (Samosata) Parthia	Syria (Samosata) Bar Kokhba	Syria (Raphanaea) Parthia	Syria (Raphanaea) Parthia Persia
<i>VI Ferrata</i>	Syria (Raphanaea)	Syria (Raphanaea) Armenia	Syria (Raphanaea)	Syria (Raphanaea) Parthia	Arabia (Bostra) Judaea (Caparcotna) Bar Kokhba	Syria- Palaestina (Caparcotna)	Syria- Palaestina (Caparcotna)
<i>XII Fulminata</i>	Egypt Syria	Syria Armenia Cappadocia Syria (Raphanaea) Judaea	Cappadocia (Melitene)	Cappadocia (Melitene) Parthia	Cappadocia (Melitene) Bar Kokhba	Cappadocia (Melitene)	Cappadocia (Melitene)
<i>III Cyrenaica</i>	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Arabia (Bostra) Parthia	Egypt (Nikopolis) Arabia	Arabia (Bostra) Parthia	Arabia (Bostra)

²³ The *legio VII Claudia*, *V Macedonica*, *IX Hispana*, and *II Parthica*, which are considered to be stationed temporarily in the East, are not listed in this table.

²⁴ Corbulo's Armenian war in 58-63, the first Jewish revolt in 66-73, Trajan's Dacian war in 105-6 and his Parthian war in 114-7, Bar Kokhba revolt in 132-5, Verus' Parthian war in 161-6, Severus' Parthian war in 197-8, Caracalla's Parthian war in 216-7, and Alexander's Persian war 232-3 are marked in bold type.

					(Bostra) Bar Kokhba		
<i>X Fretensis</i>	Macedonia Syria (Zeugma)	Syria (Zeugma) Judaea	Judaea (Jerusalem)	Judaea (Jerusalem) Parthia	Judaea (Jerusalem) Bar Kokhba	Syria- Palaestina (Jerusalem)	Syria- Palaestina (Jerusalem)
<i>XXII Deiotariana</i>	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis) Judaea (Caparcotna) Bar Kokhba	-	-
<i>IV Scythica</i>	Moesia	Moesia Armenia Cappadocia Syria	Syria (Zeugma)	Syria (Zeugma) Parthia	Syria (Zeugma) Bar Kokhba	Syria (Zeugma) Parthia	Syria (Zeugma) Parthia
<i>XV Apollinaris</i>	Illyricum Noricum (Carnuntum)	Armenia Cappadocia (Satala) Egypt Judaea	Noricum (Carnuntum)	Egypt (Nikopolis) Parthia Cappadocia (Satala)	Cappadocia (Satala)	Cappadocia (Satala) Parthia	Cappadocia (Satala) Parthia Persia
<i>XVI Flavia Firma</i>	-	-	Cappadocia (Satala)	Cappadocia (Satala) Parthia	Syria (Samosata)	Syria (Samosata)	Syria (Samosata)
<i>II Traiana Fortis</i>	-	-	-	Dacia Parthia	Judaea (Caparcotna) Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis)	Egypt (Nikopolis)
<i>I-III Parthicae</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Parthia Osroene (I at Nisibis III at Raesena) Persia
<i>IV Italica</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Persia Osroene
<i>Legiones in the East / the Empire</i>	6 / 28→25 (21→24%)	8 / 30 (27%)	8 / 30 (27%)	9 / 30 (30%)	10 / 30 (33%)	9 / 31 (29%)	12 / 33 (36%)

The emergence of the imperial legions began with Augustus' military reform after the battle of Actium in 31 BCE, which ultimately meant transforming the Republic's amateur temporary armies into the professional standing armies of the empire.²⁵ This reform was carried out in three areas: the size, remuneration and disposition of the army. Augustus reorganised some sixty legions, which had been created by competition between Caesarians and rival commanders throughout the civil wars, into twenty-eight legions.²⁶ The total number fluctuated thereafter as some legions were lost and new ones formed; by the Severan period there were thirty-three legions. Augustus established a fixed annual stipend for soldiers and a cash bonus on

²⁵ Alston 2007: 187-89; Gilliver 2007: 184-8.

²⁶ *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 3.17.

discharge, and founded the *aerarium militare* to pay the bonus.²⁷ Lastly, the legionary units, except the praetorian cohorts based in Italy, were stationed mainly in the provinces along with auxiliary units.

In the East, the history of permanently stationed legions began with the eight legions allotted to Antony for his Parthian campaign after the battle of Philippi in 42 BCE. Five of those were disbanded by the Augustan reform, but the *legio III Gallica*, *VI Ferrata* and *XII Fulminata* remained in the East throughout the Principate. The *legio III Gallica*, as Parker argued, was probably raised by Caesar in 48 BCE from veterans who had previously served in his Gallic campaign, and from soldiers of the old *legio XV*.²⁸ The full title including the cognomen *Gallica* is first attested in an inscription from Cyprus belonging to the end of Augustus' reign or the beginning of Tiberius'. The *legio VI Ferrata* was created by Caesar in Gallia Cisalpina in 52 BCE to fight against Vercingetorix. The earliest mention of its full title is in an inscription of a veteran settled at Beneventum in 41 BCE.²⁹ The *legio XII Fulminata* was formed with *legio XI* by Caesar in Italy in 58 BCE for his campaign against the Helvetii and later moved to the East with Antony. Its first cognomen was *Paterna* after Caesar as *pater patriae*, which changed to *Antiqua* when the legion passed to Antony, and then finally became *Fulminata*, which can be found in an inscription of a colonist at Patrae in 30 BCE.³⁰

Augustus stationed four more legions in the East after his reform: the *legio III Cyrenaica*, *VII Claudia*, *X Fretensis* and *XXII Deiotariana*. The origin of *legio III Cyrenaica* is obscure. Parker's hypothesis seems valid that this legion was probably

²⁷ Mann (1983: 2) explains that in the late Republic soldiers began to be loyal to a certain commander, who was able to ensure the reward for their military service, rather than the Senate which had not designed any institutional reward for them.

²⁸ *CIL* 3.217; Parker 1928: 264-5; Keppie 1984: 206; Dabrowa 2000a: 309-10.

²⁹ *CIL* 9.1613; Keppie 1984: 82, 207.

³⁰ *CIL* 3.504, 507, 509; *ILS* 2242; Keppie 1984: 88, 209-10; Bertrand and Rémy 2000: 253-4.

raised by Lepidus between 42 and 36 BCE since Augustus and Antony both already had legions numbered III.³¹ Antony stationed it in Cyrenaica, which is how it gained the cognomen. The *legio VII Claudia* was one of the oldest legions formed by Caesar for his Gallic wars. This legion had been called *Macedonica*, but the emperor Claudius granted it a new cognomen, *Claudia Pia Fidelis*, because of its loyalty during the revolt of Scribonianus in 41 CE.³² The *legio X Fretensis* was formed by Augustus in Italy after the battle of Philippi. In 36 BCE, it gained its cognomen from its victorious role in the battle of Naulochus in the strait (*fretum*) between Italy and Sicily.³³ The *legio XXII Deiotariana* had an unusual background. This legion had its origin in two legions created by king Deiotarus of Galatia, who introduced Roman equipment and drill system into his army. His legions fought for Caesar against Pharnaces II, the king of Pontus, but were defeated in the first engagement, and then reorganised into one legion. This legion became the twenty-second Roman legion when Amyntas, the successor of Deiotarus, was killed and his kingdom annexed by the Roman empire in 25 BCE, but the founder's name was left in its title.³⁴

The defence of the East under Augustus was the responsibility of those seven legions. There was no obvious need to station more legions there since he had restored diplomatic relations with the Parthians. Augustus stationed three of them, the *legio III Gallica*, *VI Ferrata* and *X Fretensis* in Syria, and another three, the *legio III Cyrenaica*, *XII Fulminata* and *XXII Deiotariana* in Egypt. The exact location of each legion at that time is still uncertain, even though most scholars agree that the headquarters of the Syrian legions were located around Zeugma, Raphanea and the Orontes, and those of

³¹ Parker 1928: 264; Keppie 1984: 206; Alston 1995: 23.

³² Mitchell 1976a: 301-2.

³³ *CIL* 5.3890; Parker 1928: 268; Keppie 1984: 133-4, 208-9; Dabrowa 1993: 11-2; 2000b: 317-9.

³⁴ Caesar, *Alexandrian War* 34, 39-40; Parker 1928: 271-2; Keppie 1984: 136, 141, 157; Alston 1995: 23, 42.

the Egyptian legions at Nikopolis and Babylon, and in the Thebaid.³⁵ The *legio VII Claudia* had presumably been garrisoned in Galatia from 25 BCE, but in 6 CE it was redeployed to Pannonia and did not return to the East.³⁶ It is noticeable that this legion and the *XXII* legion, in contrast to the other legions mostly comprised of Roman citizens, depended largely on the recruitment of native Galatians when they were reorganised by Augustus.

Augustus' successors over the next three centuries transferred three legions, *legio IV Scythica*, *XV Apollinaris* and *IX Hispana*, and created six more legions, *legio XVI Flavia Firma*, *II Traiana Fortis*, *I-III Parthicae* and *IV Italica*, for offence and defence in the eastern frontier. The *legio IV Scythica* had presumably been formed by Antony between 40 and 31 BCE. Augustus stationed it in Moesia to conquer the Scythians, from which it moved to Syria in 56 or 57 CE for Corbulo's campaigns against Armenia and Parthia.³⁷ The *legio XV Apollinaris* was raised by either Caesar or Augustus, and it won its cognomen at the battle of Naulochus in 36 BCE. During the first century, it was located at Carnuntum in Pannonia, except during the period 63-71 CE when it was dispatched to the East to fight in the Armenian war and the Jewish war. This legion was apparently redeployed to Egypt in c.106 CE, and then from 117 was stationed permanently at Satala in Cappadocia.³⁸ It is uncertain whether the *legio IX Hispana* stemmed from Caesar's ninth legion which had been disbanded in 46 or 45 BCE, but Augustus formed it in 41 or 40 BCE. This legion probably gained its

³⁵ Strabo 17.1.12, 30, 41; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 17.10.9; *Jewish War* 2.3.1, 2.5.1; Tacitus, *Annals* 4.5; Speidel 1984c: 317-21; Keppie 1986: 411-4; Alston 1995: 28; Dabrowa 2000a: 309, 313.

³⁶ Mitchell 1976a: 303.

³⁷ *CIL* 10.680; Tacitus, *Annals* 13.35; Keppie 1984: 140, 159, 206; 1986: 415-7; Speidel 2000: 327-32.

³⁸ *CIL* 5.2516, 3.25; Parker 1928: 270; Keppie 1983: 192, 219 (*Sylloge* 68); 1984: 210; Wheeler 2000: 259-70.

cognomen because it served in Spain (Hispania) in the early years of Augustus' reign.³⁹ The time when this legion was transferred to the East and was disbanded is still a controversial issue among the scholars.⁴⁰ However, they roughly agree that this legion may have been annihilated in Judaea in 134-5 CE or in Cappadocia in 161, because it is not recorded in the list of twenty-eight legions recorded in an inscription at Rome dated to 162.⁴¹



Map 1: The eastern provinces of the Roman empire in the early second century CE

The formation of new legions in the Principate was a necessary procedure to control newly acquired territories and to prepare for major expeditions. The *legio XVI Flavia Firma* was raised by Vespasian as part of the process to integrate Cappadocia

³⁹ *CIL* 5.7443; Keppie 1984: 157, 208.

⁴⁰ Mor 1986: 267-9; Keppie 1989: 247-55.

⁴¹ Campbell 2010: 48-53; *CIL* 6.3492 (= *ILS* 2288).

into the eastern provincial and military system in the mid-70s. This legion had been garrisoned at Satala in Cappadocia until it participated in Trajan's Parthian war, and then substituted the *legio III Gallica* stationed at Samosata in Syria.⁴² The earliest evidence is a Latin inscription of 75 CE, recording the construction of a canal above Antioch.⁴³ The *legio II Traiana Fortis* was one of two legions created by Trajan for his second Dacian war in 105-106 CE. It seems that he recruited this legion from Italian settlers in Spain and experienced legionaries who had served in Moesia.⁴⁴ After fighting in the Dacian war and the Parthian war, it was stationed at Caparcotna in Judaea for less than ten years, and then finally based at Nikopolis in Egypt (Map 1).⁴⁵

The creation of *legiones I - III Parthicae* was carried out, probably in Italy, before 197 CE by Septimius Severus for his expedition against the Parthian empire. After the successful expedition, he stationed the first and third legions in the new province of Mesopotamia and returned to Rome with the second legion which was now based at Castra Albana.⁴⁶ During the first half of the third century, this second legion wintered at Apamea in Syria whenever it had to participate in the Persian wars.⁴⁷ Lastly, the *legio IV Italica* was raised by Severus Alexander in Italy in 231. He led this legion to fight against the Sassanids and then dispatched it to Maximinus' expeditionary forces in Germany. It was most likely based in Mesopotamia until the mid-250s.⁴⁸

To sum up, the *legio III Gallica*, *VI Ferrata* and *XII Fulminata* had been stationed in the East since the Second Triumvirate, and so served there for the longest

⁴² Suetonius, *Vespasian*. 8.2; Tacitus, *Histories* 2.81; Cassius Dio 55.24.3.

⁴³ *AE* 1938 927; Millar 1993: 80-9.

⁴⁴ *Augustan History* (Hadrian) 12.4; (Marcus Aurelius) 11.7.

⁴⁵ Cassius Dio 55.24.3; Mann 1963: 483, 485; 1983: 54-5, 63; Bennett 1997: 99; Isaac and Roll 1998b: 198-210.

⁴⁶ *CIL* 6.32540; Cassius Dio 55.24.4; Mann 1963: 484, 486; Birley 1969: 67; Birley 1999: 107, 132.

⁴⁷ Balty and van Rengen 1993.

⁴⁸ *CIL* 10.3856 (= *ILS* 1172); Herodian 6.3.1; *Augustan History* (Maximus and Balbinus) 5.5; Mann 1963: 484; 1999: 288.

period. The *legio III Cyrenaica* and *XXII Deiotariana* were deployed in Egypt, and the *legio X Fretensis* was transferred to Syria directly after the Augustan reform. The *legio IV Scythica* was permanently stationed in Syria after it had been redeployed to the East at the end of the Neronian period due to the Corbulo's Armenian war. The *legio XV Apollinaris*, which had had its camp at Carnuntum, also participated in Corbulo's campaign and stayed in Cappadocia and Egypt for almost ten years. It was permanently redeployed to the East in the reign of Trajan. The *legio XVI Flavia Firma* and *II Traiana Fortis* were stationed in the East from when they were created by Vespasian and by Trajan respectively. The *legiones I* and *III Parthicae*, and *IV Italica* were garrisoned in Mesopotamia from the Severan period. During the Principate, the number of legions stationed in the eastern provinces doubled from six to twelve, which indicates a percentage increase from 21% to 36% of the total imperial legions (see Table 1).

2.2.2: The auxiliary units

Table 2: The known auxiliary units in the eastern provinces⁴⁹

<i>Ala</i>	Aug.-Gaius 27BCE-41CE	Claud.-Nero 41 - 68	Flavians 69 - 96	Trajan 98 - 117	Hadrian 117 - 138	Antonines 138 - 193	Severans 193 - 235
<i>Apriana Provincialis</i>	Gallia Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>Augusta</i>	Gallia Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>Augusta Germanicana</i>	? Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia Syria	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Augusta Gemina Colonorum</i>	Galatia	Galatia	Galatia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Augusta Thracum</i>	Thracia Syria	Syria	Syria	Raetia	Raetia	Noricum	Noricum
<i>III Augusta Thracum</i>	Thracia Syria	Syria	Syria	Pannonia Sup.	Pannonia Sup.	Pannonia Sup.	Pannonia Sup.
<i>I Bosporanorum</i>	Bosporus Syria	Syria	Syria	Cappadocia Pannonia Sup.	Pannonia Sup.	Dacia Sup.	Dacia Sup.
<i>Gallorum et Thracum Antiana sag.</i>	Gallia⁵⁰ Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>Gallorum et Thracum Constantium</i>	Gallia Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>II Pannoniorum Veterana</i>	Pannonia Syria	Syria	Syria	Moesia Sup. Dacia	Dacia	Dacia	Dacia
<i>Pia Gemina</i>	Judaea	Judaea	Judaea	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis

⁴⁹ Based on Spaul 1994 and 2000; Holder 2003: 113-8, 120-45; Speidel 2009: 607-20; Eck 2014b: 238-46.

⁵⁰ The places where the units were first raised and deployed in the East are designated in bold type.

<i>Sebastena</i>							
<i>Veterana Gallica</i>	Gallia Syria	Syria	Syria	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>Vocontiorum</i>	Gallia Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt Syria	Syria
<i>VII Phrygum</i>	-	Galatia Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria-Palaestina	Syria-Palaestina
<i>I Flavia Gaetulorum</i> ⁵¹	Africa ?	?	Judaea	Arabia Moesia Inf.	Pannonia Inf.	Dacia	?
<i>II Flavia Agrippiana</i>	? Germania	Germania Sup.	Syria Britannia	Britannia Egypt	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>II Flavia Pia Fidelis mil.</i>	-	-	? Germania Syria	Raetia	Raetia	Raetia	Raetia
<i>I Commagenorum</i>	-	-	Commagene Egypt	Noricum	Noricum	Noricum	Noricum
<i>Thracum Herculana</i>	Thracia Macedonia	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia Syria	Arabia Egypt	Egypt
<i>I Thracum Mauretana</i>	Thracia Macedonia	Caesariensis	Judaea	Judaea	Judaea	Egypt	Egypt
<i>II Claudia Gallorum</i>	Gallia Hispania	?	Moesia Inf.	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Ulpia Dacorum</i>	-	-	-	Dacia Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Ulpia Dromedariorum mil.</i>	-	-	-	Arabia ? Syria	Syria	Arabia	Arabia?
<i>I Ulpia Singularium</i>	-	-	-	? Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>II Ulpia Auriana</i>	-	-	-	Raetia? Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Flavia Augusta Britannica mil.civ. Rom.</i>	? Germania	Britannia	Dalmatia Pannonia	Dacia	Pannonia Sup.	Pannonia Sup.	Syria
<i>I Flavia civ. Rom.</i>	-	-	Italia Pannonia Inf.	Dacia	Dacia	Dacia Pannonia Inf.	Syria
<i>I praetoria sig. civ. Rom.</i>	Italia?	Germania Inf.	Pannonia Inf.	Moesia Sup.	Moesia Sup.	Pannonia Inf.	Cappadocia
<i>Alae in the East / the Empire</i>	13 / 49 (27%)	14 / 62 (23%)	20 (1) / 75 (5)⁵² (27%)	19 (1) / 85 (7) (22%)	17-21 (1) / 88 (7)⁵³ (19-24%)	15-17 (1) / 80 (7)⁵⁴ (19-21%)	20 (2) / 80 (8) (25%)

<i>Cohors</i>	Aug.-Gaius 27BCE-41CE	Claud.-Nero 41-68	Flavians 69 - 96	Trajan 98 - 117	Hadrian 117 - 138	Antonines 138 - 193	Severans 193 - 235
<i>Apula civ. Rom.</i>	Italia Asia	Lycia-Pamphylia	Lycia-Pamphylia	Lycia-Pamphylia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Augusta civ. Rom.</i>	Galatia	Judaea	Judaea Cappadocia	Cappadocia	?	?	?
<i>I Augusta Thracum equi. civ. Rom.</i>	Thracia Syria	Judaea	Judaea	Arabia	Arabia	Pannonia Inf. Syria	Syria
<i>I Bosporanorum mil. equi. sag.</i>	Bosporus Galatia	Galatia Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Damascenarum equi.</i>	Syria	?	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Syria-Palaestina	Syria-Palaestina
<i>Facundi</i>	? Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Flori</i>	? Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>II Ituraeorum equi.</i>	Judaea Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>Nigri</i>	? Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>I Thebaeorum equi.</i>	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Judaea Arabia	Arabia	?	?
<i>II Thebaeorum</i>	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	-
<i>III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. equi.</i>	Cyrenaica	Moesia Syria	Syria	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Classica sag.</i>	-	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>I Hispanorum</i>	Hispania	Galatia	Galatia	Galatia	Judaea	-	-

⁵¹ This unit may be identical with *I Veterana Gaetulorum*. See Cotton and Isaac 2003: 19-26.

⁵² The number of total auxiliary units (the number of *milliaria*).

⁵³ Holder 2003: 145 (Table 18).

⁵⁴ Spaul 1994: 265-6; 2000: 526.

<i>equi.</i>			Egypt	Judaea			
<i>I Italica mil. vol. equi. civ. Rom.</i>	-	Italia Syria	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	?	?
<i>II Italica civ. Rom.</i>	-	Italia Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>I Apamenorum sag. equi.</i>	Syria Cyrenaica	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>I Ascalonitarum sag. equi.</i>	-	-	Judaea Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>I Augusta Pannoniorum equi.</i>	Pannonia	?	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria Egypt Syria	Syria
<i>I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum equi.</i>	Hispania- Lusitania	?	Judaea	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>III Augusta Thracum equi.</i>	Thracia	?	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>III Bracaraugustanorum</i> ⁵⁵	-	-	Hispania- Tarraconensis Britannia Judaea	Judaea	Judaea	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>IV Bracaraugustanorum</i>	-	Hispania- Tarraconensis	Syria	Syria	Judaea	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>II Cantabrorum</i>	-	Hispania- Tarraconensis	Judaea	-	-	-	-
<i>I Flavia Chalcidenorum equi. sag.</i>	-	-	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>I Flavia Cilicium equi.</i>	-	-	Cilicia Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>I Flavia civ. Rom. equi.</i>	Italia	?	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>I Gaetulorum</i>	-	Mauretania- Tingitana	Syria	Syria	?	?	?
<i>II Hispanorum equi. civ. Rom.</i>	Hispania	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia Syria
<i>I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag.</i>	-	-	Judaea Syria	Cappadocia Dacia	Dacia Inf. Cappadocia	Cappadocia	?
<i>III Ituraeorum</i>	-	-	Judaea Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>I Lucensium equi.</i>	Hispania- Tarraconensis	Dalmatia Pannonia	Pannonia Syria	Germania Inf.	Germania Inf.	?	?
<i>IV Lucensium equi.</i>	Hispania- Tarraconensis	?	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	-
<i>I Musulamiorum equi.</i>	-	Mauretania- Caesariensis	Syria	Mauretania- Caesariensis	Lycia- Pamphylia	Lycia- Pamphylia	-
<i>I Numidarum equi. sag.</i>	Africa	?	Syria Cappadocia	?	Cappadocia	?	?
<i>I Pannoniorum equi.</i>	-	Pannonia	Egypt	Egypt Mauretania- Caesariensis	Egypt	Egypt	Mauretania- Caesariensis
<i>I Raetorum equi.</i>	-	Raetia	Syria Moesia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Asia Phrygia	Raetia?
<i>I Sebastena mil.</i>	-	-	Judaea Syria	Syria	Judaea	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>III Syrorum sag.</i>			Syria Cappadocia	Cappadocia	?	?	?
<i>I Thracum mil. equi.</i>	-	Thracia	Judaea Syria	Arabia	Judaea	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>II Thracum civ. Rom.</i>	-	Thracia	Judaea Syria	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>II Thracum Syriaca</i>	-	Thracia	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>III Thracum Syriaca</i>	-	Thracia	Syria	?	Cappadocia	?	?
<i>IV Thracum Syriaca</i>	-	Thracia	Syria	?	Moesia Inf.	-	-
<i>I Augusta Cyrenaica equi.</i>	Cyrenaica	?	?	Galatia	Galatia	?	?
<i>II Augusta Thracum</i>	Thracia	?	?	Cappadocia	Pannonia Inf.	Pannonia Inf.	Pannonia Inf.
<i>I Claudia equi.</i>		?	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>II Claudia</i>		?	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>II Hemesenorum equi.</i>	-	-	-	Syria Arabia	?	?	?
<i>VI Hispanorum equi. Praetoria</i>	Hispania	?	?	Bithynia- Pontus	?	?	Arabia
<i>I Italica mil.</i>	-	-	Italia?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	?	?
<i>I Ulpia Dacorum</i>	-	-	-	Dacia	Syria	Syria	Syria

⁵⁵ This unit is identical with *III Callaecorum Bracaraugustanorum*. See Cotton and Isaac 2003: 19-26.

<i>I Ulpia Galatarum</i>	-	-	-	Syria Galatia Syria	Cappadocia	Syria-Palaestina	Italia
<i>II Ulpia Galatarum</i>	-	-	-	Galatia Syria	Syria	Syria-Palaestina	Syria-Palaestina
<i>I Ulpia Paphlagonum</i>	-	-	-	Bithynia-Pontus Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>II Ulpia Paphlagonum equi.</i>	-	-	-	Bithynia-Pontus Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>III Ulpia Paphlagonum equi.</i>	-	-	-	Bithynia-Pontus Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi.</i>	-	-	-	Arabia	?	Syria	Syria
<i>II Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi.</i>	-	-	-	Arabia	?	?	?
<i>III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. sag.</i>	-	-	-	Arabia Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>IV Ulpia Petraeorum</i>	-	-	-	Arabia	Judaea	Syria-Palaestina	Syria-Palaestina
<i>V Ulpia Petraeorum</i>	-	-	-	Arabia	?	Syria	Syria
<i>VI Ulpia Petraeorum</i>	-	-	-	Arabia	Judaea	Syria-Palaestina	Syria-Palaestina
<i>VII Gallorum</i>	Gallia	?	Moesia Inf.	Moesia Inf.	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>V Gemella civ. Rom.</i>	-	-	-	?	Judaea	Syria-Palaestina	Syria-Palaestina
<i>I Germanorum mil. equi.</i>	-	-	?	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Lepidiana equi. civ. Rom.</i>		?	Pannonia	Moesia Inf.	Moesia Inf. Cappadocia	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Montanorum civ. Rom.</i>	Noricum Dalmatia	Moesia	Pannonia Moesia Sup.	Dacia	Judaea	Syria-Palaestina Moesia Sup.	Moesia Sup.
<i>IV Raetorum equi.</i>	-	Raetia	Moesia Sup.	Moesia Sup.	Cappadocia	Cappadocia	?
<i>I Ulpia Afrorum equi. civ. Rom.</i>	-	Africa	Britannia	Britannia	Britannia Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>Aurelia civ. Rom.</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>VI Brittonum equi.</i>	-	-	Britannia	Germania Inf.	?	Cappadocia	Cappadocia
<i>I Claudia Sugamborum</i>	Germania?	?	Moesia	Moesia Inf.	Moesia Inf.	Syria	Syria
<i>I Flavia Numidarum equi.</i>	Africa	?	?	?	?	Moesia Inf. Lycia-Pamphylia	Egypt
<i>IX Maurorum mil.</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Mauretania-Caesariensis Arabia	Arabia
<i>mil. equi. civ. Rom.</i>	-	-	-	-	?	Cappadocia Armenia	Cappadocia
<i>XX Palmyrenorum mil. equi. sag.</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Syria	Syria
<i>II Ulpia Equitata civ. Rom. sag.</i>	-	-	-	?	?	Syria	Syria
<i>V Afrorum</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Africa Arabia
<i>Cohortes in the East / the Empire</i>	11 / c. 200 (5.5%)	13-16	41-44 (5)	57-61 (9)	63-67 (10) / 279 (29)⁵⁶ (23-24%)	70-75 (13) / 247 (30)⁵⁷ (28-30%)	64-72 (13)

The Augustan reform also changed the auxiliary system. The auxiliary units began to be transformed from supplementary contingents to professional standing units. In the Republic, the Romans used to reinforce their army with auxiliary troops from

⁵⁶ Holder 2003: 145 (Table 18)

⁵⁷ Spaul 2000: 526.

their allies. During the civil war, Caesar and Pompey relied primarily on auxiliary units for their cavalry forces. These units had regular pay and, probably from the reign of Claudius, could expect citizenship and other privileges after at least twenty-five years of mandatory service.⁵⁸ It is hard to trace the formation of auxiliary units from the late Republic to the Julio-Claudian period because most ancient authors minimised the importance of those units. Reliable epigraphic evidence of the imperial auxiliary units begins to appear on tombstones of the mid-first century when *diplomata* attesting grant of citizenship also began to appear.⁵⁹

For the organisation of auxiliary units, most scholars still rely on the treatise attributed to Hyginus, *the Formation of the Roman Camp*, which is probably dated to the late second century.⁶⁰ The structure of auxiliary units basically mirrored that of the legions. There were three types of units: *cohors peditata*, *cohors equitata* and *ala*. A *cohors peditata* consisted of six *centuriae* of eighty infantrymen each. A *cohors equitata* was divided into six *centuriae* of infantrymen, the same as *cohors peditata*, and four *turmae* of thirty cavalrymen each. A *turma* of an *ala* had thirty-two mounted men, and sixteen *turmae* composed an *ala*. Thus the paper strength of each type of unit was 480, 600, and 512 men respectively. Later, from the reign of Nero or Vespasian on, roughly double-strength units called *milliaria* began to appear, and the existing units were called *quingenaria* to differentiate them from *milliaria*. A *cohors peditata milliaria* was composed of ten *centuriae*, a *cohors equitata milliaria* had ten *centuriae* and eight *turmae* of thirty cavalrymen each, and an *ala milliaria* consisted of twenty-four *turmae* of thirty-two. The paper strengths of these *milliariae* units were 800, 1,040, and 768

⁵⁸ Cheesman 1914: 7-20; Saddington 1982: 1-26.

⁵⁹ *CIL* 16.2 is the earliest known diploma which was issued in 54 CE.

⁶⁰ Hyginus, *Fortification of the Roman Camp* 1, 16, 26-8.

men respectively.⁶¹

The titles of auxiliary units are the pivotal evidence in tracing their origins. Through the titles we can identify when they were formed, where they were recruited from or where they were stationed, what sizes and to which branches they belonged. For instance, the title of the *cohors I Ulpia Petraeorum milliaria equitata* reveals that this unit was a part-mounted regiment of around 1,040 men raised from Petra in the reign of Trajan. But it is rare to know titles in full because inscriptions normally abbreviate titles. There were some auxiliary units named after their first commanders in the reign of Augustus and Tiberius, such as *ala Aetorigiana* named after Aetorix. Some units had titles with two different tribal names or two different ethnic names, such as *cohortes Asturum et Callaecorum*, *alae Gallorum et Thraecum*. The former were levied from the neighbouring tribes, and the latter were amalgamated units of Gallic and Thracian cavalry regiments.⁶²

It is possible to identify which auxiliary units have been stationed in the eastern provinces through their veterans' *diplomata* and gravestones, while it is not easy to establish the exact time when these units were formed and were deployed to the East. As was the case with the legions, most auxiliary units were created and were relocated for military campaigns or to defend newly acquired territories. We can see the main military events that occurred in the East in Table 1 (and note 24). Paradoxically, the creation of auxiliary units from recently conquered regions could contribute to diluting rebellious groups there.⁶³ We have evidence for only twenty-eight *alae* and seventy-nine *cohortes* employed in the eastern provinces, but it is apparent that a greater number

⁶¹ Josephus, *Jewish War* 3.67; Cheesman 1914: 21-56; Holder 1980: 5-9; Gilliver 2007: 193-4.

⁶² Cheesman 1914: 45-9; Holder 1980: 14-27.

⁶³ Haynes 2013: 120, 134.

of auxiliary units served there.⁶⁴

The number of units continuously increased from the first to third century. We can see in Table 2 a remarkable increase between the reign of Nero and that of Vespasian. This increment proves the fact that most of the auxiliary units which had been raised and redeployed for the Corbulo's Armenian war and the first Jewish war remained in the eastern provinces after the campaigns. After Vespasian, while the number of attested *alae* remained around twenty, the number of *cohortes* increased steadily, which means more and more *cohortes* were required and formed to fight against the Arsacid - Sassanid empire. Almost half of the *cohortes* were *cohortes equitatae*, presumably formed in order to match the Parthian and Sassanian cavalymen. It is hard to identify how many auxiliary units were still active in the late third century, but it is likely to have been almost the same or a greater number since we can find the existence of new units such as Palmyrene archers in Egypt. During the Principate, while the percentage of the *alae* in the eastern provinces fluctuated between 20% and 27% of the total *alae* of the empire, the percentage of the *cohortes* increased steadily from 5.5% to 30% of the total.

2.2.3: The fleets

Table 3: The fleets in the eastern provinces

<i>Classis</i>	Aug.-Gaius 27BCE- 41CE	Claud.-Nero 41 - 68	Flavians 69 - 96	Trajan 98 - 117	Hadrian 117 - 138	Antonines 138 - 193	Severans 193 - 235
<i>Alexandrina</i>	Alexandria	Alexandria	Alexandria	Alexandria	Alexandria	Alexandria	Alexandria
<i>Pontica</i>	-	Trapezus	Byzantium	Trapezus	Trapezus	Cyzicus	Trapezus
<i>Syriaca</i>	-	-	Seleucia- Pieria	Seleucia- Pieria	Seleucia- Pieria	Seleucia- Pieria	Seleucia- Pieria
Total classes	1 / 3⁶⁵	2 / 8⁶⁶	3 / 9⁶⁷	3 / 9	3 / 9	3 / 9	3 / 9

⁶⁴ Tacitus (*Annals* 4.5) says that the number of auxiliaries in service was almost the same with that of legionaries.

⁶⁵ *Classis Misenensis, Ravennatis and Alexandriana*

⁶⁶ *Classis Misenensis, Ravennatis, Britannica, Germanica, Pannonica, Moesica, Alexandriana and Pontica.*

in the East / the Empire	(33%)	(25%)	(33%)	(33%)	(33%)	(33%)	(33%)
-----------------------------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

In the late Republic the Mediterranean Sea already had become *mare Romanum*. After the end of the civil wars in 30 BCE, Roman fleets no longer had to fight large-scale naval battles, but were used to carry troops and to protect official and other shipping from sporadic piracy. Like the legions and the auxiliary units, the fleets became permanent. There were two main fleets in the reign of Augustus. The western sea and the eastern sea of Italy were the responsibilities of the *classis Misenensis* at Misenum and *classis Ravennatis* at Ravenna respectively. Each fleet was commanded by a prefect of equestrian rank or an imperial freedman. Under the prefect, there were navarchs, trierarchs, and centurions in order of rank. A navarch commanded a squadron, a trierarch was responsible for a battleship, and centurions commanded the marines on a ship. The strength of each squadron varied according to the size of the ships employed. Members of the fleet were recruited from provincials and, like auxiliaries, were granted citizenship after twenty-five years of service.⁶⁸

In the East, most imperial fleets originated from those of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The *classis Alexandrina* stationed at Alexandria had its origin in the fleets of Antony and Cleopatra. The earliest evidence for it is in Philo's work from the reign of Gaius, and then in an inscription of some rowers discharged in 86.⁶⁹ This fleet was responsible for escorting the grain convoys from Egypt to Italy, and policing the coast of North Africa and the Nile. The *classis Pontica* was stationed at Trapezus. This fleet seems to have existed from the reign of Augustus, but it was reformed by Nero when he amalgamated the kingdom of Pontus with the province of Bithynia. There was also the

⁶⁷ *Classis Misenensis, Ravennatis, Britannica, Germanica, Pannonica, Moesica, Alexandriana, Pontica* and *Syraica*.

⁶⁸ Saddington 2007: 208-15; Pitassi 2009: 201-16;

⁶⁹ Philo, *Flaccus* 163; *CIL* 16.32.

classis Syriaca stationed at Seleucia Pieria. This fleet seems to have been created before Domitian's reign because a *diploma* attests a rower discharged in 119, but its origin is obscure.⁷⁰ During the Principate, the number of eastern *classes* maintained roughly a third of the total *classes* of the empire.

2.2.4: The size of demand for military recruits

Table 4: Estimated annual demand for legionaries in the eastern provinces

	I (Aug. to Flavians)	II (Trajan to Antonines)	III (Severans and after)
Number of legions	6 → 8	9 → 10	12
Number of legionaries	30,000 → 40,000	45,000 → 50,000	60,000
Averaged annual discharge	720 → 960	1,080 → 1,200	1,440
Averaged annual recruitment	1,680 → 2,240	2,520 → 2,800	3,360

The number of eastern legions increased steadily from six to twelve during the period from Augustus to Severus Alexander, which represents an increase from 21% to 36% of the total number of legions in the empire (see Table 1). More legions required more replacements. Scheidel estimates that each legion of 5,000 soldiers discharged 120 veterans per year but required 280 recruits to make up the number of soldiers who died in action or from natural causes before discharge.⁷¹ Thus we can infer that the average number of annual recruits needed, in theory, for the eastern legions also increased from 1,680 to 3,360. This figure had never exceeded 26% of the available number of annual citizen-recruits aged 20 in the empire. The number of these potential recruits had increased from 8,550 under Augustus to 19,950, assuming 14 million Roman citizens under Marcus Aurelius, but after the outbreak of the plague probably dropped to below

⁷⁰ Saddington 1991:397-9; 2001: 581-6; 2007: 215.

⁷¹ Scheidel 1996: 120-2, Table 3.14. On the other hand, Alston (1995: 44-8, and Table 3.3) suggests 150 veterans and 250 recruits per year. However, Alston and Scheidel estimate those numbers with the same sources what Gilliam (1986a: 237) has used: *CIL* 3.6178, *AE* 1955 238, *CIL* 3.8110, *CIL* 8.18067, *CIL* 3.6580, *CIL* 3.14507, *CIL* 8.18068.

9,500, and then trebled to 28,500 as a result of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* in 212.⁷² In the East, under Julio-Claudian period, there were far fewer communities with Roman (or Latin) citizenship than in the West, so the recruitment pool was in theory much smaller, that is if the criterion of prior Roman citizenship was respected.

**Table 5: Estimated annual demand for auxiliaries and sailors
in the eastern provinces**

	I (Aug. - Flavians)	II (Trajan - Antonines)	III (Severans and after)
Number of auxiliary units	24 → 64 (6 mil.)	80(10 mil.) → 92(14 mil.)	92 (15 mil.)
Number of fleets	1 → 3	3	3
Number of auxiliaries	12,000 → 35,000	45,000 → 53,000	53,500
Number of sailors	5,000 → 15,000	15,000	15,000
Averaged annual discharge	288 → 840 120 → 360	1,080 → 1,272 360	1,284 360
Averaged annual recruitment	672 → 1,960 120 → 360	2,520 → 2,968 360	2,996 360

Assuming an average strength for *cohortes* of 500 men, it is also possible to estimate the minimum annual demand for recruits to auxiliary units in the East. A standard *cohors* probably discharged 12 veterans and recruited 28 soldiers per year, while a *milliaria* discharged 24 veterans and required 56 recruits. The number of annual demand for auxiliary recruits increased from 672 under Augustus to 2,996 under the Severan emperors, which is almost 90% of the demand for legionary recruits of 3,360. In contrast to legionary recruitment, it was not difficult to find recruits qualified to serve in auxiliary units, because there was no requirement to be a Roman citizen. After the *Constitutio Antoniniana* in 212, all free-born provincials were Roman citizens anyway, so there was now no distinction, even in theory, between legionary and auxiliary

⁷² Scheidel 1996: 95, note 18. He estimates that the percentage of available citizen-recruits aged 20 was about 0.1425% (0.95% x 15%) of the total Roman citizens in the empire, and that before the *Constitutio Antoniniana* the number of citizens has been recovered to a third of 20 million. For the plague under Marcus Aurelius, see Gilliam (1986a: 227-53), although he doubts and minimises its negative impact on the imperial army.

recruitment.

There is no evidence concerning the strength of the eastern fleets. We can only consider the hypothetical number of men in the Italian fleets, which is estimated by Starr. He presumes the strength of the *classes Misenensis* and *Ravennatis* to have been more than 10,000 and 5,000 men because of Tacitus' record that two legions and one legion were formed from the sailors of the Misenum fleet and the Ravenna fleet respectively during the civil war of 68-69.⁷³ If we estimate that the number of sailors serving in the eastern fleets was around 5,000, we can expect 360 veterans to have been discharged annually from the three fleets, because their term of service was the same as that of auxiliaries. The number of annual replacements recruited to these fleets was probably not far different from the figure of the veterans, because they rarely died in a battle. When this figure is added to the annual demand for auxiliaries, it becomes possible to estimate the annual demand of provincials to serve in auxiliary units and fleets in the East, which increased from 792 to 3,356 during the period from Augustus to Severus Alexander.

Table 6: Estimated size of population and armed forces in the eastern provinces⁷⁴

	14 CE	East	164	East	212	East
Population	45,500,000	20,400,000	61,400,000	23,100,000	55,200,000	?
Citizens	6,000,000	?	14,000,000	?	20,000,000	?
Soldiers ⁷⁵	270,000	47,000	385,700	118,000	c. 407,500	128,500
Available	8,550		19,950		28,500	

⁷³ Tacitus, *Histories* 1.6; 3.50, 55; Starr 1960: 16-7. The *legio I Adiutrix* and Vitellius' temporary legion were raised from *classis Misenensis*, and the *legio II Adiutrix* was created from *classis Ravennas*.

⁷⁴ For detailed information and discussions about the sizes of population and military force, see Scheidel 1996: 93-7, note 18; 2001: 49-72, note 257; Frier 2000: 811-6, Table 5 and 6.

⁷⁵ 14 CE: 25 legions + 9 praetorian cohorts (5,000) + 250 auxiliary units + 3 fleets; 164: 31 legions + 8,000 metropolitan troops + 327 (37 mil.) + 9 fleets; 212: 33 legions + 15,000 metropolitan troops + 327 (38 mil.) + 9 fleets. The estimated number of eastern soldiers that I have calculated can be regarded as its minimum strength because there is a possibility that a greater number of *vexillationes* and *auxilia* served there and so demanded more recruits.

citizen-recruits per year						
Annual demand	7,280+7,360 =14,640	1,680+792 = 2,472	9,728 ⁷⁶ +11,272 = 21,000	2,800+3,328 = 6,128	10,080+11,300 = 21,380	3,360+3,356 = 6,716

When Augustus died in 14 CE, he left an armed force of some 270,000 soldiers to Tiberius, which was about 0.6% of an estimated total population of the empire at the time. In the mid-second and early third century, the empire maintained its military strength at around 385,700 to 407,500 troops which comprised 0.6-0.7% of an estimated total imperial inhabitants.⁷⁷ The percentage of armed forces employed in the eastern provinces increased from 17.4% to 31.5% of the total military strength during the Principate.

We can see from Table 6 that in the reign of Augustus the number of annually available male citizens in their twenties did not meet the annual demand for recruits, and would have barely filled up the legionary and Praetorian units. Thus the recruitment of *peregrini* must have been necessary for the East. From the mid-second century, however, the number of available young male citizen exceeded the annual demand for recruits, which was probably because of the extension of citizenship during the first century, and the Hadrian's subsequent policy of elevating many *municipia* to colonies and of founding new colonies, especially in the eastern provinces. There would have been no problem in recruiting soldiers, although a number of citizens tried to be exempted from military service, to find substitutes for it, or to commute it for cash payment. More importantly, this means that it was no longer necessary to use forcible

⁷⁶ Jacques and Scheid (1992: 141) estimates that in the second century the annual demand for legionary recruits was 9,000-14,000 men.

⁷⁷ The figure I use is around a quarter of the military strength of the European Union in 2012: <http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/EDA/year/2012>. However, the EU troops comprise only 0.3% of the overall European population. We must consider the fact that the advances in weapon technology of modern warfare have rendered the number of military forces much less important than it was in antiquity.

conscription of provincials except in an emergency. But the plague under Marcus Aurelius reduced the number of the available young male citizens to below 9,500, which was even lower than the annual demand for the legionary and Praetorian recruits of 9,728. The emperor allegedly had to recruit even gladiators, bandits and slaves to make up the demand.⁷⁸ The size of Roman armed forces on the eastern frontier was now particularly important because of hostilities with the Parthians, which were becoming more frequent. At the time, Caracalla's edict giving citizenship to all free men in the empire was an inevitable choice to solve this problem.

⁷⁸ *Augustan History* (Marcus Aurelius) 21.6-7.

Table 7: The Roman armed forces in the eastern provinces⁷⁹

Province	Augustus-Gaius 27BCE - 41CE	Claudius-Nero 41-68	Flavians 69 - 96	Trajan 98 - 117	Hadrian 117 - 138	Antonines 138 - 193	Severans 193 - 235
Asia	VII CLAUDIA	V MACEDONICA	XII FULMINATA XVI FLAVIA FIRMA	XII FULMINATA XVI FLAVIA FIRMA	XII FULMINATA XV APOLLINARIS IX Hispana?	XII FULMINATA XV APOLLINARIS IX Hispana?	XII FULMINATA XV APOLLINARIS I - III PARTHICAE IV ITALICA
Minor	Augusta Germaniciana I Augusta Gemina Col.	Augusta Germaniciana I Augusta Gemina Col.	Augusta Germaniciana I Augusta Gemina Col. Thracum Herculana	Augusta Germaniciana I Augusta Gemina Col. I Bosporanorum Thracum Herculana	Augusta Germaniciana I Augusta Gemina Col. Thracum Herculana	Augusta Germaniciana I Augusta Gemina Col. II Claudia Gallorum I Ulpia Dacorum II Ulpia Auriana	Augusta Germaniciana I Augusta Gemina Col. II Claudia Gallorum I Ulpia Dacorum II Ulpia Auriana I praetoria sig. civ. Rom.
Cappadocia	Apula civ. Rom. I Augusta civ. Rom. I Bosporanorum sag.	Apula civ. Rom. I Bosporanorum sag. I Hispanorum equi.	Apula civ. Rom. I Augusta civ. Rom. I Bosporanorum mil. equi. sag.	Apula civ. Rom. I Augusta civ. Rom. I Bosporanorum mil. equi. sag.	Apula civ. Rom. I Bosporanorum mil. equi. sag.	Apula civ. Rom. I Bosporanorum mil. equi. sag.	Apula civ. Rom. I Bosporanorum mil. equi. sag.
Mesopotamia	<i>1 Legio, 2 Alae, 3 Cohortes</i>	Classis Pontica <i>1 Legio, 2 Alae, 3 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	I Hispanorum equi. I Italica mil. vol. equi. civ. Rom. I Apamenorum sag. equi. II Hispanorum equi. civ. Rom. I Numidarum equi. sag. III Syrorum sag. Classis Pontica <i>2 Legiones, 3 Alae, 9 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	I Damascenarum equi. III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. equi. I Hispanorum equi. I Italica mil. vol. equi. civ. Rom. I Apamenorum sag. equi. II Hispanorum equi. civ. Rom. I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. I Raetorum equi. III Syrorum sag. I Augusta Cyrenaica equi. II Augusta Thracum I Claudia equi. II Claudia VI Hispanorum equi. Praetoria I Italica mil. I Ulpia Paphlagonum	III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. equi. I Italica mil. vol. equi. civ. Rom. II Hispanorum equi. civ. Rom. I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. I Musulamiorum equi. I Numidarum equi. sag. I Raetorum equi. III Thracum Syriaca I Augusta Cyrenaica equi. I Claudia equi. II Claudia I Italica mil. I Ulpia Galatorum I Ulpia Paphlagonum III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. sag. I Germanorum mil. equi.	III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. equi. II Hispanorum equi. civ. Rom. I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. I Musulamiorum equi. I Raetorum equi. I Claudia equi. II Claudia I Ulpia Paphlagonum III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. sag. I Germanorum mil. equi. I Lepidiana mil. equi. IV Raetorum equi. Aurelia civ. Rom. VI Brittonum equi. I Flavia Numidarum equi. Mil. equi. civ. Rom. Classis Pontica	III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. equi. II Hispanorum equi. civ. Rom. I Claudia equi. II Claudia I Ulpia Paphlagonum III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. sag. I Germanorum mil. equi. I Lepidiana mil. equi. VI Brittonum equi. I Flavia Numidarum equi. Mil. equi. civ. Rom. Classis Pontica <i>6 Legiones, 6 Alae, 14 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>

⁷⁹ Some units an emperor redeployed during his reign are repeated in this table. The point here is to know how many troops were employed in each province for each period.

				III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. sag. Classis Pontica <i>2 Legiones, 7 Alae, 20 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	I Lepidiana mil. equi. IV Raetorum equi. Classis Pontica <i>3 Legiones, 6 Alae, 21 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	<i>3 Legiones, 5 Alae, 18 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	
Syria	III GALLICA VI FERRATA XII FULMINATA X FRETENSIS I Augusta Thracum III Augusta Thracum I Bosporanorum Gallorum et Thracum Antiana Sag. Gallorum et Thracum Constantium II Pannoniorum Veterana Veterana Gallica I Augusta Thracum equi. civ. Rom. I Damascenarum equi. <i>4 Legiones, 7 Alae, 2 Cohortes</i>	III GALLICA VI FERRATA XII FULMINATA X FRETENSIS I Augusta Thracum III Augusta Thracum I Bosporanorum Gallorum et Thracum Antiana Sag. Gallorum et Thracum Constantium II Pannoniorum Veterana Veterana Gallica VII Phrygum III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. equi. II Classica sag. I Italica vol. equi. civ. Rom. II Italica civ. Rom. <i>4 Legiones, 8 Alae, 4 Cohortes</i>	III GALLICA VI FERRATA IV SCYTHICA I Augusta Thracum III Augusta Thracum I Bosporanorum Gallorum et Thracum Antiana Sag. Gallorum et Thracum Constantium II Pannoniorum Veterana Veterana Gallica VII Phrygum II Flavia Pia Fielis mil. III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. equi. II Classica sag. II Italica civ. Rom. I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. I Augusta Pannoniorum equi. III Augusta Thracum equi. IV Bracaraugustanorum equi. sag. I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. I Gaetulorum I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. I Lucensium equi. IV Lucensium equi. I Musulamiorum equi. I Numidarum equi. sag. I Raetorum equi. I Sebastena mil.	III GALLICA VI FERRATA IV SCYTHICA II TRAIANA FORTIS Gallorum et Thracum Antiana Sag. Gallorum et Thracum Constantium VII Phrygum I Ulpia Dromedariorum mil. I Ulpia Singularium II Classica sag. II Italica civ. Rom. I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. I Augusta Pannoniorum equi. III Augusta Thracum equi. IV Bracaraugustanorum equi. sag. I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. I Gaetulorum IV Lucensium equi. I Sebastena mil. II Thracum Syriaca I Ulpia Dacorum I Ulpia Galatarum II Ulpia Galatarum II Ulpia Paphlagonum equi. III Ulpia Paphlagonum equi.	III GALLICA IV SCYTHICA XVI FLAVIA FIRMA Augusta Germaniciana Gallorum et Thracum Antiana Sag. Gallorum et Thracum Constantium VII Phrygum II Flavia Agrippiana Thracum Herculana I Ulpia Dromedariorum mil. I Ulpia Singularium II Classica sag. II Italica civ. Rom. I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. I Augusta Pannoniorum equi. III Augusta Thracum equi. I Flavia Chalcidenorum equi. sag. IV Lucensium equi. II Thracum Syriaca I Ulpia Dacorum II Ulpia Paphlagonum equi. III Ulpia Paphlagonum equi. I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. V Ulpia Petraeorum VII Gallorum I Claudia Sugambrorum XX Palmyrenorum mil. equi. sag. II Ulpia Equitata civ. Rom. sag. Classis Syriaca	III GALLICA IV SCYTHICA XVI FLAVIA FIRMA Vocontiorum II Flavia Agrippiana I Ulpia Singularium I Augusta Thracum equi. civ. Rom. II Classica sag. II Italica civ. Rom. I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. I Augusta Pannoniorum equi. III Augusta Thracum equi. I Flavia Chalcidenorum equi. sag. IV Lucensium equi. II Thracum Syriaca I Ulpia Dacorum II Ulpia Paphlagonum equi. III Ulpia Paphlagonum equi. I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. V Ulpia Petraeorum VII Gallorum I Claudia Sugambrorum XX Palmyrenorum mil. equi. sag. II Ulpia Equitata civ. Rom. sag.	III GALLICA IV SCYTHICA XVI FLAVIA FIRMA Augusta Germaniciana I Ulpia Singularium II Flavia Agrippiana Vocontiorum II Ulpia Auriana I Flavia Augusta Britannica mil. civ. Rom. I Flavia civ. Rom. II Classica sag. II Italica civ. Rom. I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. I Flavia Chalcidenorum equi. sag. I Aug. Pannoniorum equi. III Aug. Thracum equi. II Thracum Syriaca I Ulpia Dacorum II Ulpia Paphlagonum equi. III Ulpia Paphlagonum equi. I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. VII Gallorum I Aug. Thracum equi. civ. Rom. V Ulpia Petraeorum XX Palmyrenorum mil. equi. sag. II Ulpia Equitata civ. Rom. sag.

			I Thracum mil. equi. II Thracum civ. Rom. II Thracum Syriaca III Thracum Syriaca IV Thracum Syriaca Classis Syriaca <i>3 Legiones, 9 Alae, 22 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	Classis Syriaca <i>4 Legiones, 5 Alae, 17 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	Classis Syriaca <i>3 Legiones, 8 Alae, 15 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	<i>3 Legiones, 3 Alae, 18 Cohortes, 1 Classis</i>	II Hispanorum equi. <i>3 Legiones, 7 Alae, 17 Cohortes</i>
Judaea Arabia	- Pia Gemina Sebastena - <i>1 Ala</i>	V MACEDONICA Pia Gemina Sebastena I Augusta civ. Rom. I Augusta Thracum equi. civ. Rom. <i>1 Legio, 1 Ala, 2 Cohortes</i>	X FRETENSIS Pia Gemina Sebastena I Flavia Gaetulorum I Thracum Mauretana I Augusta civ. Rom. I Augusta Thracum equi. civ. Rom. I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum equi. III Bracaraugustanorum II Cantabrorum I Thracum mil. equi. II Thracum civ. Rom. <i>1 Legio, 3 Alae, 7 Cohortes</i>	X FRETENSIS III CYRENAICA I Thracum Mauretana I Augusta Thracum equi. civ. Rom. I Theaeorum equi. I Hispanorum equi. III Bracaraugustanorum I Thracum mi. equi. II Hemesenorum equi. I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. II Ulpia Petraeorum mil. equi. IV Ulpia Petraeorum V Ulpia Petraeorum VI Ulpia Petraeorum <i>2 Legio, 1 Ala, 11 Cohortes</i>	X FRETENSIS III CYRENAICA VI FERRATA XXII DEIOTARIANA II TRAIANA FORTIS I Thracum Mauretana I Augusta Thracum equi. civ. Rom. I Theaeorum equi. I Hispanorum equi. III Bracaraugustanorum IV Bracaraugustanorum I Sebastena mil. I Thracum mi. equi. IV Ulpia Petraeorum VI Ulpia Petraeorum V Gemella civ. Rom. I Montanorum civ. Rom. <i>5 Legiones, 1 Ala, 11 Cohortes</i>	X FRETENSIS III CYRENAICA VI FERRATA Gallorum et Thracum Antiana sag. Gallorum et Thracum Constantium VII Phrycum Thracum Herculana I Ulpia Dromedariourm mil. I Damascenarum equi. III Bracaraugustanorum IV Bracaraugustanorum I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. I Sebastena mil. I Thracum mi. equi. VI Hispanorum equi. Praetoria II Ulpia Galatarum IV Ulpia Petraeorum VI Ulpia Petraeorum V Gemella civ. Rom. I Montanorum civ. Rom. IX Maurorum mil. <i>3 Legiones, 5 Alae, 13 Cohortes</i>	X FRETENSIS III CYRENAICA VI FERRATA Gallorum et Thracum Antiana sag. Gallorum et Thracum Constantium VII Phrycum I Ulpia Dromedariourm mil. I Damascenarum equi. III Bracaraugustanorum IV Bracaraugustanorum I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. I Sebastena mil. I Thracum mi. equi. VI Hispanorum equi. Praetoria II Ulpia Galatarum IV Ulpia Petraeorum VI Ulpia Petraeorum V Gemella civ. Rom. IX Maurorum mil. V Afrorum <i>3 Legiones, 3 Alae, 13 Cohortes</i>
Egypt	XII FULMINATA III CYRENAICA XXII DEIOTARIANA	III CYRENAICA XXII DEIOTARIANA Apriana Provincialis	III CYRENAICA XXII DEIOTARIANA Apriana Provincialis	XXII DEIOTARIANA XV APOLLINARIS Apriana Provincialis	XXII DEIOTARIANA II TRAIANA FORTIS Apriana Provincialis	II TRAIANA FORTIS Apriana Provincialis Augusta	II TRAIANA FORTIS Apriana Provincialis Augusta

<p>Apriana Provincialis Augusta Vocontiorum</p> <p>Facundi Flori II Ituraeorum equi. Nigri I Thebaeorum equi. II Thebaeorum</p> <p>Classis Alexandriana</p> <p>3 Legiones, 3 Alae, 6 Cohortes, 1 Classis⁸⁰</p>	<p>Augusta Vocontiorum</p> <p>II Ituraeorum equi. I Thebaeorum equi. II Thebaeorum</p> <p>Classis Alexandriana</p> <p>2 Legiones, 3 Alae, 3 Cohortes, 1 Classis</p>	<p>Augusta Vocontiorum I Commagenorum</p> <p>II Ituraeorum equi. I Thebaeorum equi. II Thebaeorum I Hispanorum equi. I Flavia Cilicum equi. III Ituraeorum I Pannoniorum equi.</p> <p>Classis Alexandriana</p> <p>2 Legiones, 4 Alae, 7 Cohortes, 1 Classis</p>	<p>Augusta Veterana Gallica Vocontiorum II Flavia Agrippiana</p> <p>II Ituraeorum equi. II Thebaeorum I Apamenorum sag. equi. I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum equi. I Flavia Cilicum equi. III Ituraeorum I Pannoniorum equi. II Thracum civ. Rom.</p> <p>Classis Alexandriana</p> <p>2 Legiones, 5 Alae, 8 Cohortes, 1 Classis</p>	<p>Augusta Veterana Gallica Vocontiorum</p> <p>II Ituraeorum equi. II Thebaeorum I Apamenorum sag. equi. I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum equi. I Flavia Cilicum equi. III Ituraeorum I Pannoniorum equi. II Thracum civ. Rom. I Ulpia Afrorum equi. civ. Rom.</p> <p>Classis Alexandriana</p> <p>2 Legiones, 4 Alae, 9 Cohortes, 1 Classis</p>	<p>Veterana Gallica Vocontiorum Thracum Herculana I Thracum Mauretana</p> <p>II Ituraeorum equi. II Thebaeorum I Apamenorum sag. equi. I Augusta Pannoniorum equi. I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum equi. I Flavia Cilicum equi. III Ituraeorum II Thracum civ. Rom. I Ulpia Afrorum equi. civ. Rom. I Flavia Numidarum</p> <p>Classis Alexandriana</p> <p>1 Legio, 6 Alae, 10 Cohortes, 1 Classis</p>	<p>Veterana Gallica Thracum Herculana I Thracum Mauretana</p> <p>II Ituraeorum equi. I Apamenorum sag. equi. I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum equi. I Flavia Cilicum equi. III Ituraeorum II Thracum civ. Rom. I Ulpia Afrorum equi. civ. Rom. I Flavia Numidarum</p> <p>Classis Alexandriana</p> <p>1 Legio, 5 Alae, 8 Cohortes, 1 Classis</p>
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⁸⁰ Strabo (17.1.12) reports that there were three legions, three *alae* and nine *cohortes* in the late first century BCE.

2.3: The views of previous scholars about the pattern of recruitment

The first detailed investigation of the pattern of recruitment was published by Mommsen in 1884.⁸¹ From epigraphic evidence he drew three broad conclusions. First, the legionaries were recruited mostly from the public provinces, while the auxiliaries were enlisted solely from the imperial provinces. Second, the legionaries began to depend on local recruitment from the reign of Hadrian onwards, as had auxiliary recruitment from the reign of Vespasian. Lastly, there were differences in recruiting patterns between the East and the West. These three points were taken as fundamental for discussions about the recruitment pattern until the advances made by Forni and Kraft in their respective studies of legionary and auxiliary recruitment.⁸² They adduced enough epigraphic evidence to support the claim that Roman soldiers were recruited from every province without any distinction between ‘imperial’ and ‘public’, and to suggest that the tendency to local recruitment was not a sudden result of an emperor’s decision, but a gradual process which developed through the first two centuries. However, the evidence they discussed came mostly from the western provinces, leaving it unclear whether their views could also be applied to the East.

Mann advanced Forni’s study, and tried to identify patterns in legionary recruitment and veteran settlement.⁸³ For example, he divided the recruitment sources of the legionaries stationed in Egypt into five groups: Italy and Gallia Narbonensis, Asia Minor and Syria, Egypt and Cyrenaica, *e castris* or sons of soldiers, and elsewhere. He also divided forms of veteran settlement into four types: returned to homes outside Egypt, settled privately in Egypt, settled in *canabae* in Egypt, and settled outside the province. According to his investigation, the number of veterans who settled in *canabae*

⁸¹ Mommsen 1884: 1-79, 210-34.

⁸² Forni 1953; Kraft 1951.

⁸³ Forni 1974: 339-91; Mann 1983.

constantly increased, and the origin of legionaries changed from the West, mainly Italy, and Asia Minor to Egypt and *e castris* over the first two centuries. In particular, recruitment *e castris* became predominant in the third century. This could support Webster's hypothesis that legionaries and veterans began to develop into a hereditary privileged class, the so-called 'caste model'.⁸⁴ In other words, the legionary soldiers and veterans came from a closed group separate from the civil life of the provincials. Contrary to this, Alston, who has also studied the recruitment of soldiers in Egypt, pointed out that a majority of legionaries were still recruited from Africa, Syria and Asia Minor in the second century despite the undoubted growth of recruitment *e castris*. Therefore he argued that the 'caste model' should be revised.⁸⁵

According to Fentress, the *legio III Augusta*, which was the only legion stationed in Numidia and Africa, mostly recruited replacements *e castris*, including some from the colonies formed in its previous camps. She argued that there was a close connection between the civilians and soldiers at both the upper and lower levels of the society, but little contact across the respective social levels.⁸⁶ She pointed out that military service and its rewards could only help people move up from being a landless labourer to a smallholder, rarely from a peasant to a decurion. Shaw, by contrast, argued that the soldiers formed an isolated military class and, even after discharge, they contributed only to their own communities without any wider interest in the local society.⁸⁷ Mócsy, who studied the soldiers serving in Pannonia and Upper Moesia, proposed a compromise argument about the interaction between soldiers and civilians. He admitted that the hereditary character of military service established a privileged military class in the frontier zone, but contended that it was neither an isolated nor an

⁸⁴ Webster 1969: 90.

⁸⁵ Alston 1995: 39-48.

⁸⁶ Fentress 1979: 150-59.

⁸⁷ Shaw 1995: 144-9.

independent group, separated from the local communities. While the upper ranks of the soldiers could transfer to the ruling class of civilians after discharge, the poorer civilians were able to improve their status by serving in the army. Thus he concluded that the army provided the link between the two levels of the population on the frontier.⁸⁸

Le Bohec focused on the question of local recruitment because it had been considered as a principal factor to the interaction between soldiers and civilians. On the base of understanding the 'localisation' as a trend of recruitment, decreasing 'foreigners' and increasing 'natives', he argued that the existing concept of local recruitment needs to be divided into regional recruitment and local recruitment.⁸⁹ The former he defined as provincial recruitment and the latter as recruitment *e castris*. He explained the pattern of legionary recruitment in the second and early third century as a steady evolution from regional to local recruitment. For auxiliaries, he noted that local recruitment, which had already begun in the reign of Tiberius, accounted for more than half of new enlistment from the Flavian period onwards, and that the ratio of citizen recruits increased continuously from the reign of Vespasian to c.170; thereafter, only a few *peregrini* became auxiliaries until the *Constitutio Antoniniana* issued by Caracalla.⁹⁰ He concluded that while the legionaries were recruiting from humbler backgrounds, the auxiliaries were generally recruiting more and more Roman citizens, and thus there was a gradual convergence in recruiting the two types of units.⁹¹

Le Bohec introduced various cases of the western provinces, mainly Spain (*VII Gemina*) and Africa (*III Augusta*), to explain the localising pattern of legionary recruitment, but all the eastern provinces except Egypt (*II Traina*) were not dealt in his study. In terms of the gradual tendency to localisation, according to Le Bohec, it seems

⁸⁸ Mócsy 1974: 157-8.

⁸⁹ Le Bohec 1994: 79-82.

⁹⁰ Le Bohec 1994: 98-9.

⁹¹ Le Bohec 1994: 93.

that there were not great differences in the pattern of legionary recruitment between Africa and Egypt. In both the number of recruits *e castris* to the legions, though not overwhelming, steadily increased throughout the late second century. However, these two provinces may not represent the general pattern of recruitment in the western and the eastern parts of the empire.

The first intensive researches on recruitment specifically in the eastern provinces were carried out by Speidel, Mitchell and Kennedy. Speidel added more recent evidence to Forni's study and investigated the pattern of recruitment in Asia Minor.⁹² His study was based on the premise that 'local' recruitment in Asia Minor should mean that the auxiliary units there and the six legions (*XV Apollinaris*, *XII Fulminata*, *XVI Flavia Firma*, *IV Scythica*, *I and III Parthicae*) stationed along the Euphrates frontier from Armenia to Mesopotamia were drawing their recruits from the provinces of Asia Minor.⁹³ He ascertained that recruitment to these units from Asia Minor began in the reign of Augustus, and that by the second and third centuries Asia Minor was also contributing to the legionary and auxiliary units in the Danube and Egypt.

Mitchell drew on many new inscriptions for recruitment to the eastern legions and focused on the number of recruits from Anatolia, especially Galatia, to the legions stationed in the Balkans, Cappadocia and Syria over the first three centuries.⁹⁴ He argued that while the Balkan legions recruited the bulk of their replacements from their local area, the legions garrisoned in Cappadocia and Syria depended largely on Anatolian recruitment. In addition to this, he noted that in the late second century most of the legionaries recruited from Asia Minor did not come from urbanised areas such as

⁹² Forni 1953; 1974: 339-91; Speidel 1984a: 45-64; 1984b: 273-300.

⁹³ Speidel 1984a: 46.

⁹⁴ Mitchell 1993: 136-42.

Asia and Bithynia, but from mountainous regions. He argued that the civilians living in urban areas were generally able to commute possible conscription for cash payments, unless there was an emergency.⁹⁵

Kennedy focused on the Roman army in Syria because it was the most important militarised province in the East.⁹⁶ He reaffirmed that peregrine recruitment to legionary units was relatively common in the eastern provinces where there were few Roman citizens. Thus partial dependence on western sources was indispensable at least until the early second century. The legionaries in Syria were mostly recruited from the old cities located on the Phoenician coast and the Greek cities of Syria. On the other hand, numerous sources for recruitment to auxiliary units in Syria originated from mountainous or desert areas. The dependence on the recruitment from rural areas seems to have been gradually gaining more importance as urban civilians became to prefer commuting military service for cash payments, as the case of Asia Minor. Many auxiliary units formed in Syria were deployed to other parts of the empire. As a result, the recruitment of these units then became localised, but a few of the replacements were still recruited from Syria.

Of Mommsen's three conclusions, only one is still valid: that there were differences in the pattern of recruitment between the West and the East. To sum up the previous studies, the general views of scholars on the broad patterns of recruitment in the eastern provinces during the first three centuries were as follows: 1) legionary and auxiliary recruitment in the East became 'local' relatively earlier than that in the West, because from the Augustan period the eastern units had to recruit a significant number of provincials, mostly from Asia Minor; 2) people in some urban areas became to reluctant to be recruited, while in rural, mountainous, and desert areas there were still a

⁹⁵ Mitchell 1994: 142-5.

⁹⁶ Kennedy 1989: 235-46.

good number of candidates for soldiers. However, because investigation has not been as detailed in the East as for the western provinces, various problems remain.

A significant question is what is meant by ‘local’: most scholars mentioned above have used the term without precise definition, although to Le Bohec it meant precisely *e castris*. For the pattern of recruitment in the East, in particular, ‘local’ has often conflated regional and provincial. Also, when discussing provincial ‘localisation’, we need to distinguish recruitment *e castris* from recruitment of provincials. Thus the recruiting areas for the army units in the eastern provinces need to be more precisely categorised as Italy, the West, the Danube, regional (i.e. other neighbouring eastern provinces), provincial and *e castris*. For instance, the ‘neighbouring’ provinces for recruitment to Egypt are taken to be Syria, Judaea and Arabia. In the following section, I will rearrange the epigraphic evidence for the origins of legionaries using my new categories, which then shows a distinct pattern; I will then examine the pattern of the eastern auxiliary recruitment.

2.4: The pattern of recruitment to the eastern units: the epigraphic evidence

2.4.1: Asia Minor, Cappadocia, Mesopotamia⁹⁷

**Table 8: Origins of legionaries serving in Asia Minor, Cappadocia
and Mesopotamia**

	Augustus – Gaius <i>VII Claudia</i>	Claudius – Nero <i>III Gallica</i> <i>VI Ferrata</i>	Flavian – Trajan <i>XII Fulminata</i> <i>XVI Flavia Firma</i>	Hadrian - 3C <i>XII Fulminata</i> <i>XV Apollinaris</i> <i>I and III Parthicae</i> <i>IV Italica</i>	Total
Italy	19 (32%)	-	1	3 (9%)	23(25%)
Hispania	-	-	-	1 (3%)	3 (3%)
Gallia	-	-	-	-	
Germania	-	-	-	-	
Africa	-	-	-	2 (7%)	
Noricum	-	-	-	3 (9%)	17 (18%)
Pannonia	-	-	-	2 (7%)	

⁹⁷ Speidel (1984a: 46) suggests that these provinces should be considered as an integrated area under the concept of ‘localisation’ (see section 2.3).

Dalmatia	1 (2%)	-	-	1 (3%)	
Moesia	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
Dacia	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
Thrace	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
Macedonia	7 (12%)	-	-	-	
Syria	-	-	-	1 (3%)	3 (3%)
Judaea	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
Egypt	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
Asia	3 (5%)	-	-	-	45 (49%)
Bithynia	2 (3%)	-	-	2 (7%)	
Pontus	3 (5%)	-	-	-	
Galatia	21 (36%)	-	-	8 (25%)	
Lycia	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
Pamphylia	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
Cilicia	2 (3%)	-	-	1 (3%)	
Cappadocia	-	-	-	1 (3%)	
<i>e castris</i>	1 (2%)	-	-	-	1 (1%)
Total	59	-	1	32	92

Asia Minor is normally considered to have been a peaceful region where there were fewer military units. However, as previous scholars noted, the *legio VII Claudia* was stationed there in the reign of Augustus and at least one auxiliary unit was stationed in each province during the Principate. Furthermore, it was actually one of the main recruiting grounds for legionaries to serve in the Danube area and the eastern provinces.⁹⁸ Asia Minor was divided into five provinces: Asia, Bithynia-Pontus, Galatia, Lycia-Pamphylia, and Cilicia. Among these, Galatia was the kingdom from which the *legio XXII Deiotariana* had been created and it continued to recruit a majority of its replacements from the province for some time, even after it had been stationed in Egypt. Tacitus reports that Asia, along with Gallia Narbonensis and Africa, was one of the sources of levies in 65 CE for the legions stationed in Illyricum.⁹⁹

The *legio VII Claudia* was garrisoned in Galatia for almost thirty years from 25 BCE to 6 CE. I provide information about fifty-nine soldiers (updated by Forni, Mitchell and Speidel) who were enrolled in this legion in the period from Augustus to Gaius.¹⁰⁰ The proportion of recruits from Italy, the Danube, neighbouring provinces,

⁹⁸ Speidel 1984a: 45-64; Mitchell 1993: 136-42.

⁹⁹ Tacitus, *Annals* 16.13.

¹⁰⁰ Forni 1953; 1974: 339-91; Mitchell 1976a: 298-308; 1993: 137-8; Speidel 1984a: 45-64; 1984b: 273-

and Galatia was 32%, 14%, 16%, and 38% each. It is noticeable that this legion recruited more soldiers from Galatia itself than from Italy, although at that time most of the western legions were taking the bulk of their replacements from Italy. Adjacent provinces in Asia Minor and some provinces in the Balkans, such as Macedonia and Dalmatia, were also recruiting areas. Only one recruit *e castris* is attested. It is usually supposed that most of the recruits were *peregrini* who gained Roman citizenship when they were enlisted, since this region was an area lacking Roman citizen communities. However, this hypothesis is debatable and will be assessed in the next chapter.

Cappadocia had been annexed to the Roman empire in the early years of Tiberius' reign, but only a few auxiliary units were stationed there.¹⁰¹ Some legions led by Corbulo were temporarily active in this province during his Armenian war in 58-63 CE. According to Tacitus, Corbulo discharged many incapacitated soldiers from his Syrian legions, and held levies in Galatia and Cappadocia for reinforcements.¹⁰² These legions were most likely the *legio III Gallica* and *VI Ferrata*, but the epigraphic evidence relating to the replacements is not enough to support Tacitus' record. Although Cappadocia became a province with two legions (*XII Fulminata* and *XVI Flavia Firma*) after Vespasian took possession of the imperial throne, there is little epigraphic evidence to show the recruiting pattern until the reign of Hadrian.¹⁰³

From the reign of Hadrian to the third century, Cappadocia was the permanent base for the *legio XII Fulminata* and *XV Apollinaris*, and Mesopotamia, which was annexed as a Roman province at the end of the second century, hosted the newly-raised legions, *I* and *III Parthicae* and *IV Italica*. Although there is no evidence concerning the soldiers of *IV Italica* as yet, it is possible to identify the origins of thirty-two soldiers

300.

¹⁰¹ Tacitus, *Histories* 2.81.

¹⁰² Tacitus, *Annals*. 13.35.

¹⁰³ *CIL* 3.353.

who served in the other legions at this period.¹⁰⁴ The proportion of Italian, western, Danubian, regional, and provincial recruits was 9%, 10%, 28%, 50% and 3% respectively. Easterners came to make up over half of the total known recruits, a quarter of them from Galatia alone. The ratio of soldiers from the Danube doubled from what it had been in the first century. No recruit *e castris* is attested.

2.4.2: Syria

Table 9: Origins of legionaries serving in Syria

	Augustus - Gaius <i>III Gallica</i> <i>VI Ferrata</i> <i>X Fretensis</i>	Claudius - Nero <i>III Gallica</i> <i>VI Ferrata</i> <i>X Fretensis</i> <i>XII Fulminata</i>	Flavians - Trajan <i>III Gallica</i> <i>VI Ferrata</i> <i>IV Scythica</i>	Hadrian - 3C <i>III Gallica</i> <i>IV Scythica</i> <i>XVI Flavia Firma</i> <i>II Parthica</i>	Total
Italy	1	1	2	21	25 (22.5%)
Gallia	-	-	2	1	5 (4.5%)
Africa	-	-	-	2	
Pannonia	-	-	-	7	41 (37%)
Dalmatia	-	-	-	3	
Dacia	-	-	-	2	
Thrace	-	-	-	26	
Macedonia	-	-	1	1	
Achaea	-	-	-	1	
Asia Minor	1	1	1	5	16 (14%)
Cappadocia	-	-	-	3	
Egypt	-	-	-	1	
				+ 4 easterners	
Syria	-	1	-	21	22 (20%)
<i>e castris</i>	-	-	-	2	2 (2%)
Total	2	3	6	100	111

Syria was the province where the greatest number of military units was garrisoned in the East, and the most important bridgehead for invasions of or by Parthia. The *legio XII Fulminata* was transferred from Egypt to Syria after 23 CE, and the *legio IV Scythica* was redeployed to Syria at the end of the Neronian period. In the early years of his reign, Hadrian redeployed the *legio XVI Flavia Firma* from Satala in Cappadocia to Samosata in Syria, and transferred the *legio VI Ferrata* from Raphanaea in Syria to

¹⁰⁴ Forni 1953; 1974: 339-91; *CIL* 6.3644, 36775 (= *ILS* 484); Speidel 1984a: 48-51, no. 24, 26, 29; *IGR* 3.479, 814; Seyrig 1950: 247, no. 7; *SEG* 41.1331; Mosser 2003: 157-60.

Bostra in Arabia.¹⁰⁵ In 197 CE, Septimius Severus created the *legio II Parthica*, which took up its camp at Apamea in Syria from 215 to 234 CE. Yet despite its military importance, this province has yielded little epigraphic evidence; from the reign of Augustus to Trajan the origins of eleven soldiers are all that we can identify, too few to identify a definite pattern of recruitment.¹⁰⁶ Recruits nonetheless came from Italy and Asia Minor, as they continued to do for over 150 years.

From Hadrian's reign to the third century, there is more evidence compared to the previous period. We can identify the origins of one hundred soldiers.¹⁰⁷ Syrian legions recruited 21% of known soldiers from Italy, 3% from the West, 40% from the Balkans, especially Thrace, 36% from the eastern provinces (13% from regional, 21% from Syria itself, 2% *e castris*).

2.4.3: Judaea, Arabia

Table 10: Origins of legionaries serving in Judaea and Arabia

	Augustus - Gaius	Claudius - Nero	Flavians - Trajan <i>X Fretensis</i>	Hadrian - 3C <i>X Fretensis</i> <i>VI Ferrata</i> <i>III Cyrenaica</i>	Total
Italy	-	-	-	3 (4%)	3 (4%)
Britannia	-	-	-	1 (1.5%)	13 (18%)
Hispania	-	-	-	1 (1.5%)	
Africa	-	-	-	2 (3%) + 9 westerners (13%)	
Pannonia	-	-	-	1 (1.5%)	2 (3%)
Thrace	-	-	-	1 (1.5%)	
Asia Minor	-	-	2	2 (3%)	44 (61%)
Syria	-	-	-	9 (13%)	
Egypt	-	-	-	22 (32%) + 9 easterners (13%)	
Judaea	-	-	1	3 (4%)	10 (14%)
Arabia	-	-	-	6 (9%)	
<i>e castris</i>	-	-	-	-	-
Total	-	-	3	69	72

¹⁰⁵ Bowersock 1983: 106 and note 47; Millar 1993: 108.

¹⁰⁶ *CIL* 3.181 (= 3.6697); 3.335 (= 3.6991 and 3.14188); 5.4377; 5.4987; 7.2230; *AE* 1902 41 (= *ILS* 9090); 1914 131; 1923 40; 1926 125; 1969-70 133; Speidel 1984a: 48-51, no. 11.

¹⁰⁷ Forni 1953; 1974: 339-91; Balty and van Rengen 1993: no. 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 14, 18; Speidel 1998: 197-9; *AE* 1934 273c; *CIL* 6.403 (= *ILS* 4328); *P. Dura* 32: lines 1-2, and 5-7; *SEG* 28.1255.

Judaea and Arabia have relatively short histories of permanently stationed legions. The *legio X Fretensis* was garrisoned at Jerusalem directly after the first Jewish war in 66-73 CE. The *legio VI Ferrata* was transferred from Bostra in Arabia to Caparcotna in Judaea between 123 and 130 CE.¹⁰⁸ The *legio III Cyrenaica* participated in Trajan's plan to establish a new province of Arabia in 106 CE, returned to Egypt, and then was finally stationed at Bostra after the *legio VI Ferrata*. These three legions remained in the same camps until Diocletian reformed the military system at the end of the third century.

The evidence of recruitment for the Flavian-Trajanic period is thin: only two Galatians were recruited to the *legio X Fretensis*, and Titus Flaivus Pudens, who was recruited from Judaea or Arabia, also served in this legion in the late first century.¹⁰⁹ From the reign of Hadrian to the third century, the origins of sixty-nine legionaries are identifiable: the percentages of known soldiers from Italy, the West, the Danube, the East region, and the provinces of Judaea and Arabia are 4%, 19%, 3%, 61%, and 13% respectively. It is clear that the three legions relied mostly on replacements enlisted from neighbouring provinces such as Egypt and Syria rather than their own provinces.¹¹⁰ In both Judaea and Arabia, legions appear to have experienced difficulties in provincial recruitment. The *legio VI Ferrata* enlisted only three soldiers from Judaea and one from Arabia, and the *legio III Cyrenaica* recruited five soldiers from Arabia. There are no attested recruits *e castris*.

¹⁰⁸ Lehmann and Holum 2000: 74-7, no. 49, 54.

¹⁰⁹ *CIL* 6.3614, 3627; *SEG* 44.1422.

¹¹⁰ Forni 1953; 1974: 339-91; Sartre 1982: 171-6; MacAdam 1986: 182-4; *IGLS* 13.9178, 9183, 9187, 9188, 9193, 9194, 9203, 9179.

2.4.4: Egypt

Table 11: Origins of legionaries serving in Egypt

	Augustus - Gaius <i>III Cyrenaica</i> <i>XII Fulminata</i> <i>XXII Deiotariana</i>	Claudius - Nero ¹¹¹ <i>III Cyrenaica</i> <i>XXII Deiotariana</i>	Flavians - Trajan <i>III Cyrenaica</i> <i>XXII Deiotariana</i>	Hadrian - 3C <i>II Traiana Fortis</i>	Total
Italy	2 (14%)	1	3 (5%)	16 (9%)	22 (9%)
Gallia	-	-	2 (3.5%)	-	101 (39%)
Germania	-	-	-	1 (0.5%)	
Africa	2 (14%)	-	2 (3.5%)	91 (50%)	
Numidia	-	-	-	2 (1%)	
Cyrenaica	-	-	1 (2%)	-	
Pannonia	-	-	-	1 (0.5%)	5 (2%)
Dalmatia	-	-	-	2 (1%)	
Thracia	-	-	-	1 (0.5%)	
Macedonia	-	-	-	1 (0.5%)	
Asia Minor	5 (36%)	3	28 (50%)	8 (4.5%)	80 (31%)
Syria	4 (29%)	1	6 (11%)	17 (9.5%)	
Judaea	-	-	-	7 (4%)	
Arabia	-	-	-	1 (0.5%)	
Egypt	1 (7%)	-	8 (14%)	12 (6.5%)	21 (8%)
<i>e castris</i>	-	-	6 (11%)	22 (12%)	28 (11%)
Total	14	5	56	182	257

Egypt has the largest number of inscriptions concerning the origins of legionaries who served there. Despite the fact that this province was a comparatively peaceful place, being distant from the eastern frontier, three and then two legions had been stationed there until Hadrian. Added to these, many auxiliary units were deployed along the Nile, and the *classis Alexandriana* was responsible for securing the grain supply to Italy. The *legio III Cyrenaica* and *XXII Deiotariana* had been garrisoned at Nikopolis close to Alexandria from 23 CE or before to 119, after which the former was redeployed to Arabia, the latter disappeared, and the *legio II Traiana Fortis* was transferred from Judaea and became the sole legion in Egypt.¹¹² The reason why the eastern legions were relocated in the early years of Hadrian's reign is obscure, but there is no doubt that the disappearance of *legio XXII Deiotariana* was connected with the Bar Kokhba revolt.¹¹³

¹¹¹ *CIL* 3.6023, 6603, 14138; 10.5368.

¹¹² Tacitus, *Annals* 4.5; Alston 1995: 28; Isaac and Roll 1998b: 203-5.

¹¹³ Isaac and Roll 1998a: 188-90.

In the early first century, about 36% of legionary replacements were drawn from Asia Minor. This high proportion results partly from peregrine recruits from Galatia to the *legio XXII Deiotariana*. There were also a few Italian recruits, but it was not a significant figure.¹¹⁴ In the period of the Flavians to Trajan, legionary recruitment in Egypt still depended largely on Asia Minor: 50% of the total known recruits were drawn from there, 14% came from Egypt, and 11% *e castris*.¹¹⁵ After the reign of Hadrian, the *legio II Traiana* still recruited many replacements from these provinces, especially Egypt and Syria, but the figure was overtaken by the remarkable number of African soldiers which is 50%. Italian recruits are still attested, but the total was less than 10%.¹¹⁶ The proportions of known soldiers from Italy, the West, the Danube, the neighbouring provinces, the province of Egypt, and *e castris* are 9%, 51.5%, 2.5%, 18.5%, 6.5% and 12% respectively.

¹¹⁴ BGU 4.1083 (= ChLA 10.426). This is a papyrus found at Arsinoite in Fayum, provides a list of fifteen soldiers. It is most likely a roster of legionaries since their names follow the rule of Roman citizens: nomen, filiation, voting tribe, and origin. Their fathers or grandfathers, except the Italians, were probably non-citizens and gained citizenship after serving as auxiliaries. This papyrus seems to be in 32-38 CE, the end of the reign of Tiberius, which ascertains the fact that these fifteen legionaries served in the *legio III Cyrenaica* or *XXII Deiotariana* in Egypt.

¹¹⁵ CIL 3.6627 (= ILS 2483); CPL 106; CIL 3.6598, 6599, 6602, 6603, 6606, 6607, 12059, 14138³; AE 1986 700; P. Mich 12.637. Although CIL 3.6627 has been commonly believed as the inscription of the reign of Augustus or Tiberius, Alston (1995: 30-1) infers that it would be of the Flavian period owing to the fact that a legionary from Phapos in Cyprus used 'Flavius' as his own *gentilicium*. His inference seems more valid because this inscription offers information about two legions, three *alae*, and seven *cohortes* stationed in Egypt, which is the number of military units in the Flavian period. A *diploma* (CIL 16.29), which is dated 83, found at Koptos informs the same number of auxiliary units stationed in Egypt.

¹¹⁶ AE 1969/70 633; CIL 3.6580 (= ILS 2304); CIL 3.6593, 6596, 6611, 6592, 12056, 12057, 14132; 10.1772; AE 1925 63; P. Oxy. 14.1666; BGU 1.240; PSI 8.928. CIL 3.6580 is a fragmentary inscription found in Alexandria, which records a list of forty six legionaries discharged from the *legio II Traiana Fortis* in 194, who had been enlisted in 168.

Table 12: Origins of legionaries serving in the East

	Augustus - Trajan	Hadrian - 3C	Total
Italy	30 (20%)	43 (11%)	73 (14%)
The West	9 (6%)	113 (29%)	122 (23%)
The Danube	9 (6%)	56 (15%)	65 (12%)
Regional	52 (35%)	91 (24%)	143 (27%)
Provincial	42 (28%)	56 (15%)	98 (18%)
<i>e castris</i>	7 (5%)	24 (6%)	31 (6%)
Total	149	383	532

Now we can calculate the total origins of legionaries who served in the eastern provinces from the first to third century. Although new epigraphic evidence may change these statistics, for now, we can identify three characteristics in the pattern of recruitment to the eastern legions as follows: 1) The percentage of Italian recruits decreased as in the case of the recruiting pattern of the West, but that of regional and provincial recruits also declined from 63% to 39%; 2) The rate of replacements recruited from the western and Danubian provinces increased from 12% to 44%, surpassing that of regional and provincial recruits after the reign of Hadrian; 3) The percentage of provincial recruits and *e castris* decreased from 33% to 21%. Even in the third century the proportion of recruits *e castris* was still more or less 5%.

To summarise, according to this epigraphic evidence, the pattern of legionary recruitment in the eastern provinces seems very different from the theories of previous scholars. For example, the Syrian evidence does not support the orthodox hypothesis (see Table 9). The period from the reign of Hadrian to the third century has been considered as the peak period of ‘localisation’, but over a fifth of recruits to Syrian legions still came from Italy. The percentage of Thracian recruits was even slightly higher than that of provincial recruits. For recruitment *e castris*, there is little evidence to validate the narrow theory of ‘localisation’ of previous scholars; known recruits *e castris* are largely confined to the province of Egypt (see Table 11). In the period from Hadrian to the third century, the ‘foreigners’ were the majority in the legionary

recruitment of the eastern provinces. Thus, it is simply not true that the eastern legions became increasingly localised during the Principate.

2.4.5: Auxiliary units

There have been no detailed researches into the origins of recruits to the auxiliary units stationed in the East. The one reasonably certain statistical finding is that the percentage of officers of *alae* across the whole empire who originated from the eastern provinces, increased from 13% to 23% during the first three centuries.¹¹⁷ In fact, it is difficult to find a clear pattern of recruitment from the handful of epigraphic sources relating to the origins of auxiliaries. An altar discovered near the *Tropeum Traiani* at Adamklissi in Romania, possibly dating to the period of Domitian, lists twenty auxiliary soldiers from various western provinces to a single unit, and a papyrus of 117 CE records 123 recruits from Asia to the *cohors I Lusitanorum* in Egypt.¹¹⁸ Le Bohec estimates that 78.5% of the auxiliary units that were created in the Roman empire had names implying that they had initially been raised in Europe (about 56% of the units in the western Europe), 15% in Asia, and the remaining 6.5% in Africa.¹¹⁹ But this too does not reveal the ongoing pattern of auxiliary recruitment. Although the auxiliary units originally raised in Asia seem to have comprised only 15% of the total, we have just seen that inhabitants of eastern provinces were regularly recruited to units that had originated in the West. However, at least it is possible to estimate the number of

¹¹⁷ Devijver 1992: 120; Eck 2014a: 94-5.

Region	I (Aug.-Flavians)	II (Trajan-Antonines)	III (Severans and after)
Italy	65%	38%	21%
West	23%	41%	56%
East	13%	21%	23%

¹¹⁸ Two from Britannia, three from Hispania, twelve from Gaul, one from Noricum, one from Raetia, and one from Africa: *CIL* 3.14214 (= *ILS* 9107); 123 recruits: *RMR* 74.

¹¹⁹ Le Bohec 1994: 96.

auxiliary units which were raised in the East, and to determine which units of them continued to be employed in the East (see Table 13).

Table 13: The movements of auxiliary units raised in the East¹²⁰

<i>Ala</i>	Aug.-Gaius 27BCE-41CE	Claud.-Nero 41 - 68	Flavians 69 - 96	Trajan 98 - 117	Hadrian 117-138	Antonines 138 - 193	Severans 193 - 235
<i>I Augusta Parthorum et Araborum sag.</i>	Syria Germania Inf.	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis
<i>I Bosporanorum</i>	Bosporus Syria	Syria	Syria	Pannonia	Pannonia	Dacia	Dacia
<i>Pia Gemina Sebastena</i>	Judaea	Judaea	Judaea	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis	Caesariensis
<i>I Hamiorum Syrorum sag.</i>	-	Syria Tingitana	Tingitana	Tingitana	Tingitana	Tingitana	Tingitana
<i>Augusta Ituraeorum</i>	-	Syria Pannonia	Pannonia	Dacia	Dacia	Pannonia Inf.	Pannonia Inf.
<i>VII Phrygum</i>	-	Galatia Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>I Commagenorum</i>	-	-	Syria Egypt	Noricum	Noricum	Noricum	Noricum
<i>Catafractaria</i>	-	-	-	Syria Moesia	Moesia	Moesia Dacia	Germania Syria
<i>I Ulpia Dromedariorum</i>	-	-	-	Syria	Syria	Arabia	-
<i>Alae stationed / total raised in the East</i>	2 / 3	3 / 6	4 / 7	2 / 9	2 / 9	2 / 9	2 / 8

<i>Cohors</i>	Aug.-Gaius 27BCE-68CE	Claud.-Nero 41 - 68	Flavians 69 - 96	Trajan 98 - 117	Hadrian 117 - 138	Antonines 138 - 193	Severans 193 - 235
<i>I Apamenorum sag. equi.</i>	Syria Egypt	Syria?	?	?	?	Egypt	Egypt
<i>I Cilicum mil. sag.</i>	Cilicia	?	Moesia	Moesia Sup.	Moesia Inf.	Moesia Inf.	Moesia
<i>VI Commagenorum equi.</i>	Commagene Numidia	?	?	?	?	Africa	Africa
<i>II Cyrrhestarum sag.</i>	Syria Dalmatia	Dalmatia	-	-	-	-	-
<i>I Damascenarum sag.</i> ¹²¹	Syria	?	Judaea	Judaea	Judaea	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>I Hamiorum sag.</i>	Syria Tingitana	?	?	?	Britannia	Britannia	?
<i>II Ituraeorum equi.</i>	Judaea Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>I Tdhebaeorum equi.</i>	Egypt	?	Egypt	Judaea Arabia	Arabia	-	-
<i>II Thebaeorum</i>	Egypt	?	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	-
<i>I Flavia Damascenorum mil. equi. sag.</i>	-	Syria	Germania Sup.	Germania Sup.	Germania Sup.	Syria- Palaestina	Germania Sup.
<i>I Antiochensium sag.</i>	-	-	Syria Moesia	Moesia Sup.	Moesia Sup.	Moesia Sup.	Moesia Sup.
<i>I Ascalonitarum sag. equi.</i>	-	-	Judaea Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	?
<i>I Flavia Canathenorum mil. sag.</i>	-	-	Syria	Raetia	Raetia	Raetia	?

¹²⁰ Spaul 1994: 261-8; 2000: 390-458; Holder 2003: 113-8, 120-45.

¹²¹ = *I Damascena Armeniaca*. Cotton and Isaac 2003: 19-26.

<i>I Chalcidenorum sag. equi.</i>	-	-	Syria	?	Africa	Africa	Africa
<i>II Chalcidenorum</i>	-	-	Syria	Moesia Inf.	Moesia Inf.	Moesia Inf.	?
<i>I Flavia Chalcidenorum equi. sag.</i>	-	-	Syria	?	?	Syria	Syria
<i>I Flavia Cilicum equi.</i>	-	-	Cilicia Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>I-II Flaviae Commagenorum</i>	-	-	Commagene Moesia	Moesia	Dacia	Dacia	Dacia
<i>II Hamiorum mil.</i>	-	-	Syria Africa	Africa	?	?	Africa
<i>I Augusta Ituraeorum sag.</i>	-	-	Judaea Pannonia	Pannonia Dacia	Dacia Sup.	Dacia Sup.	Dacia Sup.
<i>I Ituraeorum sag.</i>	-	-	Judaea	Dacia	Dacia Inf.	-	-
<i>I Ituraeorum civ. Rom.</i>	-	-	Judaea Tingitana	Germania Sup. Tingitana	Tingitana	Tingitana	?
<i>III Ituraeorum</i>	-	-	Judaea Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
<i>I Sebastena mil.</i>	-	-	Judaea Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>I Syrorum sag.</i>	-	-	Syria Africa	?	?	?	Africa
<i>I Syrorum mil. equi. sag.</i>	-	-	Syria Tingitana	Tingitana	Tingitana	Tingitana	?
<i>I Tyriorum sag.</i>	-	-	Judaea Moesia Inf.	Moesia Inf.	Dacia Inf.	Dacia Inf.	-
<i>I-II Hemesenorum</i>	-	-	-	Syria	Pannonia	Pannonia Inf.	Pannonia Inf.
<i>I-III Ulpiae Galatarum</i>	-	-	-	Galatia	Syria	Syria- Palaestina	Syria- Palaestina
<i>I-III Ulpiae Paphlagonum</i>	-	-	-	Paphlagonia	Syria	Syria	Syria
<i>I-III Ulpiae Petraeorum mil.</i>	-	-	-	Arabia	?	Syria Cappadocia	Syria Cappadocia
<i>IV-VI Ulpiae Petraeorum</i>	-	-	-	Arabia	?	Syria Syria- Palaestina	Syria Syria- Palaestina
<i>XX Palmyrenorum</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Palmyra
<i>Parthorum</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Parthia Mauretania
<i>I Severiana Syrorum sag. equi.</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	Syria Pannonia Sup.
<i>Cohortes stationed / total raised in the East</i>	6 / 9 (67%)	7 / 10 (70%) 1 / 1	14 / 27 (52%) 9 / 18¹²²	25 / 41 (61%) 14 / 14	22 / 41 (54%) 0 / 0	22 / 39(56%) 0 / 0	21 / 40 (53%) 1 / 3

From the Julio-Claudian to the Flavian period, at least seven *alae* and twenty-seven *cohortes* were formed in the eastern provinces. More than half of them were deployed in the East, even though the provinces near the Rhine and Danube rivers seem to have required more military units than the eastern frontier before Corbulo's retaliation against the Parthians. The rest of them were employed all over the empire. As in the case of most auxiliary units from Gaul and Germany, the eastern units also

¹²² Nine units among the eighteen newly raised units in the East were stationed there.

consisted of tribal recruits and served under their own chiefs. However, while the units from Gaul and Germany gradually came to rely on provincial recruitment, the eastern units probably recruited replacements from their homelands owing to their specialised military skill, for example, the Syrian archers.¹²³

After the Trajanic period, although only two *alae* remained, the majority of *cohortes* raised in the East were deployed in the eastern provinces; Trajan stationed all of the fourteen new units there. These units were garrisoned near their founding places or in neighbouring provinces, where it was comparatively easy to recruit provincial and regional candidates. In addition to this, during the first three centuries 50-70% of the eastern units continued to remain in the East, contrary to the view of some scholars that Vespasian made a strategic decision to redeploy the auxiliary units to provinces distant from their homelands in order to prevent uprisings such as the Batavian revolt led by Civilis.¹²⁴

In conclusion, provincials in the eastern provinces were liable to be recruited to three sorts of auxiliary units: those that had been formed there but dispatched all over the empire; those that had been formed elsewhere but were transferred to the eastern provinces; and those that had been formed in the East and were still stationed there. In other words, easterners filled up the auxiliary units stationed in the East and also contributed to the recruitment of eastern units distributed all over the empire.

2.5: Conclusion

As the importance of the eastern frontier grew, more and more armed units were raised, redeployed and stationed in the eastern provinces. Over the period from Augustus to Severus Alexander, the military strength of the eastern units increased from

¹²³ Cheeseman 1914: 84; Holder 1980: Table 8.9-11.

¹²⁴ Cheeseman 1914: 78-80, 84.

47,000 to 127,500, which was from 17.4% to 31.5% of the total military power of the empire. The annual demand for the recruits was around a third of the total annual demand for the recruits of the entire empire. However, most Italians were reluctant to serve in the East because they thought the camps were too distant from their home town. Italians, in particular, preferred to serve in the Praetorian units stationed in Rome. Thus from the early Principate the legions, auxiliary units and fleets seem to have depended largely on provincials to maintain their strengths. Since the Augustan period, Egyptians had been recruited to the fleets at Misenum and Ravenna in addition to their contribution to the Alexandrian fleet. The Egyptian legions also occasionally drew recruits from among the provincials. From the mid-second century, as the human resources for military recruitment became sufficient, there was no need to compulsorily recruit provincials, but it was possible to rely on volunteers, at least in theory. After the plague under Marcus Aurelius, when it became more important to maintain military strength on the eastern frontier to confronting the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, the importance of recruitment from eastern provincials also increased. It will be worth considering whether the increased number of provincials serving in the Roman armed forces improved their political and diplomatic leverage in the frontier zones.

As scholars have previously maintained, the pattern of recruitment in the East throughout the first three centuries was different from that in the West. However, the nature of this recruitment, as I have re-examined it, turns out to be very different from their expectations according to the theory of 'localisation'. From the early first century, the eastern legions relied largely on regional and provincial recruits (63%), but in the second century the proportion of recruits from the western and Danubian provinces increased to 44%, and even surpassed that of regional and provincial recruits (39%). Moreover, recruits *e castris* made up only 5 or 6% of the total known recruits throughout this period, and are almost all attested in Egypt. By contrast, it is difficult to

know the pattern of auxiliary recruitment, but the eastern provincials were evidently recruited to auxiliary units and fleets not only in the eastern provinces but across the entire empire. Thus, in the eastern provinces under the Principate, the pattern of recruiting soldiers was not localised, and therefore the theory that the Roman soldiers came to form a privileged class in provincial society, following the trend of 'localisation' of recruitment, should be reconsidered or simply denied.

Ch. 3: The processes of recruitment and veteran settlement

3.1: Introduction

Following the standard view, Millar asserts that “the recruitment of non-citizens into the auxiliaries and their discharge as citizens was one factor in the Romanization of the provinces.”¹²⁵ Auxiliary soldiers who had been recruited from a conquered region were granted Roman citizenship after completion of their mandatory service, and the benefit was shared with their families, so that the military service of a non-citizen provincial could lead to the creation of several new citizens. Sons of veterans might enlist in the Roman army, taking after their fathers.¹²⁶ However, some details of the processes of recruitment and veteran settlement are little known to us: recruitment (*dilectus*) - physical testing (*probatio*) - taking the oath (*sacramentum*), service and discharge with a *diploma* (in the case of a non-citizen soldier). Vegetius’ *Epitome of Military Matters*, probably dating to 380s, provides some information about recruitment.¹²⁷ But it is doubtful how far his account reflects the recruitment process of the Principate, and there is no mention of veteran settlement. Therefore, we depend largely on archaeological evidence, mostly collected from Egypt.

It is also important to investigate the relationships between veterans and civilians, that is whether veterans formed a separated caste, isolated from civilian societies, or were closely integrated and blended with them. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the eastern provinces the hypothesis of ‘localisation’ is not valid,

¹²⁵ Millar 1981b: 5.

¹²⁶ Gilliam (1986b: 281-7) estimates that from Augustus to Caracalla at least 600,000 men were granted Roman citizenship by military service in the East, and argues that the soldiers’ families and sons contributed to Romanisation in the East.

¹²⁷ For the author and some controversial points of dating his work, see Milner 1993: xxi-xxix; Reeve 2004: vi-x.

because the percentage of recruits *e castris* and from the province decreases from 33% to 21% during the Principate (see Table 12). Contrary to this, in the second century, a considerable number of recruits came from other provinces.

In this chapter, I will first examine the process of recruitment, and suggest it was a process by which non-citizen provincials were, in a sense, reborn as Roman soldiers. Second, I will investigate the relations between veterans and civilians, and suggest that there was a strategic intention of the Roman authorities behind the procedure of veteran settlement. Third, I will use the Roman garrison at Syene in Egypt as a case study for discussion of soldiers' relations with civilians and their influence in provincial communities. I will argue that the Roman army contributed to the incorporation of provincial societies into the empire, and thus played a pivotal role in the integration of the empire

3.2: The procedure for recruiting soldiers

3.2.1: The timing of recruitment: regular or occasional?

It is necessary to establish at the outset whether wartime recruitment should be deemed an abnormal event, distinguished from peacetime recruitment. Recruiting patterns and processes in emergencies have been considered to have been different from those in normal situations. However, recruitment was probably carried out more frequently in preparation for military operations, in order to supply recruits to army units which had normally been left under full strength in peacetime, and then to replace wartime casualties. For example, Gaius Fabricius Tuscus carried out recruitment on Augustus' order at Rome in 6 CE as part of measures to deal with the Illyrian revolt of 6-9.¹²⁸ Cassius Dio reports Augustus' difficulties with recruitment after Varus' disaster

¹²⁸ *EJ* 368; Suetonius, *Augustus* 25.2; Cassius Dio 55.31.

in 9.¹²⁹ Tacitus says that in 54, in planning the war against the Parthians, Nero ordered the recruitment of new soldiers from the neighbouring provinces of Cappadocia, and probably Asia Minor and Syria, to reinforce the strength of eastern legions.¹³⁰ A few years later, Corbulo also held levies in Galatia and Cappadocia for his Syrian legions which were under strength.¹³¹ During the Bar Kokhba revolt in 132-5, Hadrian dispatched Voconius Saxa Fidus and Caesarianus Statianus to Italy for recruitment to replace the casualties of the eastern units to support Julius Severus' counter-insurgency operations against the Jews.¹³²

Two texts also deserve mention. Eck argues that *PSI* 9.1026 (= *CPL* 117) and *AE* 1969/70 633 attest recruitment in an emergency situation at the beginning of the Bar Kokhba revolt.¹³³ The former is a papyrus recording twenty-two Egyptians discharged from the *legio X Fretensis* at Jerusalem in 150, who had originally been recruited as marines in the *classis Misenensis* in 125, and then transferred to the legion a few years later. The latter inscription, found in Alexandria, is a dedication to Antoninus Pius by 136 soldiers discharged from the *legio II Traiana Fortis* in 157. Recruited in 132 or 133, they included fifteen men from Italy and eighty-six men from Africa. Eck concludes that these transfers and recruitment were abnormal and were intended to replace serious losses in the Roman forces. Contrary to this, in his attempt to downplay the scope of the revolt, Mor contends that the transfers and recruitment were carried out before the outbreak of revolt and were caused by a shortage of proper legionary candidates, rather than an urgent need to deal with the Jewish rebels.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Cassius Dio 56.23.

¹³⁰ Tacitus, *Annals* 13.7.

¹³¹ Tacitus, *Annals* 13.35

¹³² Voconius Saxa Fidus: *IGR* 3.763 (= *ILS* 8828). Caesarianus Statianus: *CIL* 8.7063 (= *ILS* 1068).

¹³³ Eck 1999: 78-80.

¹³⁴ Mor 2003: 113-9.

The twenty-two Egyptians in *PSI* 9.1026 were apparently transferred before 130 because they claim that they had served in the *legio X Fretensis* for over twenty years, and therefore their transfer does not seem to have related to the Bar Kokhba revolt in 132-135.¹³⁵ Instead, some scholars have interpreted this as evidence that there was unrest in Judaea in the late 120s, along with a papyrus receipt dating to 128.¹³⁶

We, Dionysius son of Socrates and the associate collectors of public clothing for the guards, have received from the weavers of the village of Socnopaei Nesus nineteen ... tunics, total nineteen, and for the needs of the soldiers serving in Judaea five white cloaks, total five. The thirteenth year of the Emperor Caesar Trajanus Hadrianus Augustus, Choiak 23. (Signed) Received by me, Diogenes. Received also by me, Onesas. Received also by me, Philoxenus.

However, this receipt is just one of the many receipts surviving from Roman Egypt for requisitions - in fact purchases - of military supplies, which occurred regularly in peacetime as well as in times of war, and therefore is not good evidence for warfare in Judaea.¹³⁷

On the other hand, the recruitment in *AE* 1969/70 633 postdates the outbreak of the revolt, 132/133. It may indicate emergency recruitment to bring the *legio II Traiana* up to strength as a precautionary measure, because part of this legion seem to have been dispatched to Judaea; Nummius Constans, a *primus pilus* of the unit, was decorated by Hadrian for his deeds during the war against the Jewish rebels.¹³⁸ Egypt had been a

¹³⁵ *PSI* 9.1026. *Cum militaverimus, domine, in classe praetoria Misenensis et ex indulgentia divi Hadriani in leg(ionem) Fr(etensem) translatis [a(nnos)] super XX omnia nobis uti bonis militibus constiterit, ...*

¹³⁶ *P. Ryl.* 2.189; Smallwood 1976: 437; Mor 2003: 114, note 26.

¹³⁷ Rathbone 2007: 165-73.

¹³⁸ *CIL* 10.3733 (= *ILS* 2083).

centre of Jewish revolt some fifteen years previously.

CIL 3.6580, which has often been thought to illustrate the normal process of recruitment in peacetime, also needs to be re-examined. It is a dedication to Septimius Severus by thirty-nine veterans discharged from the *legio II Traiana* in 194, who had been recruited in 168. Of the thirty-nine veterans, the presence of twenty-four *e castris* and eight from Egypt has been regarded as evidence for ‘local recruitment’. But they had enlisted in 168, two years after Lucius Verus and his soldiers returned from their Parthian campaign, bringing the plague. The recruitment was carried out after the outbreak of the plague, and so should rather be considered to relate to abnormal recruitment. In the same inscription Alston notices that eight of the twenty-two centuries needed to replace their centurions, and argues that this delay implies less pressure in peacetime to maintain a legion at full strength.¹³⁹ However, the year 194 was wartime in practice; the eastern provinces were involved in the civil war between Septimius Severus and Pescennius Niger. The *legio II Traiana Fortis* had supported Pescennius Niger, but switched sides just before the decisive battle in 194. A number of soldiers, including the centurions, had probably stuck to the side of Niger or had deserted from the unit when it changed sides. Nevertheless, the argument that the army units were normally left under strength in peacetime and only brought up to full strength when necessary still stands.

It seems that the Roman armed forces did not rely on an annual recruiting system (even if it is convenient for us, as I have done in the previous chapter, to estimate demand in annual terms). But every unit should have maintained a minimum strength, say around 80% of full strength, to fulfil its routine peacetime duties. The occasional shortage caused by discharge and injuries was probably filled by recruiting volunteers. As discussed in chapter 2, the human resources of the empire were able to

¹³⁹ Alston 1995: 46-7.

meet this demand. The emperor delegated oversight of recruitment to the governor. An Oxyrhynchus papyrus dating to 103 attests six recruits who were sent to an auxiliary unit by the order of the prefect of Egypt, Gaius Minicius Italus.¹⁴⁰

Gaius Minicius Italus sends greetings to his own Celsianus. Give orders that the six recruits approved by me should be included in the roster of the cohort which you command, to take effect from February 19. I have appended their names and distinguishing marks to this letter. Farewell dearest brother.

Gaius Veturius Gemellus, age 21, no distinguishing mark.

Gaius Longinus Priscus, age 22, a scar on left eyebrow.

Gaius Julius Maximus, age 25, no distinguishing mark.

[...] Julius? Secundus, age 20, no distinguishing mark.

Gaius Julius Saturninus, age 23, a scar on left hand.

Marcus Antonius Valens, age 22, a scar on right side of forehead.

Received February 24, year six of our Emperor Trajan by means of Priscus, aide. I, Avidius Arrianus, senior clerk (*cornicularius*) of the third (or second) cohort of Ituraeans, declare that the original letter is in the archives of the cohort.

In the majority of cases, however, recruitment was carried out only when it became necessary: in preparation for military campaigns and to replace casualties. The Roman army in the eastern provinces usually conducted military expeditions and counterattacks only after spending a certain time on preparations, that is recruiting and training new soldiers. Thus, we should not regard wartime recruitment as an unusual or irregular event, but understand it as part of the normal recruiting process.

¹⁴⁰ P. Oxy. 7.1022 (= RMR 87); Campbell 1994: no. 9.

3.2.2: Volunteering, conscription, and civil status

Brunt divided the processes of recruitment into volunteering, conscription and substitution, as illustrated in a letter from Trajan in answer to a letter from Pliny the Younger: *voluntarii*, *lecti* and *vicarii*.¹⁴¹ Pliny had asked the emperor about the punishment of two slaves who had been enlisted either as volunteers or possibly as substitutes put up by their masters to evade conscription. Based on this, Brunt argued that conscription still existed as common practice into the second century, although volunteering seems to have been predominant, but by the Severan age local recruitment and improvement in the conditions of military service were the two main factors which made volunteering the norm.¹⁴² After this, there has been a general consensus among scholars that conscription was required when an emergency situation arose, such as a revolt or an external war, or in peacetime if there were insufficient volunteers. Yet, in terms of volunteering and conscription, we can obtain more information from the correspondence.

Pliny to the emperor Trajan. Sempronius Caelianus, who is an excellent young man, has discovered two slaves among his recruits and has sent them to me. I have postponed judgement on them until I could ask your advice on what would be a suitable sentence, knowing that you are the founder and upholder of military discipline. My chief reason for hesitating is the fact that the men had already taken the oath of allegiance but had not yet been enrolled in a unit. I therefore pray you, Sir, to tell me what course to follow, especially as the decision is likely to provide a precedent.

Trajan to Pliny. Sempronius Caelianus was carrying out my instructions in sending you the slaves. Whether they deserve capital punishment will need investigation; it is important to know if they were volunteers or

¹⁴¹ Pliny, *Letters* 10. 29-30; Brunt 1990b: 188-9.

¹⁴² Brunt 1990b: 211-2.

conscripts, or possibly offered as substitutes. If they are conscripts, then the blame falls on the recruiting officer; if substitutes, then those who offered them as such are guilty; but if they volunteered for service, well aware of their status, then they will have to be executed. The fact that they were not yet enrolled in a unit makes little difference, for the truth about their origin should have come out on the actual day they were accepted for the army.

Pliny served as the governor of Bithynia and Pontus in 109-11. The period was apparently a time of peace between Trajan's second Dacian war of 105-6 and his Parthian war of 114-7. However, it is uncertain whether Pliny's correspondence show evidence for conscription, because we do not have his subsequent letter to Trajan, reporting the outcome of his legal actions in response to Trajan's reply, and whether he had managed to discover how the two slaves had come to be recruited. In his reply to Pliny, Trajan had only listed the various possible routes to recruitment, but had not indicated whether he thought volunteering or conscription was the more usual. The slaves might have volunteered to aim at elevating their own status, although the enrolment of slaves to the armies was strictly prohibited by the Roman law, and permitted only in emergency situations such as civil wars or plagues.¹⁴³ Thus, we can not take this correspondence as good evidence for the existence of conscription in peacetime as a normal practice.

During the civil wars of 69-70 the Romans appear to have begun to appreciate the East as an integrated strategic area. Tacitus notes that there were enough sources of recruits and wealth in the eastern provinces, such as Asia Minor, Cappadocia, Syria, Judaea, and Egypt, to meet the needs of the armed forces led by Vespasian and

¹⁴³ *Digest* 49.16.2.1.

Mucianus.¹⁴⁴ Vespasian, after he had gained power, reformed the military system of the eastern provinces into an establishment of seven legions and thirty-four or more auxiliary units. He and his sons created the *legio XVI Flavia Firma* and nineteen auxiliary units drawn largely from eastern provincials. Trajan formed one legion and at least sixteen auxiliary units in the East for his campaigns in Dacia and Parthia.¹⁴⁵ Later he raised three auxiliary units from Paphlagonia in Pontus for defence duties or to support his Parthian campaign in 113/4. It is likely that these spates of recruitment were achieved by using conscription, because in the short span of years it would probably have been impossible to meet the heavy demand for recruits with only volunteers. But it can not be excluded that this heavy recruitment was welcomed by the eastern provincials as an increased opportunity to gain Roman citizenship, and that Tacitus meant there were sufficient numbers of volunteers.

Of course, in every part of the empire some men tried to avoid conscription by mutilation or bribery, which could lead to severe disciplinary action against them. Suetonius tells us that Augustus put an equestrian and his property up for auction because he had cut off his sons' thumbs.¹⁴⁶ In 59, the Senate expelled Pedius Blaesus, who had been the governor of Crete and Cyrene, because the provincials of Cyrene accused him of bribery to grant exemption from conscription.¹⁴⁷ The penalty seems to be somewhat severe. At that time Corbulo was campaigning on the eastern frontier, and wartime demanded effective implementation of recruitment. Contrary to this, there was also a case of a candidate who was exempted from military service by fair means. An

¹⁴⁴ Tacitus, *Histories* 2.6. *septem legiones statim et cum ingentibus auxiliis Syria Iudaeaque; inde continua Aegyptus duaeque legiones, hinc Cappadocia Pontusque et quicquid castrorum Armeniis praetenditur. Asia et ceterae provinciae nec virorum inopes et pecunia opulentae.*

¹⁴⁵ See Table 13 in chapter 2.

¹⁴⁶ Suetonius, *Augustus* 24.1. Under Trajan, even a man who was born with one testicle or has lost one was still a legitimate recruit (*Digest* 49.16.4).

¹⁴⁷ Tacitus, *Annals* 14.18.

Oxyrhynchus papyrus, dating to 52, records that a weaver was released from service because his poor eyesight, impaired by a cataract, had been diagnosed in the process of *probatio* conducted in Alexandria.¹⁴⁸ Thus, we should not jump to a conclusion that the evasion of military service was endemic in the eastern provinces.

Conscription has often been thought of as an *ad hoc* measure. But it does not seem that the emperor and governors ordered recruitment in absolute ignorance of provincial human and material resources. The results of local censuses could have been utilised for recruitment.¹⁴⁹ The governor sometimes dispatched officers to provincial areas in order to carry out a census, which was used not only for levying taxes but also for recruiting soldiers.¹⁵⁰ In emergency situations, the emperor sent special officers to the provinces to perform both a census and recruitment, presumably selecting areas thought to have enough human resources for recruitment. Le Teuff presents a list of five attested officers who were responsible for those tasks, all, as it happens L. Clemens Volusenus in Narbonensis and Aquitania in 14-6, Torquatus Novellius Atticus in Narbonensis under Tiberius, C. Mocconius Verus in Hispania Citerior at the end of the first century, Titus Haterius Nepos in Britannia around 100, and C. Iulius Celsus in Aquitania under Hadrian.¹⁵¹

One more point to note from the Pliny's correspondence whether recruitment was carried out with the needs of specific units, or categories of units (legions or *auxilia*) in mind. According to another letter of Pliny, in which he asks Trajan how to deal with a centurion's petition for a grant of Roman citizenship to his daughter, there was an

¹⁴⁸ *P. Oxy.* 1.39.

¹⁴⁹ Orejas and Sastre 1999: 172-3.

¹⁵⁰ *CIL* 3.338, 6687; 14.3955; Le Bohec 1994: 234.

¹⁵¹ Le Teuff 2012: 182-9. Clemens Volusenus: *CIL* 11.6011. Torquatus Novellius Atticus: *CIL* 14.3602 (= *ILS* 950). Mocconius Verus in Hispania Citerior: *CIL* 6.1463. Titus Haterius Nepos: *Tab. Vindol.* 2.304; 3.594, 611. Iulius Celsus: *CIL* 13.1808; *AE* 1954 253

auxiliary unit stationed permanently in Bithynia and Pontus.¹⁵² This unit was almost certainly the *cohors VI Hispanorum equitata Praetoria*.¹⁵³ One scholar assumes that Pliny had ordered Sempronius Caelianus, whom he took to have been an officer of this unit, to carry out recruitment to bring the unit up to strength.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, there is some evidence that the province needed more soldiers.¹⁵⁵ However, there is another possibility that he recruited men for units stationed in neighbouring provinces. Pliny's letter shows that although the slaves had taken the military oath (*sacramentum*), they had not yet been assigned to any units (*numeri*). This implies that recruits drawn from a province were generally distributed to a number of units, and perhaps the Romans recruited for legions or auxiliary units together, and then distributed the recruits according to their status.

The principle of recruiting citizens to the legions was sometimes strictly applied. According to a Fayum papyrus dating to 92, Titus Flavius Longus, an *optio* of the *legio III Cyrenaica*, had to declare on oath that he was a freeborn Roman citizen before his three guarantors and companions. This case supports Mommsen's theory that only citizens could be recruited to legions, and so, if *peregrini* were recruited to legions, they had to be given citizenship on enlistment. However, a legionary veteran named L. Pompeius Niger in the middle of the first century provides a counter case. He presumably began his military service in the early years of Tiberius' reign, was discharged from the *legio XXII Deiotariana* in 44 CE, and gained Roman citizenship

¹⁵² Pliny, *Letters* 10.106-7. *Rogatus, domine, a P. Accio Aquila, centurione cohortis sextae equestris, ut mitterem tibi libellum per quem indulgentiam pro statu filiae suae implorat.*

¹⁵³ Spaul 2000: 136.

¹⁵⁴ Haynes 2013: 66, 71.

¹⁵⁵ In previous correspondence, Pliny (*Letters* 10.19-20) had confessed that he was worrying about using public slaves as the warders of prisons instead of deploying soldiers, and therefore asks Trajan whether he needs to transfer more soldiers.

with his children the following year.¹⁵⁶ Pompeius, originally a metropolite of Oxyrhynchus called Nilos, had therefore not formally been given Roman citizenship at the time of his recruitment to the legion, although he had been given a full Roman name with the *tria nomina* and a tribal affiliation (the Fabian *tribus* standard for Alexandrians who became Roman citizens). This is the earliest example of a provincial achieving promotion in status through military service.¹⁵⁷ Pompeius' children were also given Roman citizenship after their father returned to his hometown, Oxyrhynchus, on discharge.

3.2.3: Integration under Roman military law and discipline

For provincial non-citizens, the process of recruitment was in itself an elevation of their social status. After the physical fitness test (*probatio*), a qualified recruit was given a Roman name and then swore the military oath (*sacramentum*). Several texts attest the change of identity marked by the new name: Pompeius Niger under Tiberius, the six auxiliary recruits sent the Ituraean cohort in 103, Antonius Maximus in the second century (below). While the given name marked a provincial recruit as belonging, prospectively, to the citizen body, the military oath created a personal connection between him and the emperor.¹⁵⁸

After these steps, a recruit had to journey to his designated unit. For most recruits to the eastern army units, as noted in chapter 2, this generally meant an

¹⁵⁶ *PSI* 13.1318; *P.Fouad* 44.6-7; *SB* 8.9824; 12.10788 B. His military service, social status, financial situation and family relations have been investigated by several scholars. Whitehorne 1988: 445-50; Rathbone 2001: 99-113.

¹⁵⁷ The earliest known *diploma* is dated to 54 (*CIL* 16.2), and the latest one dating to 206 CE (Eck 2011: 63-77). The earliest case in the East is a Syrian soldier who received *diploma* in 75 CE (*AE* 1968 446 (= 1980 788)).

¹⁵⁸ Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.14.15. Campbell (1984: 25) points out that: "the real importance of the *sacramentum* lay in the soldiers' bond of personal loyalty to the emperor; and this was secured by ties of *religio* and sanctified by Roman military tradition".

interprovincial journey, even from the West to the East.¹⁵⁹ The first payment received from the Roman state by each recruit was a ‘travel allowance’ (*viaticum*), set at a flat three *aurei*.¹⁶⁰ This may also have symbolised that he had now achieved legal and financial independence from his *pater familias*. A second-century papyrus from a Fayum village gives us a recruit’s own account of the process in a letter to his father.¹⁶¹

Apion to Epimachus, his father and lord, very many greetings. Before all else I pray for your health and that you may always be well and prosperous, together with my sister and her daughter and my brother. I thank the lord Serapis that when I was in danger at sea he straightway saved me. On arriving at Misenum I received from Caesar three gold pieces for travelling expenses. And it is well with me. Now I ask you, my lord and father, write me a letter, telling me first of your welfare, secondly of my brother’s and sister’s, and enabling me thirdly to make obeisance before your handwriting, because you educated me well and I hope thereby to have quick advancement, if the gods so will. Give many salutations to Captio and my brother and sister and Serenilla and my friends. I have sent you by Euctemon a portrait of myself. My name is Antonius Maximus, my company the Athenonica. I pray for your health.

The oath of allegiance was repeated collectively by every unit at a special parade on the first day of January every year, and a new oath was worn when a new emperor came to power. This collective oath was probably quite effective in promoting loyalty to the emperor by linking it to pride in and loyalty to the unit. Civilian communities throughout the empire also took the oath of allegiance on the accession of a new emperor, but we do not know whether this event was carried out together with the local garrison (if any) or separately. Campbell has hypothesised that leading civilians

¹⁵⁹ The percentage increased from 67% to 79% during the Principate.

¹⁶⁰ *PSI* 1063 (= *SP* 2.368 = *RMR* 74); Rathbone 2007: 162, note 16.

¹⁶¹ *W. Chr.* 480 (= *BGU* 2.423 = *SP* 1.112).

may have attended the annual oath-taking in military camps.¹⁶² If so, this ceremony would have been a significant contribution to integration between soldiers and civilians, but its importance should not be exaggerated until we have better evidence to support it.

One more thing to note is that through the process of recruitment all the recruits, regardless of whether they had volunteered or been conscripted, became soldiers with equal rights. Provincial non-citizens could expect a formal grant of Roman citizenship after their mandatory service of twenty-five years. However, under military law and discipline, they already enjoyed equal rights and privileges with their colleagues who were already citizens. More importantly, local and provincial recruits gradually blended with a large number of foreign replacements throughout their military service. Arguably, recruitment *e castris* did not practically mean ‘local’ recruitment, that is from the local civilian population, but ‘internal’ recruitment from military families. Discussing a Philadelphia papyrus of 122-45, Speidel points out the multi-national nature of auxiliary recruitment, and argues that the recruitment of soldiers from all provinces did not only contribute to increasing military strength but also to strengthen the loyalty of the soldiers to Rome.¹⁶³ After discharge they also exercised their rights as veterans. There might have been some distinctions between legionaries and auxiliaries, although this is not certain, but there was no disparity between citizens and non-citizens under Roman military law and discipline.

Provincials’ perception of recruitment and military service appears to have gradually improved during the second century. Bussi explains this trend with reference to three texts on papyrus.¹⁶⁴ *BGU* 4.1097, dating to the mid-first century, is a private

¹⁶² Campbell 1984: 26-7, note 26-30.

¹⁶³ Noricum, Emona, Syria, Kapitolias, Egypt, Africa, Gerbes: *ChLA* 10.422 (= *BGU* 7.1689); Speidel 2007: 295. Speidel (2014: 625-40) has also recently stressed the role of Roman army in Cappadocia that contributed to the incorporation of the province into the empire.

¹⁶⁴ *BGU* 4.1097; *SB* 4.7354; *BGU* 7.1680; Bussi 2008: 82-3.

letter sent from a wife to her husband. In this letter, she is angry with her husband and complains because he had persuaded their son to become a soldier. *SB* 4.7354 of the second century is also a letter from a father to his son. This father is bitterly disappointed in his son because the son did not desire to join the fleet. However, *BGU* 7.1680 from Philadelphia is a letter sent from a girl, Isis, to her mother at the beginning of the third century. She wrote that: “So if Aion wants to become a soldier, he just needs to come, since everyone is becoming a soldier”. This phrase is supposed to reflect a positive perspective on military service after Septimius Severus had raised military pay and substantially improved their standard of living. According to Cassius Dio, the emperor had left an instruction to his two sons Caracalla and Geta before he died: “Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers and scorn all other men”.¹⁶⁵

3.3: The procedure for veteran settlement

3.3.1: Veterans and civilians

The honourable discharge from the Roman armed forces after the military service for twenty-five years guaranteed a soldier various legal privileges. A veteran and his children may not have been subjected to flogging or forced labour, and he was exempted from public manual liturgies, although he had to pay for road maintenance cost and property taxes.¹⁶⁶ Legionary veterans were also granted a large cash payment, or a piece of land (whether instead of or in addition to the cash payment), as a retirement bonus which was disbursed from *aerarium militare* instituted by Augustus.¹⁶⁷ Non-citizen soldiers were granted Roman citizenship attested in bronze *diplomata*. This honourable discharge was only granted by the emperor or governors to soldiers who had

¹⁶⁵ Cassius Dio 77.15.2.

¹⁶⁶ *Digest* 49.18.1-3; Haynes 2013: 346.

¹⁶⁷ Wesch-Klein 2007: 439-40.

completed their mandatory service or who had been discharged for health reasons.

There seem to have been certain differences in treatment between legionary veterans and auxiliary veterans which remained in force until 212. Haynes notes, correctly, that the Roman government did not found *coloniae* for auxiliary veterans, and that purpose-founded *coloniae* were for the benefit of legionary veterans only.¹⁶⁸ However, this applies to the West only, because in the East the Roman government simply did not, on the whole, found any *coloniae* for veterans. Most of the *coloniae* in the eastern provinces were cities granted the status of a *colonia* under Vespasian and Hadrian, rather than purpose-founded *coloniae*, and there were not necessarily cities where veterans had been settled. The foundation of Aelia Capitolina at Jerusalem in the 130s was a unique exception.¹⁶⁹

As we have seen, a considerable number of recruits took a journey from the West to the East. After spending half or a third of their lifetime in service, staying in the province where they had served may have been preferable to returning to their native places. On the other hand, they did not have to go on staying near the camps. The eastern provinces were more urbanised than the western provinces, and thus there were more options for the veterans to settle down. Of course the veterans who had come from the province where they had served, or neighbouring provinces, could easily return to their home places.¹⁷⁰

An interesting papyrus, dating to 63, throws light on the issue of discrimination between or integration of legionary and auxiliary veterans. A group of veterans petitioned the governor of Egypt apparently to complain about the failure to respect

¹⁶⁸ Haynes 2013: 348-50.

¹⁶⁹ Isaac 1998: 87-111.

¹⁷⁰ Papyri from Karanis and Philadelphia illustrate this. See Alston 1995: 123-42.

their prerogatives.¹⁷¹ The governor's official response reads:

With reference to discharged soldiers, in respect of status (*politeia*):
[Tuscus]: I told you before that the situation of each of you is neither similar nor identical. For some of you are veterans from the legions, others from *alae*, others from cohorts, others from the fleet, with the result that your legal rights are not the same. I shall deal with this matter, and I have written to the *strategoi* in each nome to ensure that the rewards of [each] person are completely guaranteed, according to the legal rights of each person.

Various interpretations of this text are possible. Although Tuscus insists that their rights were different, and this is the normal view in most modern scholarship, it remains unclear what specific differences there were in practice. However, even if there were differences, this group of assorted veterans apparently thought that the differences were not significant, or possibly were unaware of the differences. In any case, the text shows a common consciousness and solidarity between veterans from different units, and now living in different areas of Egypt.

It is difficult to judge the state of relations between veterans and civilians, and to what extent they were integrated into most provinces of the East. However, we have much evidence from Karanis in Egypt, from which Alston argues that veterans did not develop into a separate caste but became integrated and blended with the population.¹⁷² Based on Jones' study on the Ituraean principality in Syria, Haynes argues that veterans functioned as benefactors and founders of civilian settlements in rural areas.¹⁷³ In section 4, I shall add one more case to these with a case study of Syene in Roman Egypt.

¹⁷¹ *FIRA* 3.171; Campbell 1994: no. 337.

¹⁷² Alston 1995: 117-42; 1999b: 176-96.

¹⁷³ Jones 1931: 265-75; Haynes 2013: 352.

3.3.2: The strategic implications of veteran settlement

It is hard to find evidence for the intentions of the Roman government in veteran settlement, but there are some hints of a strategic policy with regard to relations between veterans and civilians. Roman-period accounts of Alexander the Great record his policy of encouraging marriage of his Companions and soldiers with local women in Asia and Persia.¹⁷⁴ Pompeius Trogus, a Roman historian of the late first century BCE, presents a strategic interpretation of the policy in his *Philippic History* which has been preserved in an epitome written by Justin in the fourth century CE:¹⁷⁵

He (Alexander the Great) permitted his soldiers also, if they had formed a connexion with any of the female captives, to marry them; thinking that they would feel less desire to return to their country, when they had some appearance of a house and home in the camp, and that the fatigues of war would be relieved by the agreeable society of their wives. He saw, too, that Macedonia would be less drained to supply the army, if the sons, as recruits, should succeed their veteran fathers, and serve within the ramparts within which they were born, and would be likely to show more courage, if they passed, not only their earliest days of service, but also their infancy, in the camp. This custom was also continued under Alexander's successors. Maintenance was provided for the boys, and arms and horses were given them when they grew up; and rewards were assigned to the fathers in proportion to the number of their children. If the fathers of any of them were killed, the orphans notwithstanding received their father's pay; and their childhood was a sort of military service in various expeditions. Inured from their earliest years to toils and dangers, they formed an invincible army; they looked upon their camp as their country, and upon a battle as a prelude to victory.

¹⁷⁴ Plutarch, *Moralia* 329C-E; *Alexander* 47.5-8; Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander* 7.4.4-8.

¹⁷⁵ Justin 12.4.1-12.

Although Pompeius Trogus says this was the policy of Alexander the Great, his interpretation probably reflects, or was designed to influence, contemporary Augustan policy. Augustus was one of the emperors who paid particular attention to veterans because he had to disband a considerable number of units after he came to power. In this context, Trogus' interpretation of Alexander's so-called 'assimilation' policy could be understood to imply the principle of exploiting veterans for a strategic use: encouraging relations between soldiers and veterans on the one hand and civilians on the other to contribute to strengthening military power and to the incorporation of local communities into the Roman social system.

In his *Histories*, Tacitus recounts how Mucianus tried to incite the population of Antioch to be hostile to Vitellius, in a passage which has often been cited as an example that shows the close social relations between soldiers and civilians in the East.¹⁷⁶

Then he (Mucianus) entered the theatre at Antioch, where the people regularly hold their public assemblies, and addressed the crowd which hurried there, and expressed itself in extravagant adulation. His speech was graceful although he spoke in Greek, for he knew how to give a certain air to all he said and did. There was nothing that angered the province and the army so much as the assertion of Mucianus that Vitellius had decided to transfer the legions of Germany to Syria, where they could enjoy a profitable and easy service, while in exchange he would assign to the troops in Syria the wintry climate and the laborious duties of Germany. For the provincials were accustomed to live with the soldiers, and enjoyed association with them; in fact, many civilians were bound to the soldiers by ties of friendship and of marriage, and the soldiers from their long

¹⁷⁶ Tacitus, *Histories* 2.80.

service had come to love their old familiar camps as their very hearths and homes.

Settling veterans seems to have been more effective in frontier zones. Under Hadrian, Arrian reported to the emperor that he had overseen the construction of fortifications by the fort at Phasis in the Caucasus to protect both veterans and traders.¹⁷⁷ This permitted and encouraged the veterans to band together while their presence also could be exploited to achieve social integration in the province. For a more detailed study of the impact of soldiers on provincial societies and their role in social integration, I present in the next section a case study of Syene in Roman Egypt.

3.4: A case study of the Roman garrisons at Syene in Upper Egypt

The impact of the Roman army on provincial communities has been investigated in various ways. Because the term ‘impact’ embracing those numerous subjects is rather vague, I shall use it here to refer to socio-economic changes embodied in social interaction and urbanisation. It is also important to clarify who was receiving the impact and in what ways. As the majority of provincials stay silent or invisible in our sources, our target can scarcely extend beyond local elites, whose experience deeply influenced the social life of local people in substance. In Roman Egypt, for example, the Roman authorities depended largely on the close cooperation of the local elites for the administration of the province.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Arrian, *Periplus*. 9.

¹⁷⁸ Bowman and Rathbone 1992: 126-7.



Map 2: The auxiliary units in Upper Egypt and the Eastern Desert¹⁷⁹

Located on the southern border of Upper Egypt, near the First Cataract, Syene (modern Aswan) had held military, religious and commercial significance since at least the New Kingdom (Map 2).¹⁸⁰ In Roman time, the town functioned as the headquarters of three auxiliary cohorts for more than three centuries from the conquest under Augustus to the withdrawal by Diocletian.¹⁸¹ About 1,500 soldiers were garrisoned in Syene and its environs, and the town expanded to 16 ha from an estimated 12 ha in the Ptolemaic period.¹⁸² Syene makes a good case study to help our understanding of soldiers' relations with civilians and urban development because of the inscriptions and graffiti left by soldiers in the temples, and the results of a decade of recent excavations by the Swiss Institute for Architectural and Archaeological Research on Ancient Egypt. In this section I shall argue that the Roman camps in and around Syene did not encroach

¹⁷⁹ Maxfield 2000: 408.

¹⁸⁰ Seidlmayer 1999: 152-3; Manning 2013.

¹⁸¹ Speidel 1988: 768, note 2.

¹⁸² Seidlmayer 1999: 153.

on civilian areas, and that the soldiers changed gradually from occupiers to part of local society.



Map 3: The wall between Aswan and Konosso/Philae¹⁸³

Syene was of vital strategic importance to protect Egypt from the peoples to the South and to monitor trade and transportation up the Nile valley.¹⁸⁴ Under Augustus three camps were established to accommodate three auxiliary units in the region of Syene: one at Syene, one on the facing island of Elephantine, and the third at Shellal, a

¹⁸³ Jaritz 1993: 108.

¹⁸⁴ Speidel 1988: 770-5.

plain east of Philae a few km to the south of Syene.¹⁸⁵ These camps were presumably founded by Cornelius Gallus, the first prefect (governor) of Egypt, after his advance into this area recorded in his trilingual inscription from Philae.¹⁸⁶ Strabo reports that while Aelius Gallus, the second prefect of Egypt, was mounting an invasion of Arabia in 25 BCE, the Ethiopians made a surprise attack on the area and occupied Syene, Elephantine, and Philae.¹⁸⁷ In 24-22 BCE the next prefect Petronius recaptured these areas and established a military zone to the South with outposts at Pselkis, Talmis, and Hiera Sykaminos.¹⁸⁸ This southern frontier and the number of units there seem to have been maintained until Diocletian's reign.¹⁸⁹

In the Ptolemaic period a road connecting the harbours at Syene and Shellal had already existed. Archaeological evidence shows that in the Roman period this road was first equipped with some watch or signal towers guarded by soldiers, and then was gradually protected by a wall, over a distance of some 7.5km, which was 5m thick at the base and might have reached 10m high (Map 3).¹⁹⁰ This wall protected access from Syene to the temple of Isis at Philae and the auxiliary camp at Shellal, and made Syene and Philae one fortified zone.¹⁹¹ With this defence the Romans gave security from desert raiders to the civil settlement of Syene, which presumably contributed to its development so that it expanded its area to the North nearly to the centre of the modern urban area.

¹⁸⁵ Strabo 17.1.12; 17.1.53.

¹⁸⁶ *CIL* 3.14147/5 (= *ILS* 8995).


¹⁸⁷ Strabo 17.1.54.

¹⁸⁸ *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 26; Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 6.35; Speidel 1988: 771; Maxfield 2000: 410-8.

¹⁸⁹ For the stationing of auxiliary units in Nubia (Syene and the South), see Speidel 1988: 783-9. All the Roman army units in Egypt are listed in Alston 1995: 163-91 (appendix 1).

¹⁹⁰ Jartiz 1986: 67-74; 1993: 107-19.

¹⁹¹ Speidel 1988: 773.



Map 4: Excavated areas in Aswan¹⁹²

The exact location of the camp in the city of Syene has not been discovered despite archaeological traces of the massive military presence.¹⁹³ Two ditches south of the modern Coptic Church (Map 4: Area 32) seem to be defensive works, but are not necessarily a trustworthy indication of the Roman camp.¹⁹⁴ We might expect the camp to have been sited near the harbour which is supposed to be located in the area of the modern Sofitel Legend hotel or, to the north, in the Ferial Garden. So for now, the Roman army camp in the city of Syene was most likely located inside the modern sector of the Coptic Church. Some traces of the northern enclosure of a fortress in the Late Period (664-332 BCE) were also found in Area 13 (Map 4), just north of the church.

¹⁹² http://swissinst.ch/html/forschung_neu.html (11/09/2015).

¹⁹³ 39 CE: *CIL* 3.14147/1 (= AE 1986 39 = *ILS* 8899); 99 CE: *CIL* 3.14147/2 (= AE 1896 40 = *ILS* 8907); Alston 1995: 33-5.

¹⁹⁴ http://swissinst.ch/html/forschung_neu.html (11/09/2015).

This would fit with other evidence that in the eastern provinces the Roman army re-used pre-existing camp sites when they could. The sector of the Coptic Church (150m x 100m) is greater than the typical size of other forts in Egypt, such as Dionysias (94.4m x 80m), Mons Claudianus (75m x 70m), and Mons Porphyrites (85m x 55m), but it is closer to the size of fort at Nag'al-Hagar (150m x 150m), which functioned as the headquarters of a Roman army unit.¹⁹⁵ Thus, although the army camp at Syene seems to coexist as part of the city, it was physically separated from the civilian area and never encroached on it.

The military character of Syene, because of its strategic importance, was reflected in its religious cults. Ptolemy III and Ptolemy IV dedicated a temple to the goddess Isis with the epithet “who fights in front of the army” (Map 4: Area 1).¹⁹⁶ A demotic graffito, that is in Egyptian language, on the temple, dating to 23 January 19 CE, also shows that a priest offered sacrifices to the goddess with the title “the chief of the army”.¹⁹⁷

Regnal year 5, Tiberius Caesar Augustus, Tybi, day 28.
 Petidjhuty [...] came (?) in order to ... giving to the
 chief of the army (?). And he will say it (?)
 during the first month of Tybi festival. His name en-
 dures [here] forever, ..., the chief *pastophoros* of Isis,
 the scribe of the Qenbet for (to?) his brother (?)
 Petiese son of Nakhtus, the prophet of Isis-Anukis,
 scribe of the *wab*-priests of Isis, forever

An epigram to Isis of Iunius Sabinus, apparently of the Augustan period,

¹⁹⁵ Alston 1995: 192-207 (appendix 2).

¹⁹⁶ Seidlmayer 1999: 153.

¹⁹⁷ Dijkstra 2012: 128, no. 213.

presents us much information, which is inscribed into a victory relief on the south pylon of the temple of Isis at Philae.¹⁹⁸

Iunius Sabinus commander of the Ituraean cohort(?) came here leading the multitude of the Syene forces, solemnly celebrating with new chants Isis who knows how to save the world. Having conquered the Nubian tribes that raged against the sons of Romulus, he came here with his troops. [...] in the fray, you will say, then, Caesar's man [...] put on the crown.

Speidel suggests that this Roman soldier was not only the prefect of a *cohors Ituraeorum* but also the commander of the entire force of three cohorts at Syene.¹⁹⁹ It is noticeable that the epigram of Iunius Sabinus was inscribed in Greek, not in Latin which has generally been considered the 'official language' of the army. Adams provides abundant evidence to show that Greek was regularly used, even for official purposes, by the Roman army in Egypt, and he argues that there was not a fixed linguistic practice using Latin as the 'official language' of the army.²⁰⁰ Latin, as a sort of super-high language in the army, was normally used among its highest ranks to communicate for interprovincial duties and to interact with the imperial government at Rome. On the other hand, Fewster argues that bilingualism, mostly Greek and Demotic, in Roman Egypt must be reconsidered. She suggests that the bilingualism is to be expected among the civic elites because of their role in administration, but that otherwise it was limited to knowing just a few words, and for most Egyptians Greek still remained a very foreign language.²⁰¹

The priestly class, as a group of the local elite and of bilinguals in Greek and

¹⁹⁸ Bernand 1969: no. 159; Speidel 1988: 779.

¹⁹⁹ Speidel 1988: 778-80.

²⁰⁰ Adams 2003: 599-623.

²⁰¹ Fewster 2002: 220-45.

Demotic, were presumably able to influence people and to facilitate the connection between soldiers and civilians. We do not know if the dedication of Iunius Sabinus had been composed by the soldier himself or one of the priests of the sanctuary, but at least it had probably been set up with the approbation of the priests, which implies some collaboration by the Egyptian priests with the local garrison from the very beginning of the Roman rule. Added to this, more dedicatory inscriptions written in Greek by soldiers are found in Egyptian temples at Talmis and Pelchis.²⁰² Myers argues that these are evidence for individual soldiers' concern for 'religious sensibilities'.²⁰³ Religious dedications by soldiers to the Egyptian goddess Isis continued at Syene during the second century. For instance, the following dedication by a soldier of *cohors II Ituraeorum equitata* written in 135 has been found on the temple of Isis at Philae.²⁰⁴

Liberalis Sarapion, soldier of the second cohort of the Ituraeans, century of Valentinus, dedicated this with good luck for her favours to the Lady Isis. In the year 20, on the sixth day in the month Hadrian.

In 166 the soldiers of *cohors I Flavia Cilicum equitata* made a dedication for the welfare and victory of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus.²⁰⁵ It is interesting that they erected matching obelisks for the dedication. Haynes argues that: "the choice of obelisks as a medium is telling: the emperors' soldiers are happy to use an Egyptian form of great antiquity to assure the welfare of their imperial rulers".²⁰⁶ This is a good example that soldiers were not reluctant to use practices of local religion which were

²⁰² *IGR* 1.1303; *IGR* 1.1348 (= *SB* 5.8521); *IGR* 1.1363 (= *SB* 5.7912); *IGR* 1.1370 (= *SB* 5.8537).

²⁰³ Myers 2010: 124-5.

²⁰⁴ *SEG* 31.1532.

²⁰⁵ *AE* 1974 664.

²⁰⁶ Haynes 2013: 211.

familiar to the local people. Many soldiers also worshipped local gods.²⁰⁷ Thus adoption of local religious practices, with the aid of the priests, played a crucial role in blending soldiers into the local elites and of settling them down in local societies.

I have attempted to evaluate the spatial and psychological distances between Roman soldiers and civilians through investigating the location of the camp at Syene and the inscriptions on the temples in the area. This case study shows that during the three centuries of its occupation the camp maintained a certain distance from the civilian area, and the development, or urbanisation, of the town was never stunted by this military presence. Rather, the civil settlement could be safely expanded to the north under the protection of the army from the South. On the individual level the soldiers' religion was an important avenue for interaction between soldiers and civilians. The local priests, who were able to communicate in Greek and Egyptian, played a pivotal role as a bridge connecting the soldiers and the locals. Of course, this case study is not necessarily valid for all the eastern provinces, let alone the entire empire. However, when it is put together with other case studies from the eastern provinces, I will be able to argue whether the Roman army was generally so oppressive to civilians in the East as it has often been supposed to have been there, and whether the presence of military units near civilian settlement seriously hindered urbanisation in the East. Yes, for provincials, Roman soldiers were obviously occupiers at the time of conquest, but it did not take much time for them to change their role to that of protectors, and they became part of provincial society throughout the long period of Roman rule.

²⁰⁷ Speidel 1988: 795. The figures of Horus in Roman armour (bronze: EA 36062, limestone: EA 51100) and Bes with a shield (terracotta: EA 12745) in the British Museum are worth consideration, although we do not know yet whether these mean soldiers' worship of the local gods or locals' worship of the **Romanised** and militarised gods. In either case, these reflect the importance of religion in integrating soldiers with the local societies.

3.5: Conclusion

In the eastern provinces, conscription was not a common way of recruitment, and was probably carried out only when volunteers were not sufficient to maintain units at what was thought to be the necessary strength (about 80% in peacetime and at full strength in wartime). During the second century, the military importance of the eastern provinces increased because of conflicts with the Parthian empire. The growing number of military units helped to control the provincials and to improve security in the frontier zones, but it also led to much heavier recruitment. Initially, this seems to have triggered some discontent among the provincials, and some upper-class local youths, in particular, appear to have tried to evade military service. For many more provincials, however, serving in the army still represented a good opportunity of being granted Roman citizenship. In the second and third centuries, 79% of new legionary soldiers were recruited from the Latin West and neighbouring provinces. They blended in with local and provincial recruits, because all recruits were reborn as Roman soldiers under the same military law and discipline. After discharge, veterans settled in urban areas or large villages, and became part of local societies. The case study of the Roman garrisons at Syene in Egypt shows the interaction of the soldiers with the civilians throughout the three hundred years from 25 BCE to the reign of Diocletian that they were stationed there. They seem to have cooperated with the local priests, an important element in the local elite. Since socio-economic exchanges and good relationships between soldiers and civilians would have contributed significantly to assuring the dominance of Roman empire in the East, and this must have been realised by the Roman authorities, we may assume that their policies of recruitment and settlement of veterans had a conscious strategic intent.

Ch. 4: The logistics of the Roman army and civilians

4.1: Introduction

Careful planning and execution of the logistics for military operations has been essential for commanders to succeed in warfare across all times and places. An ancient Chinese general pointed out this basic concept in the 6th century BCE: “An army without its baggage-train is defeated; without rations it is defeated; without bases of supply it is defeated”, which was reiterated by a lieutenant colonel of the US army who experienced the Second World War.²⁰⁸ The importance of supplying an army at war was not neglected by the Romans.²⁰⁹ For example, Vegetius stated: “Frequently indeed, lack of supplies rather than the battle destroys an army, and hunger is harsher than the sword. Then the army can be rescued from other calamities: foraging and food-supply have no remedy in necessity except being stored beforehand. In every expedition the sole and most powerful weapon is that provision is sufficient to you while the lack of it crushes the enemy”.²¹⁰

In the Republic, logistics meant supplying armies in the field, and had largely depended on *ad hoc* preparations by commanders just before their campaigns.²¹¹ A system of peacetime logistics became necessary with the establishment of a professional standing army during the early Principate. This involved a major transformation of the supply system, as Rathbone has summarised, from “the Rome-based private contractors

²⁰⁸ Sun Wu, *The Art of War* 7.11. 軍無輜重則亡，無糧食則亡，無委積則亡。Millett 1945: 206-7.

²⁰⁹ Caesar, *Civil Wars* 1.72.1; Frontinus, *Stratagems* 4.7.1; Tacitus, *Annals* 15.16; Appian, *Wars in Spain* 87; Ammianus Marcellinus 25.7.4.

²¹⁰ Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Matters* 3.3. *saepius enim penuria quam pugna consumit exercitum, ferro saevior fames est. deinde reliquis casibus potest in tempore subueniri, pabulatio et annona in necessitate remedium non habent, nisi ante condantur. in omni expeditione unum est et maximum telum, ut tibi sufficiat victus, hostes frangat inopa.*

²¹¹ For the logistics of the Republican Roman army, see Erdkamp 1998.

used in the Republic to supply the expeditionary forces levied for each war” to “a province-based civil administration supplying, still from taxation and purchases, the dispersed units of the standing, largely peacetime, army of the Principate”.²¹² The logistics of the standing army for their food, clothing and equipment became ‘normal’, but still required extra levies for emergencies, such as campaigns and imperial visits.

Despite its importance, because ancient authors rarely mention the logistics system, scholars have tended to pay more attention to wartime logistics which were often coercive and exploitative of civilians.²¹³ Many attested complaints about requisitions (*annona militaris*, *hospitium*, *angareia*) from the East, in particular, give us the impression that the duty of provision imposed on the civilians was more oppressive than it was in the West.²¹⁴ However, this distinction between “the East” and “the West” may be false: for example, in the meantime Roman Britain also experienced many campaigns requiring extra levies from its civilians, and abuses of the system are attested by Tacitus; indeed, the abuse of requisitions in peacetime appears not to have been a phenomenon of a specific region but of every frontier province.²¹⁵ My focus will be concentrated on ‘normal’ supply system for the army logistics in the eastern provinces, in order to re-examine critically the view that this system was so exploitative that it strained the relationships between soldiers and civilians, and probably hindered the

²¹² Rathbone 2007: 165-6.

²¹³ The logistics of Roman warfare have been studied in detail by Adams 1976 and by Roth 1999. While the former focuses on the major campaigns in the East during the first three centuries, the latter’s book covers the whole Empire and a longer period from 264 BCE to 235 CE. The normal logistics of supplying the eastern army units in the Principate has been studied by Kissel 1995. The food supply systems and networks for the western army has been studied by many scholars of Roman Britain: Middleton 1979: 81-97; Anderson 1992; Breeze 1993a: 526-52, 1993b: 574-95, and 2000: 59-64; Birley 1997: 273-80; Whittaker 2002: 204-34. This topic has been discussed in detail at TRAC in 2007, see Stallibrass and Thomas 2008.

²¹⁴ The petitions, rules, and responses are presented in Herrmann 1990 and Hauken 1998.

²¹⁵ Peacetime abuses in Roman Britain are attested in Tacitus, *Agricola* 19; Cassius Dio 59.21.3-4; 76.14.1-2. For soldiers’ abuses, see Mitchell 1976b: 111-12; Campbell 1984: 248-51.

growth of the civilian economy.²¹⁶

The aim of this chapter is to illuminate the interplay between soldiers and civilians through investigating the logistics system of the Roman imperial army in the eastern provinces. I will explain the general system of logistics, and then estimate to what extent provincial societies were burdened by it. I will also examine whether the demand for supplies for the army units stimulated economic growth in the surrounding civilian areas, which is a common idea in scholarship about the army in the western provinces.

4.2: The system of logistics

4.2.1: The views of scholars

The purpose of Roman military logistics was basically to meet the needs of the military system including remuneration, food, clothing, equipment, accommodation, fodder and transport. These supplies largely depended on the provincial economy, and therefore scholars have focused on the relationship between soldiers and civilians based on literary and archaeological evidence from the provincial societies. Although many opinions have been suggested, the key issue is whether the impact of the Roman army was positive or negative on the provincial economy. While the positive contribution of the armies to the economies of the western provinces is largely accepted, in the East it is considered nothing or negative, because scholars believe the economy in the eastern provinces had already developed to a substantial level before the Romans came. In his book on the economy of Roman frontiers, Whittaker does not even devote one page to a discussion of the economy of the eastern frontiers.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Isaac (1990: 269-310) has a negative view on the economic and social situation in the eastern civic societies, which he thinks was caused by the Roman army stationed there.

²¹⁷ Whittaker 1997: 98-131.

Isaac evaluates the soldiers' requisitions of *annona*, *hospitium* and *angareia* (supplies, lodging and transport) as heavy burdens on civilians in the East: "generally speaking, it is hard to distinguish between excessive taxation and plain robbery by soldiers", and he concludes that corrupt practices by the soldiers in the East were severe because they were garrisoned in cities.²¹⁸ The period of his study is the Later Empire, but his evidence is largely drawn from Rabbinic literature and Roman laws of the Principate. Alston asserts that the economic impact of the army in Egypt was insignificant and never promoted the economic growth of the province.²¹⁹ Adams also notes that imperial visits and military campaigns imposed a heavy burden on the local economy of Egypt.²²⁰ Pollard on one hand suggests that in Syria "the army was a key element in the provincial economy through its position in a chain of cash taxation, army pay, and army spending", but on the other hand appears to share Isaac's view in his concluding chapter.²²¹ Focusing on the road system, Kissel explains that the most important purpose of its construction was to smooth the progress of military administration, and therefore any economic benefits must be considered as only a by-product.²²²

Other scholars, however, assess the contribution of the Roman state and its army to the provincial economy in more positive terms. In his study of the provinces of Asia Minor, Mitchell suggests that it was enormous, although the Roman authorities do not seem to have had a conscious policy of promoting the economic development of the provinces.²²³ On the economy of Judaea/Syria-Palaestina under Roman rule Roth

²¹⁸ Isaac 1990: 269-310.

²¹⁹ Alston 1995: 112-5.

²²⁰ *P. Panop. Beatty* 1: Adams 2007a: 281-91.

²²¹ Pollard 2000: 171-211, 252-4.

²²² Kissel 2002: 129, note 8.

²²³ Mitchell 1993: 257-9.

argues that: “the region evolved from a closed economy, based on subsistence agriculture and the Temple, to an export economy driven by a powerful private sector. This change was due in large part to the capital infusion brought by the army, in the form of payroll, purchase of supplies and discharge bonuses; the construction of infrastructure for military purposes; as well as the entrepreneurial skill of the veterans who settled in the province”.²²⁴

It seems that the logistics system of the Roman army in the East was not different from that in the West. Existing studies are insufficient for us to draw a comprehensive conclusion, because all but Isaac have focused on the case study of a single province. However, despite regional differences, the system which the imperial government had introduced into each province was essentially consistent across the empire.²²⁵ It is true that relatively many petitions and complaints of civilians are attested in the East, but this fact does not indicate or prove systemic differences of military logistics between the East and the West. The greater number of these appeals probably simply reflects the strong ‘epigraphic habit’ of the East, which was rooted in greater cultural confidence in complaining and greater literacy than existed in the western cultural environment.

4.2.2: The officials

Military supplies probably involved almost all the standing Roman officials of the empire and all local authorities.²²⁶ The central imperial posts in Rome comprised the emperor and his staffs, notably the *a rationibus* and *praefectus annonae* and, and at times the Senate. The emperor appointed a freedman at the head of the *a rationibus* to

²²⁴ Roth 2002: 375-97, supported by Eck 2014c: 207-14.

²²⁵ Rathbone 2007: 168.

²²⁶ *P. Amh.* 2.107 (185 CE); Adams 1999: 119-26. He attempts to generalise the case study of Roman Egypt in his reviews of Erdkamp 1998 and Roth 1999 (Adams 2001: 465-73).

manage the financial accounting of the imperial treasury; this post was held by an equestrian from the second century, and the equestrian *praefectus annonae* supervised food supplies. The *praefecti vehiculorum* administered the *cursus publicus* to facilitate the transport of food supplies arranged by the *praefectus annonae*. In wartime more temporary offices, such as the *curator copiarum*, were appointed specifically for handling the logistics of expeditionary forces.²²⁷

The governors and procurators of all provinces were ultimately responsible for paying and supplying the troops in their provinces on behalf of the emperor, the supreme commander of the Roman army. The governors assigned some soldiers to work for the supply system: the *beneficarii* were dispatched to supervise its logistical infrastructure, and the *frumentarii* were attached to the procurators when they had the tasks of collecting and purchasing grain. The *legati* and *praefecti* of units with their staffs like the *tribuni laticlavii* and *praefecti castrorum* administered the distribution of money and food to their soldiers. The local authorities often had to provide supplies for the units under the name of contributions. The private contractors called *publicani* were also used for supplies and transport.

Some scholars have been sceptical about whether the *praefectus annonae* was responsible for the peacetime food supply to the armies. Roth suggests that it is very unlikely that the emperor would have entrusted control of the military supply system to one official such as the *praefectus annonae*, which could have created a potential threat against his own authority.²²⁸ Kehne thinks that the system was under the supervision of the *a rationibus*. However, most scholars consider the *praefectus annonae* to have been a permanent position instituted by Augustus, which had the responsibility for arranging

²²⁷ Roth 1999: 261-75; Kehne 2007: 300.

²²⁸ Roth 1999: 263-4; Kehne 2007: 326-7.

the *annona* (food supply) to Rome and to the army units in the provinces.²²⁹ They identify this office as the highest bureaucrat for the logistics system, just under the emperor and above the governors and procurators. At the overarching imperial level there was normally no separation in management of civilian and military resources. The *praefectus annonae* primarily worked for the food supply of Rome, but probably also of the *praetoriani*, *cohortes urbanae*, and *vigiles* there. He also managed the surplus of food resource generated in this supply process for interprovincial supplies which could be diverted at Rome, from elsewhere, to the army units in both the western and eastern provinces. This interprovincial supply to the frontiers was considered important among the imperial authorities. A governor of Baetica, Umbonius Silio, was even expelled from the Senate, because he had been falsely accused of that he provided too little grain to the soldiers stationed in a neighbouring province, Mauretania.²³⁰

4.2.3: The structure of system and the *annona militaris*

The emperor and his officials administered the empire by drawing on standard taxes in cash and kind raised throughout it. The governors and procurators normally collected the annual amount of taxes in cash and kind from each community, and arranged its transport toward Rome or wherever it was needed. Under the supervision of the *a rationibus*, soldiers were paid out of these standard cash taxes managed by the procurators.²³¹ Taxes in kind were also collected through this regular system: taxpayers themselves delivered taxes to near local villages or cities, and then these were gathered to the state, normally by the private contractors, to be distributed to public granaries

²²⁹ Remesal 1986: 81-9; Kissel 1995: 124-51; Erdkamp 2002b: 53-5; Pujol 2008: 145.

²³⁰ Dio Cassius 60.24.5.

²³¹ Direct local levies of cash for soldiers' wages and bonuses are firstly attested under the reign of Diocletian (300 CE). *P. Panop. Beatty* 2.

within or outside the army camps and near the *mansiones*.²³² For long distances private entrepreneurs were contracted to provide transport, and then the military commander of each unit distributed the supplies to his soldiers.²³³ Although the basic food, clothing, and equipment were provided by the state, soldiers might individually buy extra goods and private arms from local markets and sometimes run their own business with local civilians.²³⁴

Sometimes the state made compulsory purchases of wheat when normal taxes were insufficient. If there was a shortage of supplies, particularly in emergency situations, they also had to prepare supplements by compulsory purchase at a flat price. When the emperor had planned an expedition or was visiting provinces, or rebellions were being suppressed, irregular and extra levies were required from the provinces. During his governorship of Pontus and Bithynia Pliny the Younger was ordered by Trajan to arrange for extra grain supply from Paphlagonia as a preparation for his Parthian war in 114-7.²³⁵ Some soldiers from the local units would often escort the supplies.

The theory of a new and distinct *annona militaris* in the third century has often confused understanding of army supplies during the Principate. Van Berchem invented the hypothesis that Septimius Severus instituted the *annona militaris* to supply the soldiers directly with materials collected from provincials, which implied the replacement of taxation in cash.²³⁶ Although his controversial idea of the specific

²³² MacMullen (1963: 1-22) divides the supply system at local level into three parts: supply from private land; production upon army territory by civilian farmers; production upon army territory by soldiers. The third part implies farming by the *limitanei*, which he explains as “mixed function and mixed development”, but this was a supposed development of the fourth century.

²³³ Middleton 1983: 75-83; Adams 1995: 119-24; Rathbone 2007: 171-3.

²³⁴ *PSI* 13.1318.

²³⁵ Pliny, *Letters* 10.27-8.

²³⁶ Van Berchem 1937: 117-202.

annona for military use has been much discussed and has caused much confusion, it is no longer accepted by most scholars, including van Berchem himself.²³⁷ Some instead now consider it part of Diocletian's reforms, drawing on the practice of extraordinary taxes in kind for expeditions or imperial itineraries under the Principate.²³⁸ Others suggest that it was a certain proportion of the *annona* (annual food supply) destined for military use, which was controlled by the *praefectus annonae* who was also responsible for the grain distribution at Rome.²³⁹

There was no fundamental change of taxation from the Late Republic to the Principate, and taxation in kind, mostly of grain, but also fodder and other food stuffs, was a normal source of the food supply system throughout the period.²⁴⁰ The food production from the relatively fertile provinces of Spain, Asia Minor, Egypt, and Africa normally exceeded the demand of *annona* for the armies stationed there and also for Rome. The surpluses were thus transported to frontier areas. For example, a considerable quantity of Baetican olive oil was shipped to the Rhine, Danube and Mauretania frontiers, while the Danube and Euphrates frontiers were supplied with olive oil produced in the provinces of Asia Minor.²⁴¹

The army units on the eastern frontier depended on food supplies mainly from the provinces of Asia Minor and Egypt.²⁴² The bulk of grain supply from the province

²³⁷ Rickman (1971: 278-89) and Tribbick (1987: 182-207) explains the reasons in detail why van Berchem's evidence of the Severan dynasty is impossible to warrant his argument. Van Berchem (1977: 335) acknowledges: "J'ai indiqué par le choix de mon titre que j'acceptais volontiers la perspective d'une revision de mes vues d'autrefois, heureux si par mes observations j'ai pu y contribuer. ... Impôt extraordinaire, au départ, mais devenu routine bien avant Dioclétien".

²³⁸ Mitthof 2001: 37-81. Isaac (1990: 285-91) believes the *annona militaris* became a regular taxation during the crisis of the third century, while Roth (1999: 240-3) still supports van Berchem's hypothesis.

²³⁹ Remesal 1986: 81-9; Kissel 1995: 124-42; Erdkamp 2002b: 51-5; Pujol 2008: 145, note 1, 2.

²⁴⁰ Mitchell 1993: 250-5; Erdkamp 2002b: 49-60, 68-9; Rathbone 2007: 165-76, note 49.

²⁴¹ Mitchell 2005: 98-103.

²⁴² Mitchell 1993: 250-3.

of Egypt was supplied to Rome, and also some to the eastern frontier for military use. The soldiers and civilians at Mons Claudianus in the Eastern Desert of Egypt could enjoy a diet as good as the ordinary people at Rome.²⁴³ Wierschowski estimates that generally 10-12% of the agricultural income was provided to soldiers, and Mitchell estimates that roughly a tenth of the total crop cultivated from Asia Minor was sent to those frontiers as tax in kind.²⁴⁴

To conclude, under the Principate taxation in kind was part of normal food supply system for Rome and its soldiers stationed in the provinces, and it did not impose a heavy extra burden on civilians. In emergency situations such as famine, war or imperial visits, the government could require extraordinary grain supplies from provincials. This was carried out by means of compulsory purchase, but not by illegal extortion or confiscation. The problems were the abuse of taxes and requisitions committed by some soldiers, officials and local elites in the name of military use. The imperial authority (the emperor, governors, and procurators) had the intelligence to sense the danger of condoning illegal forced requisition, and thus issued edicts and legal regulations to control it. The imperial government retained this food supply system at least until the crisis of the later third century.

4.3: Soldiers and civilians: requisition, petition, and regulation

4.3.1: Compulsory requisition

Compulsory requisition from civilians was more or less acceptable in an emergency, but its abuses were problematic. Under the normal supply system providers possessing officially issued receipts had the right to reimbursement from the state. Even in wartime the state arranged to purchase their grain and service for flat price. However,

²⁴³ Van der Veen 1998: 101-16.

²⁴⁴ Wierschowski 1984: 152, note 606; Mitchell 1993: 254, and see the graph on the same page.

some soldiers, officials, and local elites tended to require unreasonable provisions from provincials which the imperial authorities tried to prevent. Hadrian issued an edict that if a private contractor or official had collected more products than that they were ordered to buy, the amount of excess should be counted as a tax credit:²⁴⁵

Of the things, which governors order to be brought to themselves for their use, the deified Hadrian wrote to governors saying that when a provincial governor or a legionary commander or a procurator or such a person dispatches someone to make a purchase, he should indicate this in a memorandum signed in his own hand and should send this memorandum to a private contractor so that anything that is brought in excess of what was ordered can be counted as tax. It is normal for customary usage to be taken into account in almost all matters concerning taxes, and this is also assured in imperial constitutions.

There was another law to prevent the abuse of compulsory requisition, and to compensate civilians for damages:²⁴⁶

Any illegal exaction, private or public, is paid back to the victims with as much again; but where the extortion was made by force, the restitution is threefold; those responsible are in addition liable to extraordinary criminal punishment. The one measure is demanded by the interests of private individuals, the other by the need for strong public discipline.

²⁴⁵ *Digest* 39.4.4 (Paul/ third century). *de rebus, quas in usus advehendas sibi mandant praesides, divus Hadrianus praesidibus scripsit, ut, quotiens quis in usus aut eorum, qui provinciis exercitibusve praesunt, aut procuratorum suorum usus sui causa mittet quendam empturum, significet libello manu sua subscripto eumque ad publicanum mittat, ut, si quid amplius quam mandatum est transferet, id munificum sit. in omnibus vectigalibus fere consuetudo spectari solet idque etiam principalibus constitutionibus cavetur.*

²⁴⁶ *Digest* 39.4.9.5 (Paul/ third century).

It is difficult to judge to what extent these legal remedies were effective or practical, but they imply that the imperial authorities were concerned to try to prevent, or at least limit, abuses regarding food supply. They recognised the potential danger of people's complaints as a threat public discipline, which might arouse revolts, and obviously appreciated the importance of maintaining the balance of supplies and compensation between soldiers and civilians.

4.3.2: *Angareia* and *hospitium*

Angareia and *hospitium* have been often cited as forms of extortion at the level of the local logistics system. *Angareia* was a forced requisition of transport for soldiers and officials, while *hospitium* or *hospitium militare* was compulsory billeting, included providing food and drink. The practice of *angareia* (a Persian word) dated back to the Achaemenid period.²⁴⁷ *Hospitium* was an *ad hoc* measure of the Republic (and other states) to quarter troops on civilian houses. These previously *ad hoc* practices were probably institutionalised as part of the regular supply system under the reign of Augustus, when soldiers and officials were deployed over all the provinces to maintain and to supervise the logistics of the standing armies. However, the official foundation of these institutions has often been forgotten in discussion of the abuses, because most of the available evidence consists of legal regulations against abuses in the *Codex Theodosianus* and the *Codex Justinianus*.

As regards the issues of *angareia* and *hospitium* in the eastern provinces under the Principate, we have to depend on the slight documentary evidence of petitions and responses (letters and edicts). The first attested regulation is the edict of Libuscidianus, the governor of Pisidia, concerning *angareia* to the people of Sagalassus in 13-15 CE.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁷ Rathbone 2007: 172.

²⁴⁸ Mitchell 1976b: 107-9.

Sextus Sotidius Strabo Libuscidianus, *legatus pro praetore* of Tiberius Caesar Augustus, says: It is the most unjust thing of all for me to tighten up by my own edict that which the Augusti, one the greatest of gods, the other the greatest emperors, have taken the utmost care to prevent, namely that no-one should make use of carts without payment. However, since the indiscipline of certain people requires an immediate punishment, I have set up in the individual towns and villages a register of those services which I judge ought to be provided, with the intention of having it observed, or, if it shall be neglected, of enforcing it not only with my power but with the majesty of the best of princes from whom I received instructions concerning these matters.

The people of Sagalassus must provide a service of then waggons and as many mules for the necessary uses of people passing through, and should receive, from those who use the service, ten *asses per schoenum* for a waggon and four *asses per schoenum* for a mule, but if they prefer to provide donkeys, should give two in place of one mule at the same price. Alternatively, if they prefer, they can pay people of another town or village who undertake the duty the same price for individual mules and waggons as they would have received if they had provided the service themselves, in order that these perform the same service. They are obliged to provide transport as far as Cormasa and Conana.

(...)

I want nothing to be provided for those who transport grain or anything else of that sort either for their own use or to sell, and (nothing should be provided) for anyone for their own personal baggage animals or for their freedmen's or for their slaves' animals. Shelter and hospitality should be provided without payment for all members of my own staff, for persons on military service from other provinces and for freedmen and slaves of the best of princes and for the animals of these persons, in such a way that these do not exact other services without payment from people who are unwilling.

This edict, as Mitchell comments, was based on the instructions of Augustus.²⁴⁹ Thus it is clear that *angareia* had been instituted in the reign of Augustus, and therefore its abuse became subject to legal regulations. More importantly, this governor re-affirmed the precise criteria for *angareia* and specified the reasonable price for each service, prohibiting the private use of this service without payment. This implies that *angareia* itself was part of the normal transport system with the deferred payment arranged by the state, and its abuse on the individual level was the real problem.

A few years later, *hospitium* is attested in Germanicus' edict on his visit in Egypt. Imperial visits needed almost as much transport and billets as military campaigns from the provincial societies. In these special cases, as imperial authorities scheduled appropriate payment for the services of *hospitium*, likewise they had done for *angareia*, but unplanned requisitions by individual soldiers and officials had to be regulated. Germanicus' edict was directed to the province of Egypt, but reflects the rules for the entire empire.²⁵⁰

Proclamation of Germanicus Caesar, son of Augustus and grandson of the deified Augustus, proconsul. [Being informed that in view of my visit] requisitions of boats and animals are being made and that quarters for lodging are being occupied by force and private persons intimidated, I have thought it necessary to declare that I wish neither boat nor beast of burden to be seized by anyone except on the order of Baebius my friend and secretary, nor quarters to be occupied. For if it be necessary, Baebius himself will allot the quarters fairly and justly; and for boats or animals which we requisition I command that hire be paid in accordance with my schedule. Those who disobey I desire to be brought before my secretary, who will either himself prevent private persons from being wronged or will report the case to me. And I forbid beasts of burden to be forcibly

²⁴⁹ Mitchell 1976b: 111-4.

²⁵⁰ *SP* 2.211 (= *SB* 1.3924).

appropriated by those who meet them traversing the city; for this is nothing but an act of open robbery.

It is unclear when *hospitium* was officially institutionalised, but the abuse of *hospitium* was probably subject to regulations during the Julio-Claudian period. Pretending to perform official duties, soldiers and officials often lodged in private houses even though there was some state-organised accommodation for them in most cities and towns.²⁵¹ In the reign of Commodus a governor of Syria, Julius Saturninus, sent a letter to the village of Phaina: “For on the one hand you do not owe a general contribution to visitors; and since on the other you have a guest house, you can not be compelled to take the visitors into your homes”.²⁵² In another example of general regulation by the imperial authority, Domitian ordered to his procurator of Syria, Claudius Athenodorus, in 92-93:²⁵³

Among items of special importance that required great attention by my father, the god Vespasianus, I know that he gave great care to the cities’ privileges. With his mind fixed on them he ordered that neither by the renting of beasts of burden nor by the distress of lodging should the provinces be burdened, but, nevertheless, by conscious decision or not, deliberate neglect has set in and this order has not been observed, for there remains up to the present an old and vigorous custom which, little by little, will progress into law if it is not obstructed by force from gaining strength. I instruct you to see to it that nobody commandeers a beast of burden unless he has a permit from me.

This ruling has two important points. First, it shows the process by which the abuse of

²⁵¹ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 10.1; Millar 1981a: 68, note 29.

²⁵² Hauken 1998: 179-87.

²⁵³ *IGLS* 5.1998 (= *SEG* 17.755); Sherk 1988: no. 95. Bradley (1978: 337) believes that this order was probably related to the famine at Pisidian Antioch in 92-93.

hospitium, along with that of *angareia*, became the subject of the imperial regulation. Second, Vespasian had apparently managed to win hearts and minds among the populations of the cities in Syria, and the support of the civilians had been crucial to his victory in the civil war.²⁵⁴ Domitian needed to maintain the good relationship instituted by his father, and so ordered the procurator to eradicate the wrong practices to ease the burden on civilians.

The emperor sometimes intervened directly to protect the inhabitants of cities located at major traffic points, which made them vulnerable to abuses by official travellers, especially requisitions by soldiers. Sometimes the emperor ordered governors to dispatch some soldiers, probably *beneficarii*, to control abuses. In year 112, for instance, Trajan ordered Publius Calpurnius Macer, the governor of Moesia Inferior, to send a centurion to a city of Byzantium in the neighbouring province of Thrace, despite the existence of auxiliary units and marines there. In his correspondence with Trajan, Pliny the Younger, the governor of Pontus and Bithynia, where there were no legionary units, asked the emperor to implement the same measure for the dwellers of Juliopolis, and then accepted his agreement.²⁵⁵

You acted agreeably, Sir, to your usual prudence and foresight in ordering the illustrious Calpurnius Macer to send a legionary centurion to Byzantium: you will consider whether the city of Juliopolis does not deserve the same regard, which, though it is extremely small, sustains very great burdens, and is so much the more exposed to injuries as it is less capable of resisting them. Whatever benefits you shall confer upon that city will in effect be advantageous to the whole country; for it is situated at the entrance of Bithynia, and is the town through which all who travel into this province generally pass.

²⁵⁴ Tacitus, *Histories* 2.80, cited in section 2 of chapter 3.

²⁵⁵ Pliny, *Letters* 10.77-8.

The circumstances of the city of Byzantium are such, by the great confluence of strangers to it, that I held it incumbent upon me, and consistent with the customs of former reigns, to send thither a legionary centurion's guard to preserve the privileges of that state. But if we should distinguish the city of Juliopolis in the same way, it will be introducing a precedent for many others, whose claim to that favour will rise in proportion to their want of strength. I have so much confidence, however, in your administration as to believe you will omit no method of protecting them from injuries. If any persons shall act contrary to the discipline I have enjoined, let them be instantly corrected; or if they happen to be soldiers, and their crimes should be too enormous for immediate chastisement, I would have them sent to their officers, with an account of the particular.

In the twilight of Hadrian's reign, the edict of a governor of Egypt shows that illegal requisitions of transport by members of the local elites or officials were as serious as those of soldiers. At this time the nearby province of Judaea was facing the Bar Kokhba revolt, to confront which the Roman forces largely depended on supplies from Egypt. Wartime gave people room to distort the institution to their own profits. The governor yet again had to order that requisitions without his specific warrant were illegal:²⁵⁶

Proclamation of Marcus Petronius Mamertinus, praefect of Egypt. I am informed that without having a warrant many of the soldiers when travelling through the country requisition boats and animals and persons improperly, in some cases seizing them by force, in others obtaining them from the *strategi* through favour or obsequiousness, the result of which is that private persons are subjected to insults and abuses and the army is reproached for greed and injustice. I therefore command the *strategi* and royal scribes never in any case to furnish to any person without a warrant,

²⁵⁶ SP 2.221.

whether travelling by river or by land, any contribution for the journey, understanding that I will vigorously punish anyone who after this edict is discovered receiving or giving any of the aforesaid things. The ... year of Hadrianus Caesar the lord, Thoth 8.

Sometimes military tribunes, quoting the governor's edict, regulated soldiers' abuses of *hospitium*. In the province of Asia a tribune on behalf of his governor, T. Flavius Sulpicianus, announced that he would not longer connive at his soldiers' violations of private estates:²⁵⁷

[..., greetings. I have read the petition of n. n. presented to the most illustrious proconsul, T. Fl. Sulpicianus - alleging that his estates, and especially Z[.]mos and Madilos, are being harassed by soldiers - and the response [which is] quoted below:

'The most honourable Ligy[s] shall see to it that your estates are not being abused in any way. The most honourable tribune shall also take care of the same.'

Consequently, if any of the soldiers placed under my command on his way through the estates of your master show misconduct by demanding either a guide, breakfast, dinner or any such thing, that the most illustrious [proconsul] ...

There is doubt to what extent this kind of self-regulatory approach among soldiers could be effective. However, it is noticeable that at the end of the second century, as this letter has been dated to 187-191, civilians' petitions could still be sent to the governors without being censored, and that the governors did not ignore them.

Angareia and *hospitium* in the eastern provinces under the Principate, which originated from the Republican practice or even further back, were still managed

²⁵⁷ Hauken 1998: 188-202.

reasonably as part of the regular supply system for the Roman armies. The contributions of civilians by these institutions were properly compensated by the imperial government. On the personal level, however, the abuses of these requisitions by individual soldiers and officials were still problematic. In the perspective of imperial authorities, controlling these systems was very important to maintain their supply lines for the army and to keep the hearts and minds of the provincials. Thus they never ignored civilians' petitions but responded with re-statement of the official regulations.

4.4: The impact of the Roman army on the provincial economy

4.4.1: Military budget

The size of the military budget needs to be estimated to understand the economic impact of the Roman army on provincial societies. Duncan-Jones suggests that the military budget of the Roman empire was approximately three quarters of the imperial government's annual budget in the mid-second century.²⁵⁸ Accepting Duncan-Jones' analysis, Erdkamp says that it confirms the fact that maintaining the army was the most important imperial expense.²⁵⁹ Despite this, he argues that the driving force of economic growth was Rome itself and major cities along the Mediterranean coast rather than the army. However, cities also drew on civic revenues and private wealth.

Rathbone instead estimates the fiscal burden of the army on the empire to be a quarter of the total imperial budget or less, and then he concludes: "However, through the participation of individual soldiers in the civilian economy, the army did help diffuse a more sophisticated model of economic behaviour. Roman soldiers of the Principate belonged to the largest salaried labour force known before the Industrial Revolution. Their lives were highly monetised; they used accounting based on paper credits and

²⁵⁸ Duncan-Jones 1994: 45.

²⁵⁹ Erdkamp 2002a: 12.

debts; they constantly borrowed and lent; they had frequent contact with civilian craftsmen, merchants, and transporters; they travelled and took this behaviour with them”.²⁶⁰ More scholars, however, believe higher estimates than that of Rathbone, and the whole issue is still the subject of unresolved debate.

4.4.2: Cities as supply bases and urban development²⁶¹

Roman military camps were established at strategic points which were also convenient for receiving supplies.²⁶² These points in the eastern provinces had already been occupied by cities, whereas in the West many cities developed from the settlements (*vici* and *canabae*) around the camps. It was a rational decision to station the eastern army units in or near already existing cities which could function as their supply bases. The eastern soldiers were often criticised by ancient authors because of their relaxation of military discipline and low morale. Tacitus, for instance, accused the Syrian legions in 58 CE of laxity:²⁶³

His (Corbulo's) legions indeed, transferred from as they had been from Syria and demoralised by a long peace, endured most impatiently the duties of a Roman camp. It was well known that that army contained veterans who had never been on piquet duty or on night guard, to whom the rampart and the fosse were new and strange sights, men without helmets or breastplates, sleek money-making traders, who had served all their time in towns.

²⁶⁰ Rathbone 2007: 175-6.

²⁶¹ Woolf (1997: 1-14) argues that the eastern cities constantly developed under Roman rule, but he does not take note of the role of the Roman army.

²⁶² Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Matters* 3.8; Bishop 1999: 111-3. Bishop argues that garrisoning (*praesidium*) was dictated by considerations of supply.

²⁶³ Tacitus, *Annals* 13.35.

His negative representation of the soldiers is based on the assumption that they had adopted a civilian lifestyle because they were garrisoned in cities and towns. Although the camp was demarcated physically by a wooden or stone perimeter, soldiers interacted constantly with civilians beyond it. We might expect some relaxation of military discipline caused by this close interaction between soldiers and civilians, but could hardly conclude that it was true only of the soldiers in the East.²⁶⁴ The western soldiers also interacted with civilians because many civilian settlements had developed around them and depended on the military economy. Tacitus' description, as Wheeler suggests, was likely a *topos* to emphasise the military initiatives of a new general rather than an objective assessment of the actual situation.²⁶⁵

Some scholars have argued that in the East the presence of the army units in the cities and towns explains the absence of forts on the frontiers, and have concluded that the primary purpose of garrisons was to control the provincials rather than to defend the imperial *limes*.²⁶⁶ They have given more importance to the nature of soldiers, forming the ruling class in provincial societies, which was unblended with civilians. Pollard argues that the 'military quarter', with restricted access for civilians, signified the remoteness of soldiers from civilians, and that soldiers maintained their identity through emphasising the 'otherness' of the army.²⁶⁷ This argument confirms the conclusion of his previous article that the army existed as a 'total institution' isolated from provincial societies.²⁶⁸ However, there are some opposite suggestions that soldiers coexisted and

²⁶⁴ Haynes (2013: 100, 145-64) argues that, "military life was ultimately a species of urban life. Soldiers themselves were either billeted in towns or stationed in fortlets, forts, and fortresses with pronounced town-like features. Much of the incorporative experience of military service involved taking those from rural communities less exposed to the empire's towns and introducing them to this lifestyle".

²⁶⁵ Wheeler 1996: 229-76.

²⁶⁶ Gregory 1995-7: 1.58; Isaac 1990: 133; Pollard 2000: 43, 64-5, 189.

²⁶⁷ Pollard 2000: 48-50, 165-7.

²⁶⁸ Pollard 1996: 211-27. He has succeeded and developed the idea of Gilliam 1986b: 281-7 and Shaw

communicated with civilians, and that their role was like a bridge connecting local communities with the imperial polity.²⁶⁹

We need to examine whether Roman army camps were located inside or outside the city walls, and if they were within it, to what extent the ‘military quarter’ encroached on the ‘civilian area’. Of course distinguishing between each area accurately from the archaeological remains has many difficulties. The archaeological sites of some legionary bases in these six eastern provinces of the Near East are known to us: Satala (Sadak), and Melitene (Malatya) in Cappadocia; Samosata (Samsat), Zeugma (Gaziantep), Cyrrhus (Khoros), Apamea (Qalaat al-Madiq), and Raphanaea (Rafniye) in Syria; Nisibis (Nusaybin) and Singara (Beled Sinjar) in Mesopotamia; Caparcotna (Kefar ‘Othnai) and Jerusalem in Judaea; Bostra (Busra al-Sham) in Arabia; Nikopolis (Alexandria) and Babylon (Old Cairo) in Egypt.²⁷⁰

Many fortified cities, towns, and ports for legionary vexillations and auxiliary units are also known to us: Sebastopolis/Dioscurios, Phasis, Absarus, and Trapezus (port) in Cappadocia; Beroea/Aleppo, Palmyra, Dura-Europos, Ana, Kifrin, Antioch, Seleucia Pieria (port), Sidon, Damascus, and Tyre in Syria; Rhesaina and Hatra in Mesopotamia; Scythopolis, Samaria, Neapolis, Emmaus-Nicopolis, Eleutheropolis, and Hebron in Judaea; Gerasa, Rabbatmoba, Mampsis, Petra, Elath/Aela (port), and Leuke Kome (port) in Arabia; Pelusium, Koptos, Contrapollonsopolis Magna, Thebes, Syene, and Berenike (port) in Egypt.²⁷¹ Some ruins of forts have also been discovered in the

1995: 133-59.

²⁶⁹ Alston 1999: 175-95. For the discussion of the relationship between soldiers and civilians, see chapter 3.

²⁷⁰ The location of the *Legio VI Ferrata* has recently been found by Yotam Tepper (2007: 57-71), a PhD candidate at Tel Aviv University, and the excavation is still going on under the name of Jezreel Valley Regional Project.

²⁷¹ Cappadocia: Mitford 1974: 160-75; 1980: 1188-92, and fig. 1-2. Syria and Mesopotamia: Pollard 2000: 38-44, 257-83. Judaea: Isaac 1990: 427-35. Arabia: Isaac 1990: 122-8. Egypt: Alston 1995: 163-

east of Cappadocia, in Mesopotamia, in the south-eastern desert of Judaea, and in the Eastern Desert in Egypt, but these forts were not near civilian settlements and mostly date from the Later Empire, with the well-known exceptions of the fortresses at Mons Porphyrites and Mons Claudianus in Egypt.

Table 14: The Roman army units and cities in the eastern provinces²⁷²

Province	City or town	Camp location	Period of garrison	First attested units
Cappadocia	Sebastopolis (city)	Outside?	Vespasian ~ 5C (founded in 540 BCE)	Vex. of <i>XII Fulminata</i> and <i>XVI Flavia Firma</i> ?
	Phasis (town or city)	Within? (evolved from fort)	Vespasian ~ 5C	Vex. of <i>XII Fulminata</i> and <i>XVI Flavia Firma</i> ?
	Absarus (town or city)	Within? (evolved from fort)	Vespasian ~ 5C	Vex. of <i>XII Fulminata</i> and <i>XVI Flavia Firma</i> ?
	Trapezus (port)	Adjacent ²⁷³	64 ~ mid-3C (756 BCE)	<i>Classis Pontica</i> and Aux. ²⁷⁴
	Satala (major city)	Within (evolved from camp)	64-66 ~ 4C	<i>XV Apollinaris</i> ? ²⁷⁵
	Melitene (major city)	Within (evolved from camp)	70 ~ 4C	<i>XII Fulminata</i> ²⁷⁶
Syria	Samosata (major city)	Outside? (evolved from city)	72 ~ 7C (2C BCE)	<i>III Gallica</i> or <i>XVI Flavia Firma</i> ²⁷⁷
	Zeugma (major city)	Adjacent (evolved from city)	49 ~ mid-3C (300 BCE)	<i>X Fretensis</i> ²⁷⁸
	Cyrrhus (major city)	Within? (evolved from city)	18 ~ mid-3C (early 3C BCE)	<i>X Fretensis</i> ²⁷⁹
	Beroea (city)	Outside?	mid-1C ~ 3C? (early 3C BCE)	Vex. of <i>IV Scythica</i> and <i>VII Claudia</i> ? ²⁸⁰
	Palmyra (city)	Within	mid-2C ~ mid 3C (flourished since 1C BCE)	<i>Ala I Ulpia singul.</i> in 150 ²⁸¹
	Dura-Europos (town or city)	Within (evolved from fort)	165 ~ 256 (312 BCE)	Aux. in 168 ²⁸²
	Ana (town)	Within? (evolved from fort)	late 2C ~ mid-3C (?)	Aux. ²⁸³
	Kifrin (town)	Within? (evolved from fort)	3C	<i>Coh. XX Palm.</i>
	Antioch	Outside	51 BCE ~ 390s	Vex. of <i>X Fretensis</i>

207.

²⁷² Based on Stillwell 1976, Mitford 1980, Jones 1983, Isaac 1990, Millar 1993; Alston 1995, Pollard 2000, and Le Bohec and Wolff 2000.

²⁷³ Bryer and Winfield 1985: 186-7, and fig. 41.

²⁷⁴ Tacitus, *Histories* 3.47; Josephus, *Jewish War* 2.367; Mitford 1974: 163.

²⁷⁵ Wheeler 2000: 275 and note 93.

²⁷⁶ Josephus, *Jewish War* 7.18.

²⁷⁷ French 1994: 29-46.

²⁷⁸ Tacitus, *Annals* 12.12.

²⁷⁹ Tacitus, *Annals* 2.57.

²⁸⁰ *CIL* 3.6047 (= 3.6705, 3.192, 3.6704).

²⁸¹ *AE* 1933.210, 211.

²⁸² Rostovtzeff 1939: 83-4, no. 845.

²⁸³ Cantineau 1933: 178-80.

	(major city)		(301 BCE)	under Julio-Claudian ²⁸⁴
	Seleucia Pieria (port)	Adjacent?	70s ~ 4C (early 3C BCE)	<i>Classis Syriaca</i> under Hadrian ²⁸⁵
	Apamea (major city)	Outside (evolved from city)	43 BCE ~ mid-3C (301-299 BCE)	<i>VI Ferrata</i> in 19 ²⁸⁶
	Raphanaea (major city)	Within (evolved from city)	20s ~ 3C	<i>XII Fulminata</i> under Nero ²⁸⁷
	Sidon (city)	Outside?	first half of 3C (before 1M BCE)	Vex. of <i>III Gallica</i> and <i>VI Ferrata</i> in early 3C
	Damascus (major city)	Outside?	first half of 3C (1M BCE)	Vex. of <i>III Gallica</i> and <i>VI Ferrata</i> in early 3C
	Tyre (city)	Outside?	first half of 3C (before 1M BCE)	Vex. of <i>III Gallica</i> and <i>VI Ferrata</i> in early 3C
Mesopotamia	Rhesaina (city)	Within (evolved from camp)	197 ~ mid-3C	Vex. of <i>III Parthica</i> in early 3C
	Nisibis (major city)	Within? (evolved from city)	197 ~ 390s (early 3C BCE)	<i>III Parthica</i> in early 3C
	Singara (major city)	Within (evolved from city)	197 ~ 363 (flourished in 2C)	<i>I Parthica</i> in early 3C ²⁸⁸
	Hatra (city)	Within? (evolved from town)	200 ~ 240 (1C?)	Aux. in 235
Judaea	Caparcotna (major city)	Within (evolved from camp)	117 ~ Diocletian	<i>II Traiana Fortis</i> in 117-23 ²⁸⁹
	Scythopolis (city)	Outside?	66 ~ 180s (rebuilt in 63 BCE)	<i>Ala</i> in 66 ²⁹⁰
	Samaria (city)	Outside?	Hadrian ~ ? (rebuilt in 57 BCE)	Vex. of <i>VI Ferrata</i> under Hadrian?
	Neapolis (city)	Outside? (evolved from town)	Trajan ~ mid-3C (refounded in 72)	Vex. of <i>XII Fulminata</i> in 115-7 or 132-5
	Emmaus (city)	Within (evolved from camp)	67-8 ~ 130s	<i>V Macedonica</i> in 67-8 ²⁹¹
	Jerusalem (major city)	Within (evolved from city)	70 ~ 2C? (30s BCE)	<i>X Fretensis</i> in 70
	Eleutheropolis (city)	?	Hadrian ~ ? (flourished since 40 BCE)	Vex. of <i>VI Ferrata</i> under Hadrian? ²⁹²
	Hebron (town or city)	? (evolved from fort)	Hadrian ~ 390s (rebuilt in 30s BCE)	<i>Coh. I Mil. Thracum</i> in 124 ²⁹³
Arabia	Bostra (major city)	Within (evolved from camp)	106 ~ 7C	<i>III Cyrenaica</i> in 106 ²⁹⁴
	Gerasa (city)	Adjacent	1C ~ 7C (330s BCE)	<i>Ala I Augusta Thracum</i> in 1C
	Rabbatmoba (city)	Within? (evolved from camp)	106 ~ 4C	<i>Ala</i> in 127
	Mampsis (town or city)	Within (evolved from camp)	early 2C ~ early 4C	<i>Coh. I Augusta Thracum</i> in early 2C
	Petra (city)	Outside?	early 2C ~ mid-5C (flourished since 1C BCE)	Vex. of <i>III Cyrenaica</i> in early 2C
	Elath/Aela (port)	Adjacent?	early 2C ~ 390s (flourished since 3C BCE)	Vex. of <i>III Cyrenaica</i> in early 2C
	Leuke Kome (port)	Adjacent?	mid-1C (?)	A garrison in mid-1C ²⁹⁵

²⁸⁴ *IGLS* 3.1.837.

²⁸⁵ *CIL* 8.8934.

²⁸⁶ Tacitus, *Annals* 2.79.

²⁸⁷ Josephus, *Jewish War* 7.17.

²⁸⁸ *ILS* 9477.

²⁸⁹ Isaac and Roll 1998b: 198-207.

²⁹⁰ Josephus, *The Life of Josephus* 121.

²⁹¹ Josephus, *Jewish War* 4.444-5.

²⁹² *AE* 1933 158.

²⁹³ Isaac 1986: 635-40.

²⁹⁴ Dio Cassius 68.14.5.

Egypt	Nikopolis (major city)	Outside (evolved from fort)	early 1C ~ 211-7 (332-1 BCE)	<i>III Cyr., XII Ful., or XXII Dei.</i> in late 1C BCE ²⁹⁶
	Pelusium (town or city)	?	early 3C (mid-8C BCE)	? in early 3C
	Babylon (city)	Within (evolved from fort)	1C BCE ~ 2C? (flourished in early 2C)	<i>III Cyr., XII Ful., or XXII Dei.</i> in late 1C BCE?
	Koptos (city)	Outside	mid-1C ~ 390s (before 2M BCE)	<i>Ala Vocontiorum</i> in 55-85 ²⁹⁷
	Contrapollonso-polis Magna (city)	?	110s ~ 150s (?)	<i>Coh. I Thracum equi.</i> in 127 ²⁹⁸
	Thebes (city)	Outside?	early 1C ~ early 3C (before 2M BCE)	? in early 1C ~ early 3C
	Syene (city)	Within (evolved from town)	1C ~ 3C (before 3M BCE)	<i>Coh. II Ituraeorum equi.</i> in 39 ²⁹⁹
	Berenike (port)	Adjacent?	(275 BCE)	? in 2C

Table 14 above shows us the locations of the units and the length of their occupation. The majority of the camps, contrary to the expectations of scholars, were adjacent to the city sites or a short distance outside them. The Roman army apparently tended to establish garrisons in the outer areas of cities rather than inside them where there was insufficient space for their camps; confiscation and demolition of inhabited areas to establish garrisons would have created conflict with the civilians. Despite this, the physical and psychological distance was close enough so that soldiers could use all the facilities of these cities without difficulty.

Establishing garrisons inside cities was more complicated, but was acceptable in three cases: first, when the army could already find appropriate space inside the cities; second, when it was necessary to fortify the cities for defence, and more army units gathered at an eastern frontier for imperial visits, expeditions, or to subdue revolts; third, when the cities had developed based on the army camps, like the western urbanisation model.

Regarding the first case, if there had been the bases of Seleucid army units inside the city wall, Roman army units appeared to reuse the spaces for their own camps.

²⁹⁵ Arrian, *Periplus* 19.

²⁹⁶ Strabo 17.1.12.

²⁹⁷ *P. Wisc.* 2.53.

²⁹⁸ *BGU* 2.696 (= *CPL* 118 = *RMR* 64).

²⁹⁹ *CIL* 3.14147/1.

The Romans destroyed pre-existing cities only when they felt the necessity show an exemplary punishment to their enemies or rebellious provincials. Grainger suggests that some Seleucid cities were planned by military considerations, and that the layout mostly continued to the Roman period.³⁰⁰ Introducing Zeugma, Cyrrhus, and Dura-Europos as good examples, Pollard argues that these cities had already had the bases of Seleucid and Parthian army units during the Hellenistic period, where Roman army units were stationed again.³⁰¹ The Romans also reused Greek stadia as places for the gladiatorial spectacles and as training grounds for the recruits.³⁰²

The cities in the province of Mesopotamia (Rhesania, Nisibis, Singara, Hatra), Dura-Europos in Syria, and Jerusalem/Aelia-Capitolina in Judaea/Syria-Palaestina belong to the second case. The Mesopotamian cities had to be fortified with the army camps since these were located on the border with the Parthian empire. An auxiliary unit inside the city wall of Dura-Europos fortified this city, but it seems not to have been stationed there over a century. Jerusalem/Aelia-Capitolina became the permanent base of the *legio X Fretensis* whose stationing was a kind of punishment for the Jewish revolt in 66-73. Sometime after the Bar Kokhba war in 132-5, this unit was moved to Elath. Isaac has guessed that this legion might have been stationed on the Temple Mount or in the northern part of the city during the second century, but there is no evidence for this.³⁰³

A plausible hypothesis can be proposed for the process of the Roman military occupation of cities. The main force (legionary units) occupied the most important strategic positions and major cities on the frontiers, while some vexillations and auxiliary units were dispatched to cities and ports situated in the rear of each province.

³⁰⁰ Grainger 1990: 82-7.

³⁰¹ Pollard 2000: 37-8.

³⁰² Welch 1998: 117-45; Dodge 2009: 40-2.

³⁰³ Isaac 1990: 427.

The purpose of these units during wartime was primarily to secure supply lines, but could vary when the war was over. They maintained the supply lines, local security, and recruitment, and they were also sometimes sent further from existing frontiers to build forts to reconnoitre the enemy's movements. On the outer areas of *limes*, smaller communities were transformed to fortresses, and the camps of small units were situated within in them. However, in most cases the Roman army units in the eastern provinces were located in garrisons outside cities.

It is dubious whether all of the garrison cities had been prosperous and major cities before the army units arrived there. Melitene, Satala, Raphanaea, Capparcotna, Bostra, and Babylon were cities that had developed from legionary camps. These cities began to appear in history with the presence of the *XII Fulminata*, *XV Apollinaris*, *VI Ferrata*, *II Traiana Fortis*, *III Cyrenaica*, and one of the three Egyptian legions (*III*, *XII*, *XXII*), respectively (see Table 14). Although some communities had probably existed in the area of Bostra and Babylon, they were insignificant during the Hellenistic period.³⁰⁴ It is noticeable that the growth of these cities rapidly caught up or overtook that of previous major cities in that period: Sebastopolis in Cappadocia; Beroea, Antiochus, and Damascus in Syria; Scythopolis and Samaria in Judaea, Gerasa in Arabia, and Alexandria in Egypt. Procopius described the process of the urbanisation of Melitene which stemmed from a legionary base, probably the *XII Fulminata*.³⁰⁵

There was in antiquity a certain town in Lesser Armenia, as it is called, not far from the Euphrates River, in which a detachment of Roman soldiers was posted. The town was Melitene, and the detachment was called a "legion". In that place the Romans in former times had built a stronghold in the form of a square, on level ground, which served

³⁰⁴ Bostra: Jones 1983: 290-1. Babylon: Alston 1995: 18-9, 33.

³⁰⁵ Procopius, *Buildings* 3.4.15-8.

adequately as barracks for the soldiers and provided a place where they could deposit their standards. Later on, by decision of the Roman emperor Trajan, the place received the rank of a city and became the metropolis of the province. And as time went on, the city of Melitene became large and populous. But since the people were no longer able to live inside the fortifications (for it was reduced to a small space, as I have said) they settled in the adjoining plain, and here their shrines have been erected and the residences of the magistrates and their marketplace, and all the other places for the sale of goods, and all the streets and stoas and baths and theatres of the city, and whatever else contributes to the embellishment of a great city.

Many locations of legionary vexillations and auxiliary units, furthermore, seem to have followed the western urbanisation model, such as Phasis and Absarus in Cappadocia, Dura-Europos, Ana and Kifrin in Syria, Rhesaina and Hatra in Mesopotamia, Neapolis, Emmaus, and Hebron in Judaea, Rabbatmoba and Mampsis in Arabia. Thus, it is hard to believe that the contribution of the Roman army to urbanisation was insignificant in the eastern provinces, and that this was only a phenomenon in the West. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that the Hellenistic major cities were declining, gradually or drastically, in their economy because of the Roman rule.

4.5: Conclusion

Under the Principate the *annona militaris*, *angareia*, and *hospitium* formed a standing part of the general logistics system to supply the Roman army. These requisitions *per se* did not mean the institutional exploitation of civilians. It is true that sometimes in emergency situations like military campaigns, imperial visits, or famine, the extraordinary levies of grain, transport and accommodation could impose a heavy burden on civilians. However, at least these requisitions were covered, to a large extent,

by the cash compensation arranged by the imperial government. The real problem was the abuse of requisitions committed at the individual level. As regulations and petitions attested, the imperial authorities did not ignore the petitions of provincials, but endeavoured to respond. Although these regulations were constantly re-enacted and thus were arguably not very effective in themselves, it was a dynamic situation where the constant re-enactment of regulations was a necessary process which meant that the level of abuses was by and large kept under control, and certainly never became such a chronic and severe problem as to weaken fundamentally the provincial economy.

The economy of the Near East constantly developed under Roman rule. The development of the cities was not, it seems, stunted by the military presence near or within them. In normal situations, the Roman army camps did not encroach on civilian areas, but kept a certain distance from it. They were stationed close or adjacent to the cities rather than within them. In some cities, where there had already been appropriate space for the camps, or which had followed the western model of urbanisation, army units occupied the specific corner of them. On the individual level soldiers interacted frequently with civilians, and were major consumers invigorating the local economy. Many cities and towns developed from the settlements around the army camps and forts, as in the western urbanisation model. The provincial economy reached a healthy and sustainable position throughout the Principate, and the Roman army had a significant influence on this.

Ch. 5: Roman soldiers in imperial Greek literature

5.1: Introduction

The bad side of Roman soldiers was a theme which recurs in provincial writers of the first three centuries.³⁰⁶ They describe soldiers' corruption and their violence towards provincials to illustrate the bad aspects of Roman rule and to justify provincial discontent. Their critical accounts, if relatively few compared to the pro-Roman writings, have still been enough to have provided an inspiration for scholars' post-colonial perspectives.³⁰⁷ In the views of Rome's subjects, Roman soldiers and their camps were the most obvious symbols of Roman imperialism and their subjugation. For the Jews in particular, after their expulsion from Jerusalem by Hadrian, the Roman empire appeared as the 'evil empire'.³⁰⁸

However, despite occasional revolts by provincials, Roman rule maintained the *pax Romana* for nearly three hundred years. There is no doubt that the big stick of Roman military strength was an effective means of control, but it can not have been the sufficient condition of that prolonged rule. In the Hellenised East, the pro-Roman stance of the local elites was evident, and their co-operation with Roman officials was an important factor in maintaining the peace and stability of the provinces.³⁰⁹ The interaction between soldiers and civilians in the East also seems usually to have been one of acceptance rather than of hostility.³¹⁰ Thus the negative aspects of Roman rule

³⁰⁶ Matthew 27.27-31; Mark 15.16-20; Luke 3.14, 23.36-8; John 19.2-3; Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 9.39–42; Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.79.

³⁰⁷ Webster and Cooper 1996.

³⁰⁸ Eusebius, *Church History* 4.6.3. For further information about the change in Jewish attitude to the Roman rule and to the Roman army, see De Lange 1978: 267-9 and Roth 2007: 409-20.

³⁰⁹ Nutton 1978: 209-21; Cotton 2007: 404-5.

³¹⁰ Alston 1999b; 2007: 192-7, and see chapter 3 and 4 above. While Isaac (1990: 273-4, 276-7, 282-304) furnishes evidence reflecting bad relationship between Roman soldiers and civilians in the East, his

and Rome's soldiers must not be exaggerated, and the positive roles of soldiers must also be considered in discussing Roman imperialism. The aim of this chapter is to re-investigate the image of soldiers revealed in imperial Greek literature, including some Latin literature set in the Greek East, and to re-assess nature of that image.

5.2: Roman rule and military force from the views of the Greek elite

5.2.1: General attitudes to Roman imperialism

Roman imperialism in the East was established in three phases. The first step was territorial expansion by means of military force during the second and first centuries BCE. The second stage was social integration by the process of cultural assimilation during the first two centuries CE. The dominant culture of the East was Hellenic, and the Roman rulers promoted Hellenisation rather than Romanisation. However, Roman citizenship gradually spread through grants to members of the elite who had dealings with emperors and by recruitment to the armed forces. The final phase began with the *Constitutio Antoniniana* issued by emperor Caracalla in 212. This edict made all free men of the provinces Roman citizens.

When the Romans undertook imperial expansion into the Greek world in the second century BCE, the rapid growth of Rome had a huge impact on Greek elites. Polybius, a noble Greek forcibly moved to Rome as a hostage after the Third Macedonian War, wrote a history of Rome to explain to his fellow Greeks how Rome had conquered and brought the whole inhabited world under its dominion within the short span of fifty-three years.³¹¹ In his opinion the Romans could overthrow the Carthaginians and subjugate the Greeks because of their superior military force which

evidence, as he admits, mostly date from the time after the crisis of the mid-third century.

³¹¹ Polybius 1.1. From the beginning of the Second Punic war to the end of the Third Macedonian war (220-168 BCE).

was based on their sound constitution. In the sixth volume of his Roman history, Polybius described the details of Roman military organisation, tactics and discipline.³¹²

In this period the Greeks considered Roman soldiers as a terrible war machine. Describing the capture and sack of Syracuse (212 BCE), Polybius criticised the plundering of works of art by Roman soldiers. It was not what he expected, because the Romans were supposed to be entirely indifferent to the arts: “while leading the simplest of lives, very far removed from all such superfluous magnificence, they were constantly victorious over those who possessed the greatest number and finest examples of such works”. He denounces the soldiers for acting so as “to abandon the habits of the victors and to imitate those of the conquered” through their plunder of Syracuse.³¹³ Plutarch’s account of this event provides a more critical assessment of Roman soldiers, but he tries to excuse Marcellus.³¹⁴

The Romans were considered by foreign peoples to be skilful in carrying on war and formidable fighters; but of gentleness and humanity and, in a word, of civil virtues, they had given no proofs, and at this time Marcellus seems to have been the first to show the Greeks that the Romans were the more observant of justice. For such was his treatment of those who had to do with him, and so many were the benefits which he conferred both upon cities and private persons, that, if the people of Enna or Megara or Syracuse met with any indignities, the blame for these was thought to belong to the sufferers rather than to the perpetrators.

The destruction of Carthage and then of Corinth (146 BCE), when the Greeks came under Roman rule, were also used by Polybius to depict the violent aspects of

³¹² Polybius 6.19-42.

³¹³ Polybius 9.10.2-13. Roman soldiers actually thought it a shame to show interests in the artworks. See Polyaeus, *Stratagems* 8.16.4.

³¹⁴ Plutarch, *Marcellus* 20.1-2.

Roman soldiers. Although Polybius' account of the sack of Corinth does not survive, Strabo refers to it:³¹⁵

Polybius, who speaks in a tone of pity of the events connected with the capture of Corinth, goes on to speak of the disregard shown by the army for the works of art and votive offerings; for he says that he was present and saw paintings that had been flung to the ground and saw the soldiers playing dice on these.

When Rome transformed its political constitution from the Republic to the Principate, the Greeks had to recognise themselves as provincials within the framework of the empire, required to conform to the permanent rule of Rome over them. Now Roman troops, transformed into a standing army, were garrisoned along the boundaries of the empire, and their controlling power over all the provinces was very obvious. The Greeks needed an explanation for their subjugation to the Romans, whom they had considered a kind of *barbaroi*. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek historian writing under Augustus, emphasised the Greek origin of Rome in the first book of his *Roman Antiquities*. He argued that those who had denigrated Rome as the refuge of barbarians must acknowledge it as another Greek city, and praised the Romans for preserving more vestiges of their Greek origins than other Greek colonists.³¹⁶

Some nations' situations were different from that of the Greeks. Josephus, who had been a Jewish commander against Rome in the First Jewish War, gave advice to his compatriots through a speech he put into the mouth of Agrippa II. This Jewish king advised the Jews, assembled to accuse a Roman governor, Gessius Florus, to remain calm and to bow to the Roman authority. His argument is based on this: all nations and

³¹⁵ Strabo 8.6.23

³¹⁶ Dionysius, *Roman Antiquities* 1.11; 1.89.1-2; 1.90.1; cf. Fox 1996: 56-63.

tribes, even the Greeks, “who were esteemed the noblest of all people under the sun”, are subordinate to Roman rule, and, more surprisingly, they are all controlled by only about twenty legions and a few auxiliaries.³¹⁷ This was a warning not to despise the size of the Roman army, and, in fact, there were twenty-eight legions in the Neronian period.

5.2.2: Greek views of the imperial army

Under the Principate, Greek writers were less concerned to analyse Roman military power, and instead focused on political ways to develop their status by means of close relationships with the philhellene emperors and aristocrats of Rome. In the reign of Trajan, Plutarch advised in his *Precepts of Statecraft* a noble Greek named Menemachus about the practical attitude needed for a successful political career. He suggests that now Greek elites should forget about military aspirations, but need to concentrate on rhetoric: “You should arrange your cloak more carefully and from the office of the generals keep your eyes upon the orators’ platform, and not have great pride or confidence in your crown, since you see the boots of Roman soldiers just above your head”.³¹⁸ He also stresses the importance of maintaining close relationships with leading Romans: “not only the statesman should show himself and his native state blameless towards our rulers, but he should also have always a friend among the men of high station who have the greatest power as a firm bulwark, so to speak, of his administration; for the Romans themselves are most eager to promote the political interests of their friends”.³¹⁹

Dio Chrysostom of Prusa, a contemporary of Plutarch, advised the

³¹⁷ Josephus, *Jewish War* 2.16.4.

³¹⁸ Plutarch, *Precepts of Statecraft* 813E-F.

³¹⁹ Plutarch, *Precepts of Statecraft* 814C.

Alexandrians to appreciate the results of Roman rule:³²⁰

Accordingly to you as his children has he given as guardians and guides those who are more prudent than you Alexandrians, and by their companionship, not only at the theatre but elsewhere too, your conduct is improved.

By ‘guardians’ (παιδαγωγοί), Dio means Roman soldiers, who have been sent from god. The Alexandrians had lost their civic independence due to their own troubles with their kings, and therefore should obey the Romans, “such reasonable men as governors”.³²¹ Despite Plutarch’s reference to ‘the boots of Roman soldiers’, the Greek elite’s portrayal of Roman soldiers seems to have been changing in the first century from a dreaded war machine to guardians.

Appian of Alexandria, writing in the mid-second century CE, illustrates the loyalist perception of the empire in the preface of his *Roman History*:³²²

From the advent of the emperors to the present time is nearly two hundred years more, in the course of which the city has been greatly embellished, its revenue much increased, and in the long reign of peace and security everything has moved toward a lasting prosperity. Some nations have been added to the empire by these emperors, and the revolts of others have been suppressed. Possessing the best part of the earth and sea they have, on the whole, aimed to preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather than to extend their sway indefinitely over poverty-stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians, some of whom I have seen at Rome offering themselves, by their ambassadors, as its subjects, but the chief of the state would not accept them because they would be of no use to it. They give

³²⁰ Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 32.51.

³²¹ Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 32.70-1.

³²² Appian, *Roman History* Preface 7.

kings to a great many other nations whom they do not wish to have under their own government. On some of these subject nations they spend more than they receive from them, deeming it dishonourable to give them up even though they are costly. They surround the empire with great armies and they garrison the whole stretch of land and sea like a single stronghold.

Two interesting ideas appear in this paragraph. First, Appian distinguishes the Roman world from the outside where poor and worthless barbarians live. This idea of ‘us and them’ signifies that some Greeks have already appreciated themselves as a part of the empire, differentiated from those outside it. Second, he describes the empire as if it were a fort surrounded with the Roman troops who are stationed on the walls. The Roman army is imagined as the institution which gives coherence and its superior prosperity to the empire.

Slightly later in the second century, Aelius Aristides mentions the armies in the same tone in his *Regarding Rome*: “Thus the cities can be clear of garrisons. Mere detachments of horse and foot suffice for the protection of whole countries, and even these are not concentrated in the cities with billets in every household, but are dispersed throughout the rural area within bounds and orbits of their own. Hence many nations do not know where at any time their guardians are”.³²³ It is clear that he rhetorically understated the military presence to highlight the prevalence of peace under Roman rule; he even says that now most men hear of wars like “myths”.³²⁴ Again, the loyalist view stresses the benefits and the low impact of Rome’s military forces.

These authors’ perspectives on the empire and its army were hardly different from those of a leading Roman, Tacitus. In Tacitus’ *Histories* Petilius Cerialis, when he prepares to deal with the revolt of Civilis, orders the Gallic levies to return to their home

³²³ Aelius Aristides, *Regarding Rome* 67a.

³²⁴ Aelius Aristides, *Regarding Rome* 70.

towns: “the legions suffice to defend the empire, and the allies might return to the duties of peace, secure in the thought that a war which Roman arms had undertaken was finished”.³²⁵ This curt instruction shows the Romans’ pride that the Roman army assures the peaceful life of provincials. In a speech Tacitus puts in the mouth of Petilius Cerialis to deter the Gauls from joining Civilis’ revolt, he says:³²⁶

We, though so often provoked, have used the right of conquest to burden you only with the cost of maintaining peace. For the tranquillity of nations can not be preserved without armies; armies can not exist without pay; pay can not be furnished without tribute; all else is common between us. You often command our legions. You rule these and other provinces. There is no privilege, no exclusion.

The message is that the high level of peace and prosperity enjoyed by Rome’s subjects is due to the protection of its army, and that there is no discrimination between the Romans and provincials in commanding Rome’s forces. The empire they protect together is unified against outsiders.

5.3: Roman soldiers in novels: villains or protectors?

We have little direct evidence for what ordinary subjects thought about Roman soldiers. One indirect indication may be episodes involving Roman soldiers in ancient novels. In this section, I will investigate the image of Roman soldiers in Petronius’ *Satyrical* (mid-first century), Achilles Tatius’ *Leucippe and Clitophon* (early second), and Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* (late second). Despite the origin and social status of Petronius and Apuleius (a Roman senator and a North African notable), their novels are

³²⁵ Tacitus, *Histories* 4.71.

³²⁶ Tacitus, *Histories* 4.74.

both set in a Greek milieu, of which they may have had some personal knowledge, and they were much closer to ordinary experience in the Roman world than we are. Of course, these novels are fiction, but we can assume that the backgrounds and character types reflect the realities of the Roman world. I will discuss the negative views of soldiers in these stories, but also the positive aspects of their portrayal.

5.3.1: Petronius' *Satyrice*

This 'novel' written by Petronius, a Roman senator and, until his enforced suicide, a friend of Nero, portrays the fictional adventures of a man named Encolpius. He was a fugitive gladiator as he confessed: "I fled from justice, I cheated the ring, I killed my host, and with all these badges of courage I am left forsaken in lodgings in a Greek town, a beggar and an exile".³²⁷ Although his ethnic origin is not specified by the author, we can suppose from his Greek name that he was meant to be a Greek or at least a Hellenised. He was in a love triangle with the other two characters who also have Greek names, Ascyltos and Giton. He is presented as having had a Greek rhetorical education because he supports the Attic style and denigrates the Asiatic style which prevailed at that time.³²⁸

The background to the extant parts of the *Satyrice* is mostly two cities of Italy, Puteoli and Croton, which both belonged to the area of *Magna Graecia*. Most characters whom Encolpius encountered through his travels seem to have Greek origins: Agamemnon, Trimalchio, Seleucos, Phileros, Ganymede and Eumolpus. Eumolpus was probably from Asia because his personal anecdotes concern the inhabitants and Greek culture of Pergamum and Ephesus. All of the events experienced by the main characters are set in Greek societies under Roman rule. Thus Petronius, although he was a member

³²⁷ Petronius, *Satyrice* 81.

³²⁸ Petronius, *Satyrice* 2.

of the ruling class of Rome, tried to recreate, or parody, Greek societies in Italy.

Roman soldiers appear twice in this novel. First, Encolpius is disarmed and his anger is controlled by a soldier when he was intending to avenge his betrayal by his lover, Giton.³²⁹

With these words I put on my sword, and recruited my strength with a square meal to prevent my losing the battle through weakness. I rushed out of doors at once, and went round all the arcades like a madman. My face was as of one dumbfounded with fury, I thought of nothing but blood and slaughter, and kept putting my hand to the sword-hilt which I had consecrated to the work. Then a soldier, who may have been a swindler or a footpad, noticed me, and said, "Hullo, comrade, what regiment and company do you belong to?" I lied stoutly about my captain and my regiment, and he said, "Well, do soldiers in your force walk about in white shoes?" My expression and my trembling showed that I had lied, and he ordered me to hand over my arms and look out for myself. So I was not only robbed, but my revenge was nipped in the bud. I went back to the inn, and by degrees my courage cooled, and I began to bless the footpad's effrontery.

At first sight, Encolpius seems to have been prevented from his rightful revenge by the soldier's coercive order to disarm. However, the soldier's viewpoint would provide an alternative interpretation. The Romans permitted civilians to possess arms for self-defence or hunting in the countryside, and attempted to disarm them only when they first conquered people or when they feared revolt.³³⁰ The production of armour and weapons for Roman forces was even contracted out to provincial craftsmen, despite the

³²⁹ Petronius, *Satyrice* 82.

³³⁰ Brunt (1990c: 266) suggests, "disarmament was neither practicable nor necessary as a systematic rule of policy; it was a mere expedient of no more than temporary utility, to be employed against some peoples at the moment of surrender or when there was some particular reason for apprehending disturbances".

risk that rebellious locals could use these supplies to arm themselves.³³¹ Noticing Encolpius' sword, the soldier asks him about his *centuria* and *legio* in the usual way soldiers identify their comrades. When he realises Encolpius is lying, he takes the sword from him. By preventing the violence, Encolpius seems likely to commit, the soldier preserves public order.

There are two interesting points in this story. It indicates that soldiers in civic society often did not wear their uniforms. Thus Encolpius can pretend to suspect that the man was not a real soldier, but a swindler or a footpad, while he himself might have been a soldier. Soldiers could only be identified by checking their details. The more important point is Encolpius' self-reflection at the end of this story. When his anger calms, Encolpius begins to give thanks for the soldier's treatment. He himself admits that his intention had to be deterred by someone before it turned into a real crime. The implication seems to be that, although subjects can denounce soldiers and their unreasonable demands, they also must acknowledge that Roman soldiers play a positive role in maintaining public peace and order.

The second soldier appears in a love story told by Eumolpus concerning a provincial widow and a soldier in Ephesus.³³² This story is also well known through Christopher Fry's comedy, *A Phoenix Too Frequent*. The scene of their romance is a vault where the widow had recently buried her dead husband. When this poor lady was intentionally starving herself to death beside his coffin, she was relieved from the sadness by a soldier who was guarding crucified criminals near the vault. He persuaded

³³¹ In 132, the Jews under Bar Kokhba armed with Roman weapons and revolted against the Romans. Cassius Dio (69.12.2) attests: "So long, indeed, as Hadrian was close by in Egypt and again in Syria, they remained quiet, save in so far as they purposely made of poor quality such weapons as they were called upon to furnish, in order that the Romans might reject them and they themselves might thus have the use of them; but when he went farther away, they openly revolted".

³³² Petronius, *Satyricon* 111-2.

her to live: “Your poor dead husband’s body here ought to persuade you to keep alive”. They came to love each other, and, when the body of one of the crucified men was taken down while the soldier was distracted with the widow, she even lent her husband’s corpse for the soldier to replace the missing criminal. She said: “Heaven forbid that I should look at the same moment on the dead bodies of two men whom I love. No, I would rather make a dead man useful, than send a live man to death”. This love affair reflects the common problem of an army which did not allow serving soldiers to marry and therefore drove them into relations with local women.³³³ Petronius’ fictional audience to the telling of this story is mostly appreciative, though one listener reacts critically to the widow’s behaviour.³³⁴ This reaction, however, does not represent provincial hostility towards Roman soldiers, because the criticism is aimed solely at the immoral behaviour of the widow, and it is noteworthy that there is no criticism in the story of the soldier or the soldier’s relationship with the widow.

Thus the two Roman soldiers depicted in the *Satyricon* depart from the usual negative image: one is a protector of public order who prevents a murder caused by passion, and the other is a decent man whose flirtation with a provincial woman develops into true love. These images were probably what the Romans wanted to be seen by provincials

5.3.2: Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* (Golden Ass)

Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*, the only Latin novel to survive in its entirety, provides much information about Roman society and soldiers. While at Hypata in Thessaly, the main character, Lucius of Madaurus, is transformed into an ass due to his

³³³ Campbell 1978: 153-66.

³³⁴ Petronius, *Satyricon* 113. “If that governor had been a just man, he would have ordered the husband’s body taken down and carried back into the vault, and crucified the woman.”

excessive curiosity about magic, and is subsequently dragged around several regions of the Greek world by a succession of owners. During his travels he encounters various people from the lower classes of provincial society, including bandits and soldiers. The author's description of Roman soldiers and Greek society offers an imagined insight into the relationships between soldiers and civilians, mostly provincials, in the eastern provinces in the Antonine period, which may give us some pointers to reality.³³⁵

Through the voice of Photis, Lucius' lover, Apuleius mentions the police function of soldiers. She warns Lucius, when he is leaving for dinner:³³⁶

“Now take care,” she said, “and come back early from supper, because an insane gang of young aristocrats has been disturbing the public peace. You will see people lying murdered everywhere right out in the street, and the governor's troops are too far away to relieve the town of all this slaughter. Envy of your fine fortune, as well as contempt for you as a foreign visitor, could cause you to be ambushed.”

Note that Photis imagines that only the presence of Roman troops would solve this problem. Provincial cities and towns had their own public police and commanders (παραφύλακται and εἰρηνάρχαι), who were recruited from the locals.³³⁷ The εἰρηνάρχης, a civic post or liturgy filled from local elites, had two or three subordinates called διωγμίται, and seems to have been involved in “targeted arrests and judicial process”, while the παραφύλακται performed “routine patrols of outlying areas”.³³⁸ The municipal policing system, however, appears to have had its limitation. Fuhrmann

³³⁵ Millar (1981a: 66) says that: “Apuleius clothes his sequence of fantastic episodes in a mass of vivid, concrete realistic detail, on physical objects, houses, social structure, economic relations, the political framework of the local communities, and the wider political framework of the Empire”.

³³⁶ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 2.18.

³³⁷ Brélaz 2005: 90-122, 123-45.

³³⁸ Fuhrmann 2012: 68-71.

points out some impediments to public order: conflict (*stasis*) between rich and poor, lack of riot police, inter-city competition, vicissitudes of budgetary and liturgical constraints in maintaining the police, and the ineffectiveness of policing due to the lack of co-ordinated action between neighbouring forces. He concludes that “these limitations of local policing may constitute one explanation for emperor’s and governors’ involvement in public order and the concomitant growth of military policing”.³³⁹ A municipal policing system was operating in provincial cities and towns, but it was not strong enough to solve problems of public order or to eradicate bandits.³⁴⁰ The εἰρηνάρχαι, who came from the local aristocracy, were also unwilling to take effective action to control their peers, and shared the common bias against foreigners.

This is illustrated by Lucius’ experiences. Returning later from the dinner to the house of his host, Milo, Lucius finds a gang of robbers, in fact young aristocrats, trying to break into the house. After a fierce fight, Lucius kills them all.³⁴¹ As a result, he is accused of murder by the *nocturnae custodiae praefectus*, that is the εἰρηνάρχης, in the local court:³⁴²

“But by the Providence of the gods, which never allows the guilty to go unpunished, before he could slip away by some secret route I was ready early in the morning, and I saw to it that he was brought before the awesome jurisdiction of your court. So you have before you a defendant defiled by manifold murders, a defendant caught in the act, a defendant who is a stranger. Be firm and pass sentence on a foreigner for a crime which you would severely punish even in the case of one of your fellow-citizens.”

³³⁹ Fuhrmann 2012: 82-7.

³⁴⁰ For the nature of bandits under the Roman order, see MacMullen 1967: 192-241; Shaw 1984: 3-52; Hopwood 1989: 171-87; McGing 1998: 159-83.

³⁴¹ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 2.32.

³⁴² Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 3.3.

The atmosphere of this court is described as a confrontation between Lucius and the others: the local magistrate, the εἰρηνάρχης, their fellows and even the gang of young local aristocrats. The local police could not be relied on to deal with problems caused by the local elite. In the view of a civilian, like Photis, Roman soldiers could seem to be more trustworthy than the local police.³⁴³

When Lucius is turned into an ass, he is dragged off by the bandits who had assailed Milo's house. In her thesis, Hidalgo de la Vega concludes that these bandits in the *Metamorphoses* are implied to be deserters and ex-soldiers because of Apuleius' description of their tactics, equipment, method of recruitment, and worship of Mars.³⁴⁴ Largely inspired by this study, Garraffoni has argued that Apuleius intended to remind the Roman elite, his main readers, of the ideal *virtus* of soldiers through the gallant spirit of the robbers depicted in his novel.³⁴⁵ Garraffoni's suggestion, however, is based on limited consideration of the linguistic evidence. Apuleius often uses military terms in describing not only the robbers, but also others; for example he describes Lucius having sexual intercourse with Photis in military vocabulary:³⁴⁶

“Fight,” she said, “and fight fiercely, since I will not give way and I will not turn my back. Close in and make a frontal assault, if you are a real man. Attack zealously and slay, as you are about to die. Today's battle admits no quarter.”

³⁴³ Some provincial authors also accepted the policing function of Roman soldiers. Josephus, *Jewish war* 2.12.1; *Acts of the Apostles* 21.31-6.

³⁴⁴ Hidalgo de la Vega 1986 cited *Metamorphoses* 4.9-11 (tactics); 4.22 (equipment); 7.4-5 (recruitment); 7.10-1 (Mars).

³⁴⁵ Garraffoni 2004: 376.

³⁴⁶ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 2.17

Apuleius frequently uses military titles such as *dux*, *signifer*, *antesignanus* and *commilito*, when he portrays fights.³⁴⁷ This implies, first, that Apuleius expected his readers to be familiar with the military vocabulary, even in an era of relative peace. It also implies that the military actions were topics of public entertainment, especially linked with sex and adventure (as in films today). So military allusions could have been what Apuleius' readers wanted.

In fact Apuleius tells us nothing about the origin of his fictional bandits, except that they have local links, but he does make them glamorise their robbery as if it was a successful military operation.³⁴⁸ They glorify their robberies by comparing themselves to military heroes in history, and dedicate the glory of their success to Mars to whom they swore the oath of loyalty. Their links with the local civilian society are revealed when we are told that they share their booty with some villagers, presumably as the reward for providing supplies or intelligence.³⁴⁹ However, in the viewpoint of Lucius-turned-ass these bandits are not comrades of Robin Hood, but just robbers who must be brought to justice, as they eventually are. When they recruit a famous Thracian bandit, Haemus (actually he is Tlepolemus who has disguised himself to save his wife), he introduces himself as the sole survivor of his great band which had been destroyed by the emperor's army.³⁵⁰ Apuleius again implies that Roman soldiers are the only effective protectors of public order in provincial society.

The last story associated with soldiers is in the ninth book of *Metamorphoses*. This story is about a gardener, who acquired Lucius-turned-ass, but soon gets into

³⁴⁷ As revealed by an electronic search on Perseus (www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/(06/07/2014)).

³⁴⁸ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 4.8-22; 7.5-9.

³⁴⁹ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 4.1.

³⁵⁰ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 7.7. This invented story seems to be based on an actual action of Roman soldiers under the order of Marcus Aurelius. *AE* 1956 124; Millar 1981a: 67.

trouble when a legionary tries to commandeer the ass.³⁵¹

On the road we encountered a tall man whose dress and manners marked him as a legionary. He inquired in a haughty and arrogant tone where my master was taking his empty ass. But my master, who was still confused with grief and furthermore did not know Latin, walked right past him without a word. The soldiers, unable to restrain his natural insolence, took offence at the gardener's silence as if it were an insult and struck him with the vine-staff he was carrying, knocking him off my back. The gardener then humbly answered that he could not understand what the soldier said because he did not know the language. So the soldier responded in Greek. "Where," he asked, "are you taking that ass of yours?" The gardener replied that he was heading for the next city. "Well, I need his services," said the other. "He must carry our commanding officer's baggage from the nearby fort with all the other pack-animals."

This story, along with Epictetus' advice in his *Discourses*, is generally used to illustrate the overbearing and violent attitude of soldiers towards provincials and the consequent hostility of provincials towards soldiers.³⁵² Apuleius portrays the soldier as naturally aggressive and violent, and it is true that requisitions by soldiers from provincials were often seen as oppressive, and were the cause of several extant petitions from communities to the Roman authorities.³⁵³ However, requisitions of transport or supplies, which could be made by civilian officials as well as by soldiers, were general and were legally sanctioned in a tradition which went back to the Achaemenid system of

³⁵¹ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 9.39.

³⁵² Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.79. "If a requisition takes place and a soldier takes your mule, let it go, do not hold on to it, and do not complain. For if you do, you will get a beating and lose your mule all the same."

³⁵³ MacMullen 1963: 84-9.

angareia.³⁵⁴ Sometimes local magistrates and leaders too illegally abused the system of requisitions, which required constant strict regulation by governors and the emperor.³⁵⁵

The soldier's attitude is peremptory, but the gardener at first ignores him and then brings his fate on himself by resisting. The situation becomes serious, when the gardener knocks the soldier down and then escapes with the donkey. What makes it even worse is that he runs away with this soldier's sword, and therefore, "beside his personal disgrace, the loss of his sword made him (the soldier) fear the protecting deity of his military oath".³⁵⁶ The soldier and his comrades quickly find the gardener where he was hiding, and execute him. For Roman soldiers, the opposition of provincials was a predictable reaction to collecting essential materials from them, but having weapons stolen by them was more serious. Thus the gardener's small revolt had to be quelled to make good the soldier's shameful disgrace.³⁵⁷

The episodes in Apuleius' novel are not records of facts, but they are still useful reflections of various social aspects. There were unstable factors threatening peaceful civilian life in the provincial society: gangs of corrupt local aristocrats, bandits and rebels. Apart from their external military function, Roman soldiers acted as public police in the cities and the countryside. They were the only force which in practice might be relied upon to solve these problems.

5.3.3: Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon* and other Greek novels

Greek novels allow us to approach the reality of provincial Greek society more directly than the writings of the Latin authors. Five imperial Greek novels are preserved

³⁵⁴ Matthew 5.41. "If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two." Mitchell 1976b: 106, 131; Millar 1981a: 67-8; Isaac 1990: 291-7.

³⁵⁵ Mitchell 1976b: 115, and see his bibliographical note 15, 16, 20, 21.

³⁵⁶ Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 9. 41.

³⁵⁷ Haynes 1999a: 10, note 3.

in their entirety: Chariton's *Callirhoe*, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesian Tale*, and Heliodorus' *Aithiopika*.³⁵⁸ These novels follow a typical pattern of the plot: two beautiful youths fall in love with each other at first sight; soon separated, they experience enforced travels and sufferings; finally they meet each other by chance and confirm their love. All the heroes and heroines suffer from bandits, who are presented as if they were endemic in the Greek East. The point of interest to us is: who saves them?

Roman soldiers rarely appear in Greek novels. Among the five Greek novels, only in *Leucippe and Clitophon* we do find some episodes involving soldiers. During their journey from Pelusium to Alexandria, Leucippe and Clitophon were captured by brigands called 'herdsmen' (βουκόλοι) in the delta of the Nile. While the main characters of other novels are providentially extricated from their troubles with brigands, Clitophon is saved by Roman soldiers.³⁵⁹

We had progressed about a quarter of a mile from the village, when there came to our ears loud shouting and the sound of trumpets, and a regiment of soldiers appeared, all heavily armed. When the robbers saw them, they placed us in the middle of their band and waited for their advance, with the intention of resisting them. Soon they came on, about fifty in number, some with long shields and some with small targets; the robbers, who were far their superior in numbers, picked up clods from the ground and began hurling them at the soldiers ... Then the heavy-armed soldiers came in a flood; the battle was severe, with plenty of blows, wounds, and slaughter on both side: the experience of the soldiers compensated for their inferiority in numbers. We prisoners, seeing that one flank of the robbers was weakening, made a concerted rush, broke through their line, and ran to join the enemy; they at first did not realise the position, and

³⁵⁸ For the literary merit and useful comments, see Schmeling 1996: 309-456.

³⁵⁹ Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe and Clitophon* 3.13.

were ready to slay us, but when they saw that we were unarmed and bound, they suspected the truth, received us within the protection of their lines, and sent us to the rear and allowed us to remain there quietly. Meanwhile a large body of horse charged up; on their approach they spread out their wings and completely surrounded the robbers, and thus herding them together into a narrow space began to butcher them. Some were lying killed, some, half-dead, went on fighting; the rest they took alive.

The emergency is not over yet. The main forces of the herdsmen still hold Leucippe as their hostage (she is luckily soon rescued by Clitophon), and they even annihilate the Roman troops in a battle. However, they are finally wiped out by a greater force dispatched from Alexandria, which emancipates the Delta from the threat of the herdsmen, and thus allows Leucippe and Clitophon to sail to Alexandria.³⁶⁰

This story brings to mind the revolt of the Βουκόλοι in 170s in the Delta of Egypt attested in historical accounts and the papyri. When the local forces failed to suppress their rebellion, the emperor Marcus Aurelius had to send Avidius Cassius, the governor of Syria, to subdue the revolt.³⁶¹ However, we are faced with a problem of chronology, because Achilles Tatius' novel is generally thought to have been written in the earlier second century, which is the period to which the earliest papyrus fragments of the text have been dated.³⁶² Alston argues that the revolt of the Βουκόλοι in *Leucippe and Clitophon* represents a story of unknown origins characterising the unruly pastoralists of the northern Delta, which was recycled again for accounts of the revolt in the 170s.³⁶³ He suggests that in the 170s they were protesting against the agricultural

³⁶⁰ Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe and Clitophon* 4.18.

³⁶¹ Cassius Dio, 72.4; *Augustan History* (Marcus Aurelius) 21.2; cf. *P. Thmouis* 1.

³⁶² For the dating of this novel, see Alston 1999a: 132.

³⁶³ Alston 1999a: 132-3.

exploitation by the Romans in the Delta area.³⁶⁴ However, while some elements in the story and the 'history' may be conventional, it is easier to believe that there had been similar revolts before the major outbreak of the 170s, perhaps a chronic pattern of low-intensity disturbances, and thus that story of the novel is based on a known reality of Roman troops acting, with varying success, to control the Delta pastoralists. In any case, the novel presents the security role of Roman soldiers as desirable to control the herdsmen.

Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesian Tale* is also worthy of notice, although there is no mention of Roman soldiers. The heroine and hero of this novel are Anthia and Habrokomes, who are of course beautiful enough to attract people's attention, and get married to each other. They are captured by pirates on the way from Rhodes to Egypt, and Anthia is soon given to a goatherd because the daughter of the captain loves Habrokomes. The goatherd feels pity for her and decides to escape with her. However, their ship sank in a storm, and Anthia, one of the few survivors, becomes the captive of a bandit, Hippothous, by whom she is in danger of being sacrificed in Cilicia.³⁶⁵

The bandit Hippothous' gang spent that night partying, and the next day they got busy with their sacrifice. When everything was prepared - images of Ares, firewood, and garlands - the sacrifice was to be carried out in their usual manner: they hung the victim that was going to be sacrificed, whether human or animal, from a tree, stood at a distance, and tried to hit it with javelins, and the god was considered to accept the sacrifice of all who scored a hit, while those who missed tried to appease him a second time. It was Anthia who was to serve as this kind of sacrificial victim. When all was ready and they were about to hang her up, they heard rustling in the woods and a din of men. It was the head officer of the peace

³⁶⁴ Alston 1999a: 141-3.

³⁶⁵ Xenophon of Ephesus, *Ephesian Tale* 2.13.

in Cilicia, whose name was Perilaus, one of the most powerful men in Cilicia. This Perilaus attacked the bandits with a large force and killed them all, except for a few that he captured alive.

In this story the saviour of Anthia is Perilaus, “the head officer of the peace in Cilicia” (ὁ τῆς εἰρήνης τῆς ἐν Κιλικίᾳ προεστώς). As has been explained above, the εἰρηνάρχαι were local magistrates in the provinces of Asia Minor, who had been recruited from the local elite. An interesting point is that, while Apuleius describes local police as untrustworthy protectors of civil life, Xenophon portrays the εἰρηνάρχαι forming as a credible policing force as Roman soldiers. Here we can see the gap between the provincial perspective on the municipal polices and that of the Romans. In other words, rather than big and infrequent actions of the army of governor or emperor, sometimes small and frequent actions of the εἰρηνάρχαι could be more helpful to provincials. Local policing was perhaps effective, if well run, against low-scale banditry or other outsiders, but was pretty hopeless against local upper class criminality.

5.4: The contribution of soldiers to imperial integration

5.4.1: The Roman military system in Aelius Aristides’ *Regarding Rome*

The perspective of Aelius Aristides on the Roman military system is important since his comments go beyond those of previous extant authors, who had limited their discussion of the roles of the Roman armed forces to the deterrence of external enemies and the policing of internal discord. He is the first extant rhetorician who focuses on Romanisation by means of military service and talks of harmony between army and provincials.

Aelius Aristides wrote his *Regarding Rome* as a panegyric to be delivered in the presence of Antoninus Pius. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, the eulogy

consists of six sections: the power of the Roman empire; comparison with other empires; comparison with ancient Greek *poleis*; the Roman military system; their form of government; prosperity under Roman rule. He prefaces the Roman military system with his admiration for it (72). He discusses the process of recruitment and of gaining citizenship (73-8). Then he turns to the walls, as if he was aware of the Antonine Wall, and praises the combination of the walls and garrisons (79-84). Lastly, he explains the superiority of Roman training, formation and tactics (85-9). We need to focus on his description of becoming Roman through military service. First of all, he points out that everyone has an “equal right” to serve in the army. The Romans, when they need to recruit replacements in moments of crisis, “count no one an alien when they accept him for any employment where he can do well and is then needed”.³⁶⁶ On this premise, he describes the process of recruitment in detail.³⁶⁷

Who then have been assembled and how? Going over the entire league, you looked about carefully for those who would perform this liturgy, and when you found them, you released them from the fatherland and gave them your own city, so that they became reluctant henceforth to call themselves by their original ethnics. Having made them fellow-citizens, you made them also soldiers, so that the men from this city would not be subject to the levy, and those performing military service would none the less be citizens, who together with their enrolment in the army had lost their own cities but from that very day had become your fellow-citizens and defenders.

He explains that provincials become Roman citizens on the very day when they are recruited, and that conscription is not needed because of the great rewards. This

³⁶⁶ Aelius Aristides, *Regarding Rome* 74.

³⁶⁷ Aelius Aristides, *Regarding Rome* 75.

explanation is patently an exaggeration, because provincials recruited into auxiliary units gained Roman citizenship only after they had completed their military service, and maybe the same was true for provincial recruits to legions. However, from recruitment they had a Roman name, and were probably under Roman law, which means that they could enjoy equal rights as Roman soldiers with the citizen recruits.³⁶⁸

Aelius Aristides goes on to consider possible complaints caused by the burden of the draft on provincials:³⁶⁹

Under your hegemony this is the contribution which all make to the armed forces, and no city is disaffected. You asked from each only as many as would cause no inconvenience to the givers and would not be possible by themselves to provide the individual city with sufficient quota of an army of its own. Therefore all cities are well pleased with the dispatch of these men to be their own representatives in the union army, while locally each city has no militia of its own men whatsoever, and for military protection they look nowhere but to you, because it is for this sole purpose that those who went out from the cities have been marshalled in good order.

He claims that Roman recruitment is reasonable and accepted, because it takes fewer men than would be needed for each city to maintain its own army. More striking is his claim that provincials view these recruited provincials as their representatives who, becoming Roman soldiers, will protect all communities.³⁷⁰ Although we do not know whether this was his own idea or a view common among contemporary Greek elites, it suggests that there was some provincial appreciation of military service as a factor for the imperial integration.³⁷¹

³⁶⁸ See chapter 3.

³⁶⁹ Aelius Aristides, *Regarding Rome* 76.

³⁷⁰ Aelius Aristides, *Regarding Rome* 78.

³⁷¹ Again, this appreciation reminds us of the speech of Petilius Cerialis to the Gauls. Tacitus, *Histories*

5.4.2: Arrian: a Greek general in the Roman army

Lucius Flavius Arrianus was a Roman senator who had been born in Nicomedia of Bithynia about 89 CE, and had studied under Epictetus at Nicopolis in Epirus. He apparently found favour with the emperor Hadrian through his relationship with Avidius Nigrinus who was a close friend of Hadrian. This philhellenic emperor brought a considerable number of Greeks into the senate, and liked to be in the company with educated Greeks. Arrian's career is best known for his governorship of Cappadocia from 131 to 137, and the expedition that he led and recorded against the Alans during his governorship.³⁷² Most Greeks who entered the senate did not become governors of military provinces, whereas Cappadocia had two legions, the *XII Fulminata* and *XV Apollinaris*, and more than a dozen auxiliary units. With these units, as a governor, he launched a campaign against the Alans who had invaded Roman territory.

Array against the Alans is supposed to be a book about military tactics, but it is mostly lost except the chapter about the planned deployment of the Roman units. Although it is very short and on a limited topic, we can recover Arrian's self-image. He calls himself Xenophon instead of using his own name, and his units phalanxes instead of legions, and his enemy the Scythians instead of the Alans.³⁷³ It seems that his counter-offensive in Cappadocia provided him with an imagined link to the successful retreat of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand men in the neighbouring areas. Some Roman generals in the Republic and some Roman emperors had also aspired to become like Alexander the Great when they planned expeditions against the Parthian empire. In sympathy with this ideology, Arrian as a Roman general led Roman armies. Maintaining

4.74.

³⁷² Syme 1982: 181-211.

³⁷³ Xenophon: Arrian, *Array against the Alans* 10, 22. Numerous mentions of phalanx are revealed by an electronic search on Perseus ([www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/\(07/07/2014\)](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/(07/07/2014)))).

his Greek identity, this Roman general protected the empire from the threat of barbarians.³⁷⁴

In any case, the fort itself, in which 400 select troops are quartered, seemed to me, owing to the nature of its site, to be very secure, and to lie in the most convenient spot for the safety of those who sail this way. In addition, a double ditch has been put round the wall, each ditch as broad as the other. The wall used to be of earth, and wooden towers were set up above it; now both it and the towers are made of baked brick. And its foundations are firm, and war engines are installed - and in short, it is fully equipped to prevent any of the barbarians from even approaching it, let alone to protect the garrison there against the danger of a siege. But since the mooring-place for the ships must also be secure, as well as the whole area outside the fort settled by veterans of the army, various merchants and others, I decided to construct another ditch from the double ditch that surrounds the wall as far as the river, which would enclose both the harbour and the houses outside the walls.

About a generation later, around 163 CE, Polyaeus wrote his *Stratagems in War*, which he dedicated to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus when they started a war against the Parthians. This Macedonian author emphasises in his preface the victorious Macedonian spirit against the Persians, based on the history of Alexander the Great and his Macedonian army, but regrets that he can not himself participate due to his old age.³⁷⁵ This feeling of guilt made him dedicate his stratagems to offset his absence. While Arrian contributed to the imperial defence as a Roman general, Polyaeus contributed to it as a military advisor.

³⁷⁴ Arrian, *Periplus* 9.3-5.

³⁷⁵ Polyaeus, *Strategem* preface.

5.5: Conclusion

In the mid-second century BCE, Greek elites had been shocked and scared by the rapid growth of Roman influence over the Mediterranean region. Roman soldiers were the first Romans most Greeks saw. Thus, the image of the Romans was close to that of barbarians. However, as the empire entered a period of political stability, Greek elites began to appreciate being part of it, and tried to distinguish conceptually the Roman world from the outside. On the border line between the empire and the barbarian world Roman garrisons were stationed, which were considered its “guardians”. Roman troops, surrounding the empire, protected provincials against external enemies and assured their peaceful life.

Roman soldiers in the novels of the first two centuries were no longer the terrible war machine of the Republic. The portrayals of them admit their beneficial role. People believed them to be, on the whole, the only trustworthy police force. Furthermore, in the Hadrianic-Antonine period a Greek orator focused on the beneficial function of the Roman military system through the process of recruitment, and argued that the recruited provincials, as Roman citizens and soldiers, contribute to the imperial defence without any discrimination. A noble Greek and a Macedonian author endeavoured to play the roles of Roman general and military advisor respectively. People in the Greek East, were willing to contribute to the military defence of the Roman empire as officers, soldiers and advisers. In the mid-second century CE, the image of Roman soldiers were no longer that of oppressors; indeed the image of Roman soldiers could also be the image of the provincials themselves.

Ch. 6: Roman propaganda as part of military strategy

6.1: Introduction

Meanwhile Phraates, fearing that Augustus would lead an expedition against him because he had not yet performed any of his engagements, sent back to him the standards and all the captives, with the exception of a few who in shame had destroyed themselves or, eluding detection, remained in the country. Augustus received them as if he had conquered the Parthian in a war; for he took great pride in the achievement, declaring that he had recovered without a struggle what had formerly been lost in battle. Indeed, in honour of this success he commanded that sacrifices be decreed and likewise a temple to Mars Ultor on the Capitol, in imitation of that of Jupiter Feretrius, in which to dedicate the standards; and he himself carried out both decrees. Moreover he rode into the city on horseback and was honoured with a triumphal arch. (Cassius Dio 54.8)

Military propaganda directed at the citizens of Rome was an important part of the imperial political strategy. Triumphal monuments were dedicated and ceremonies were performed in the city to celebrate the victories of the emperor and his army, which preserved the *pax Romana*. Ancient authors frequently described the splendid scenes of the triumph. They clearly understood how these spectacles served to reinforce the emperor's political authority.³⁷⁶ In contrast, they rarely recorded whether and how the image of martial achievements was propagated in provincial societies. I have argued that when provincials had identified themselves as imperial subjects settled inside the *pomerium* of the empire, demarcating themselves from barbarians, they perceived the

³⁷⁶ Josephus, *Jewish War* 7.5.4-7; Tacitus, *Agricola* 39; Suetonius, *Caligula* 47; *Nero* 25.1; Cassius Dio 54.24.7-8; 60.23.6; 63.20.3-6; Campbell 1984: 133-42; 2002: 143-6; Hekster 2007: 346-9.

Roman soldiers as their protectors against them.³⁷⁷ Thus propagating military strength to the civilians in the provinces would have been useful to legitimise Roman rule over them, as part of military strategy, especially in the eastern provinces where the Roman empire had a powerful rival, the Parthian empire.

The Parthian empire has generally been seen as the Roman empire's arch-enemy, competing with it for supremacy in the upper Euphrates region, especially in Armenia, from the first century BCE to the early third century CE, until its Arsacid dynasty was overthrown by the Sassanid dynasty in 224 CE.³⁷⁸ There are two questions we need to examine throughout the period. First, whether the relations between the two empires were typically hostile, and whether the conflicts were as serious as it has often been assumed. Second, was the military strategy of the Parthian empire so aggressive that the Romans were right to perceive it as a lethal threat? The idea of a conflict between West and East, which has so much modern resonance, might have been formulated or created by the Romans, drawing on Greek precedents such as Herodotus, as a means to consolidate a ruling ideology for their subjects in the eastern frontier zones, despite the fact that actually they shared Hellenistic cultural influence with the Arsacid - Sassanid empire.³⁷⁹

According to modern estimates, the Roman empire in the second century CE maintained roughly 400,000 troops, about 0.7% of an estimated total population. Nearly a third of the military force was employed to defend its eastern frontier.³⁸⁰ Considering the length of the border between the two empires, this number still seems somewhat insufficient. It would have been impossible for the Romans to secure the eastern

³⁷⁷ See chapter 5.

³⁷⁸ For a historical outline of Romano-Sassanid relations, see Dodgeon and Lieu 1991: 1-8. For the detail of conflicts between two imperial powers, see Dignas and Winter 2007; Edwell 2008.

³⁷⁹ Spawforth 1994: 233-47; Hornblower 2001: 48-61; Ferguson 2005: 1-4, note 43.

³⁸⁰ See chapter 2, Table 6.

provinces, and to carry out further military operations beyond it, unless they succeeded in drawing cooperation and support from the provincials there. The claim that the Parthians were threatening the Roman East and might be aiming at further conquest offered a useful means to identify the security needs of the local populace with those of the occupiers, justifying the deployment of the Roman army in the provinces. However, this use of military propaganda to elicit provincial loyalty is a possibility into which little research has been conducted.³⁸¹

The aim of this chapter is to investigate what Roman military propaganda against the Arsacid - Sassanid empire there was in the eastern provinces, and to evaluate the impact of the propaganda by investigating the reaction of Greeks. The predictable problem presents itself: we have to depend entirely on sources written in Latin and Greek, mostly biased in favour of Rome, because of lack of evidence from the Iranian side.³⁸² First, I shall give a brief overview of the history of conflicts between the two empires, and evaluate whether the existence of the Parthian empire appeared a real threat to Romans. Second, I shall demonstrate that the Romans deliberately exploited an image of Persian threat to create and manipulate a propaganda for strategic purpose, and the ways in which it was employed to justify its military deployment.

6.2: Review of relations

6.2.1: The Late Republic: Crassus to Antony

From 92 to 53 BCE Parthia maintained its western border along the Euphrates under the agreements made with Sulla and then Pompey.³⁸³ In this time the imperial expansion of Parthia and Rome was directed against the Seleucid kingdom between

³⁸¹ No contributions to Weber and Zimmermann 2003, but Hekster (2003: 20-35; 2007: 349-51) points out coinage as an ideal vehicle of military propaganda.

³⁸² Colledge 1967: 17-21; Bivar 1983: 21-4; Kennedy: 1996: 67-70.

³⁸³ Plutarch, *Sulla* 5.4; *Pompey* 33.6.

them rather than against one another. Parthia rejected repeated requests from Mithridates VI of Pontus for military support in his war against Rome.³⁸⁴ Parthia's foreign policy toward Rome was basically non-confrontational.³⁸⁵

The situation was changed when Crassus invaded the western frontier of Parthia for his own military glory in 53 BCE. His army was destroyed, allegedly by the 'Parthian shot', and lost its legionary standards at the battle of Carrhae. Crassus' defeat shocked the Romans, and marks the moment when the military strength of the Parthians was first imprinted on the Romans' minds. It was followed by a Parthian counter attack: two years later, the Parthian prince Pacorus and his general Osaces led their armies to raid Roman territory in Syria. Crassus' invasion had been unprovoked, and the subsequent Parthian invasion seems to have been a retaliatory raid rather than an attempt at conquest. At that time the Parthians were not equipped for conquest: the limitations of their army, mostly mounted archers, were exposed at the siege of Antioch.³⁸⁶

This military confrontation, which became entwined with the Roman civil wars, continued for about twenty years. Caesar had planned an invasion of Parthia after winning the civil war against Pompey, but his project was closed down by his assassination in 44 BCE. In 40-38 BCE, under the Second Triumvirate, Quintus Labienus, an anti-Caesarean commander, allied with a Parthian prince Pacorus I to attack Roman forces in Syria, Judaea, and Asia Minor. Decidius Saxa, who had been appointed by Antony as governor of Syria in the preceding year, perished with his troops in this war, and their eagle standards were captured by the Parthians.³⁸⁷

The joint attack of Pacorus I and Labienus could be regarded as a real threat to

³⁸⁴ Bivar 1983: 44-6.

³⁸⁵ Isaac 1990: 28; Kennedy 1996: 76; Mattern 1999: 21; Sheldon 2010: 23.

³⁸⁶ Cassius Dio 40.29.1-3.

³⁸⁷ Cassius Dio 48.24.4-26.5; Kennedy 1996: 80.

Rome, but it was essentially an extension of the Roman civil war: the Parthian force had first been involved due to the request of Brutus and Cassius.³⁸⁸ The political crisis on the Roman side offered the chance for the Parthians to interfere. Antony sent Ventidius Bassus to stop the Parthian army conquering Asia Minor. Bassus' counter-attacks defeated it, and he executed the two enemy commanders. In 36 BCE Antony led an army in person against Parthia, but his campaign resulted in failure. He repeated his Parthian operations in 34 BCE with some success, but had to turn to confront his Roman rival, Octavian.

6.2.2: The first and second centuries: Augustus to Lucius Verus

After gaining control of Rome, Augustus reverted to diplomatic relations with Parthia. An agreement was reached in 20 BCE that the Parthians would return the legionary standards and soldiers captured from Crassus and Antony's forces, and then the Roman emperor would approve a king of Armenia proposed from the Parthian royal family. Augustus' propaganda presented this agreement as a great victory.³⁸⁹ The image of a Parthian returning the standards was carved on the marble statue of Augustus of *Prima Porta* and widely propagated by the circulation of newly minted coins. Diplomatic relations were maintained, more or less, until the reign of Nero. But, based on its military strength, the Roman empire was watching for an opportunity to invade Parthia during the Principate.³⁹⁰ Which of the two major powers would control Armenia was the kernel of the problem between them.

In 35 CE, the Romans took an opportunity to support a coup against the Parthian king Artabanus III, and tried to exploit it for the benefit of Rome. According to

³⁸⁸ Appian, *The Civil Wars* 4.59, 63, 88.

³⁸⁹ *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 29 and the passage cited at start of chapter.

³⁹⁰ Campbell (2001: 18) argues: "it is clear that until the later third century the Romans were aggressive and militarily self-confident, and this often involved the domination of other peoples and their resources".

Tacitus, the Parthian king first threatened Romans with his proclamation that the ancient boundaries of the Achaemenid empire and Macedonia must be reconquered.³⁹¹ It is unclear whether he was in practice preparing to campaign in the Roman East, and even whether he really claimed *imperium* over this area. On his proclamation, in fact, some Parthian nobles who opposed the rule of Artabanus III contacted Tiberius to ask for his support. While the action of the Parthian king had been confined to giving the Armenian throne to his son, a Roman invasion of Mesopotamia in support of the rebels induced Artabanus to flee, and Tridates III, a Parthian royal hostage from Rome, was installed as king of Parthia. Before long, however, Artabanus regained his throne with Scythian forces.³⁹² This event was more a Roman threat to the Parthians than a Parthian threat to Rome.

Under Nero, the Romans attempted to annex Armenia, and invaded Parthia. A few years before his accession, Armenia had been conquered by the Iberians, and its pro-Roman king was killed. While the local Roman commanders took no action, bribed by the Iberian leader Rhadamistus, the Parthian king Vologaeses I intervened to give the Armenian throne to his brother Tiridates I.³⁹³ In 54, when Nero became emperor, Vologaeses drove the Iberians out of Armenia, helped by the Armenians, and finally achieved his end. But at the same time his own throne was threatened by a son Vardanes II, and thus he had to withdraw his army from Armenia to subdue the revolt of the son. Exploiting this insurrection in Parthia and using the excuse that Tiridates had been enthroned as the Armenian king without consulting Rome, Nero sent Corbulo to campaign in Armenia in 55-62.³⁹⁴ In 62 Caesennius Paetus was appointed to annex Armenia as a province. Although he failed, Corbulo retrieved the situation, and the end

³⁹¹ Tacitus, *Annals* 6.31; Cassius Dio 58.26.1-2.

³⁹² Tacitus, *Annals* 6.37.

³⁹³ Tacitus, *Annals* 12.44-51.

³⁹⁴ Tacitus, *Annals* 13.6-8; Cassius Dio 62.19.1-4.

result in 66 was a return to the Augustan arrangement: Tiridates visited Rome to be crowned by Nero.

The Flavian emperors maintained mostly good relations with the Parthian kings. In 69, when Vespasian was fighting against Vitellius, Vologaeses I offered 40,000 mounted archers to support him.³⁹⁵ Vespasian politely declined the offer from the Parthian king and instead recommended that he send envoys to the Senate to report the restoration of peace. Afterwards, his son Titus was presented with a golden crown from the Parthian king in recognition of his subduing the Jewish revolt.³⁹⁶ Vespasian's younger son Domitian hoped to be appointed as the commander of auxiliary troops in order to help the Parthian army opposing an invasion of Armenia by the Alans when Vologaeses I asked Vespasian for military aid.³⁹⁷ Although Vespasian did not grant the Parthian king's request, no consequential issues arose between the two empires. Following their father's foreign policy toward the Parthian empire, Titus and Domitian never provoked a war on the eastern frontier throughout their reigns from 79 to 96.

Trajan's ambitious Parthian war in 114-7 destroyed the diplomatic relations which had been maintained after the Neronian settlement. Again, the question of the Armenian throne brought on the war: in 109 the Parthian king Osroes I invaded Armenia to put his nephew Exedares on the throne without the approval of the Roman emperor. Trajan's punitive campaign was not confined to Armenia, despite the repeated requests for peace from the Parthians, but progressed to the conquest of Parthian territory east of the Euphrates.³⁹⁸ Trajan's motives seem to have been more to gain

³⁹⁵ Tacitus, *Histories* 4.51; Suetonius, *Vespasian* 6.4. Tacitus records 40,000 cavalry, while Suetonius records 40,000 archers. Considering the character of the Parthian army, the troops were most likely mounted archers.

³⁹⁶ Josephus, *Jewish War* 7.5.2.

³⁹⁷ Suetonius, *Domitian* 2.2.

³⁹⁸ Cassius Dio 68.17.1-3.

fame than strategic, and he would aspire to go as far east as Alexander the Great had reached.³⁹⁹ Trajan formed three new provinces, Greater Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Assyria, out of the areas which he had conquered from Parthia. However, in 116-7 the Jewish 'diaspora' revolt in Cyrenaica, Egypt, Cyprus, and Mesopotamia hindered his campaign, and his death ultimately ended it.

On Trajan's death in 117, Hadrian, governor of Syria and one of Trajan's commander, succeeded him, but immediately abandoned the three provinces newly formed by his predecessor and restored normal relations with Parthia. This change in policy outraged other Trajanic commanders, and to stifle criticism Hadrian felt it necessary to execute four ex-consuls, Lusius Quietus, Avidius Nigrinus, Cornelius Palma and Publilius Celsius.⁴⁰⁰ Probably Hadrian believed that the Romans were over-extending themselves, particularly in the context of the Jewish revolt in Mesopotamia and several other vital eastern provinces.⁴⁰¹ Indeed, it was suspected that the Jewish revolt had been instigated by Parthia.⁴⁰² In 70, the Jewish antipathy to Roman rule had been heightened but suppressed by the destruction of the second temple, and it could be strategically exploited by the Parthians to harass the rear of the Roman frontier. Thus, Judaea would be a potential risk factor if the Romans tried either to defend their eastern frontier or to resume the war against Parthia. Perhaps Hadrian's aggressive Hellenisation of Judaea, including the founding of Aelia Capitolina at Jerusalem and the raising of the temple of Jupiter on the site of the temple of the Jewish god, was meant to dilute Jewish resistance.⁴⁰³ However, it produced the opposite effect, the Bar Kokhba revolt of 132-5. Three years after savage repression of this revolt, Hadrian was

³⁹⁹ Cassius Dio 68.29.1

⁴⁰⁰ *Augustan History* (Hadrian) 7.1-3; Birley 2000: 77-92.

⁴⁰¹ Applebaum 1976: 4-5; Birley 2000: 229-30.

⁴⁰² Neusner 1969: 78.

⁴⁰³ Cassius Dio 69.12.1-2.

succeeded by Antoninus Pius, who followed Rome's normal policy toward Parthia in terms of maintaining the eastern frontier.

The Parthian invasion in 161-2, on the death of Antoninus Pius and accession of Marcus Aurelius, has been presented as a severe threat to the eastern provinces of Rome. The Parthian king Vologaeses IV destroyed at least one legion under Sedatius Severianus, the governor of Cappadocia, at Elegeia in Armenia.⁴⁰⁴ He also defeated the Roman army led by Attidius Cornelianus, the governor of Syria, and raided the cities of Syria.⁴⁰⁵ We have little information about the reason why Vologaeses, the longest reigning Parthian king (147-91), suddenly decided to break the long peace with the Romans, which had been maintained since the accession of Hadrian in 117. The author of the *Augustan History* claims that Vologaeses had begun preparing this war in the final years of Antoninus Pius' reign.⁴⁰⁶ A military diploma and an enigmatic inscription verify that in 160/1 Antoninus Pius had reinforced the army in Syria with vexillations led by Lucius Neratius Proculus, a legate from Cappadocia, on account of a *bellum Parthicum*.⁴⁰⁷ Again, Armenia seems to have been the problem. In the event, Vologaeses took the initiative, probably emboldened by news of Pius' death, and sent an army into Armenia to replace its king with his own nominee, Pacorus.⁴⁰⁸ Although Dio does not explain what mission Sedatius Severianus had been meant to carry out with his legion in Armenia, he had presumably been sent to reinstate the Roman approved king, and had grossly underestimated the Parthian forces. The contemporary rhetorician Lucian says that a false prophet had encouraged Severianus with regard to his

⁴⁰⁴ Cassius Dio 71.2; Speidel (2007: 76, 85) suggests that the *legio IX Hispana* was annihilated in this battle. For more debates on the disappearance of this legion see Campbell 2010: 48-53.

⁴⁰⁵ *Augustan History* (Marcus Aurelius) 8.6.

⁴⁰⁶ *Augustan History* (Antoninus Pius) 9.6.

⁴⁰⁷ *CIL* 9.2457 = *ILS* 1076; Weiss 2007: 160-72.


⁴⁰⁸ Birley 2012: 217.

invasion.⁴⁰⁹

Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, who had not had military careers under Antoninus Pius, probably did not envisage a full-scale war, but the Parthians' reaction was surprisingly aggressive and even damaged Roman Syria. One of the emperors had to make an expedition in person to fight against the Parthians. Lucius Verus took command of the operations in 163-6. Following the long Roman tradition to blame enemies for starting wars, Roman authors may have tried to retrieve Rome's reputation from the defeats in Armenia and Syria by shifting responsibility for the war onto the Parthians. Lucius Verus' campaign was prompt and well prepared. He took the titles, *Parthicus* and *Medicus*, because his generals had invaded Parthia and then Media, and many Roman authors were keen to write an encomiastic history of his successful campaign.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁹ Lucian, *Alexander the False Prophet* 27; *How to Write History* 21, 25-6.

⁴¹⁰ Lucian of Samosata criticises this trend in his *How to Write History*; see section 6.3.2.



Map 5: Roman Syria and Mesopotamia

6.2.3: The third century and after: Septimius Severus to the Tetrarchy

The Roman emperors of the Severan dynasty developed a more aggressive policy towards the Parthian empire, and favoured military solutions to diplomatic negotiations. They no longer thought control of Armenia a significant issue, and instead chose the direct route to Parthia. In contrast to earlier approaches making a detour through the Armenian capital city, Artaxata, from Cappadocia to Parthia, the new route was to directly cross over the Euphrates and to drive the enemy down to Ctesiphon (Map 5). They led their armies in person to invade the Parthian empire: Septimius Severus in 197-8, Caracalla in 216-7, and Severus Alexander (against the Sassanids) in 232-3.

Septimius Severus began his war against the Parthians on the pretext of their aid to the usurper Pescennius Niger, whom he had eliminated in 194.⁴¹¹ However, the Parthian king Vologaeses V had not actually helped the usurper, but had deviously responded to Niger's request for aid: "he would order his governors to collect troops - the customary practice whenever it was necessary to raise an army, as they have no standing army and do not hire mercenaries".⁴¹² Niger fled to Parthia for refuge after his defeat by Severus, but had received no help from it.⁴¹³ This followed the pattern of previous Parthian responses to Roman pretenders such as Terentius Maximus (the false Nero) and Vespasian: offers of support or refuge, but no more.⁴¹⁴ Nor did the Parthians ever seek to exploit the weakened Roman forces in the frontier zones by launching raids, let alone invasions. However, Septimius Severus invaded Parthia in 197, and then declared the extension of Roman power over the region east of the Euphrates:

⁴¹¹ Niger's death: Herodian 3.4.6. Severus' Parthian campaigns: Herodian 3.9.1-12.

⁴¹² Herodian 3.1.2.

⁴¹³ Cassius Dio 74.8.3.

⁴¹⁴ Terentius Maximus: Cassius Dio 66.19. Vespasian: Tacitus, *Histories* 4.51; Suetonius, *Vespasian* 6.4.

Mesopotamia became a province with garrisons.⁴¹⁵

Caracalla, if our sources Cassius Dio and Herodian can be believed, even devised a cunning excuse to invade the Parthians.⁴¹⁶ He proposed he would himself marry a daughter of Artabanus V in order to establish peace, and thus his army was able to cross the Euphrates and Tigris and to reach Arbela unopposed. Although Cassius Dio and Herodian have different views on whether or not Artabanus approved the marriage, the point is that Caracalla exploited the situation of apparent negotiations to make a sudden invasion. He massacred a considerable number of Parthians and burned their cities and towns, and he reported this to the Senate as if he conquered the entire East.

In the early reign of Severus Alexander the Arsacid dynasty of the Parthian empire was succeeded by the Sassanid dynasty (224), which adopted a more aggressive attitude toward the Roman empire. Ardashir I, the founder of the Sassanid dynasty, reiterated the same claim that Artabanus III had made about two centuries ago.⁴¹⁷ Unlike this Parthian king, who had probably intended to strengthen his political prestige rather than to conquer Roman territories, Ardashir's claim to the ancient Persian territories was implemented by attacks on Roman Mesopotamia and Syria, which were repelled by Severus Alexander. Ardashir's aggressive policy against the Roman empire was continued by his son Shapur I, who conquered Nisibis and Carrhae, which were two main Roman fortresses in Mesopotamia. In 244 he defeated the Roman army of Gordian III when he undertook a counter-campaign. Shapur then accepted a peace treaty, with enormous reparations, requested by the new emperor Philip the Arab.

In 250 Shapur I resumed the war and eventually conquered Mesopotamia and Syria in three years. He even captured the Roman emperor Valerian at the battle of

⁴¹⁵ Birley 1999: 201-3, 223.

⁴¹⁶ Cassius Dio 79.1; Herodian 4.11.1-7.

⁴¹⁷ Cassius Dio 80.3-4; Herodian 6.2.1-2; Isaac 1990: 21-2.

Edessa in 260, which shocked the Romans and seriously damaged their hegemony in the eastern provinces. Exploiting the situation, the ruler of Palmyra, Septimius Odenathus, expanded the power of his kingdom, and drove the Sassanids back across the Euphrates. After his death, the Palmyrenes under the rule of his wife Zenobia and son Vaballathus expanded their area of control to Egypt and Asia Minor, until the Roman emperor Aurelian defeated her through his reconquest in 272-3. Ten years later, Carus attacked the Sassanids again and plundered Ctesiphon, but when his decease stopped further conquest, his successor had to return to Rome. Diocletian finally restored the security of the eastern frontier only after several campaigns against the Sassanid empire.

In outlining the historical background to the three centuries of relations between the Romans and Parthians, it is hard to accept the argument that the Parthian empire caused the Roman empire serious military threats and crises. Of course, Parthia was always regarded as a potential threat to Rome, and exercising hegemony over Armenia was always a cause of dispute, but there were only a few substantial threats from Parthia among the many external threats faced by the Romans on other frontiers. The real threats faced by Roman subjects and territories (excluding Armenia) were confined to the campaigns of 40-38 BCE and 161-2 CE, but even these seem not to have been the result of an aggressive policy of Parthians. It is doubtful that the Parthians ever had any intention of subjugating the eastern provinces of Rome.

6.2.4: The Parthian shot: a phantom menace

The 'Parthian shot' was a military tactic supposedly employed by the mounted archers of Parthia. The Mediterranean armies of the period were mostly infantry-based, but the Parthians' own forces were predominantly cavalry. The 'Parthian shot' means cavalry shooting arrows behind them while retreating from a charge or counter-charge

by their opponents. The tactic meant that the mobile mounted archers of the Parthians could inflict serious damage on Roman infantry formations while avoiding Roman attempts to engage at close quarters. Our main sources for the 'Parthian shot' are Plutarch and Cassius Dio in their accounts of the catastrophic defeat of Crassus at Carrhae in 53 BCE. Roman authors tended to make much of the 'Parthian shot' as a way of explaining away this defeat, and also building up the sense of threat represented by the Parthians.

There are no mentions of the defeat of Crassus in the extant writings of contemporary Roman authors. The oldest records of this event, which belong to the Augustan period, are extant only in epitome. The epitome by Justin of the *Philippic History* of Pompeius Trogus, whose father served as a secretary to Julius Caesar during the First Triumvirate, has the single sentence: "After this, he (Orodes) carried on a war with the Romans, and overthrew their general Crassus, together with his son and all the Roman army".⁴¹⁸ Livy's account of this episode has not survived, but was summarised in the *Periochae* in the fourth century: "Marcus Crassus crossed the river Euphrates, carried the war to the Parthian empire, and was defeated in a battle in which his son also fell. With the remains of his army, he occupied a hill, and was summoned to a conference by the enemy leader, Surena, as if to speak about a truce. However, he was captured and killed in a struggle to avoid suffering the indignity of remaining alive".⁴¹⁹

The Roman authors in the reign of Augustus were hardly free from his political influence.⁴²⁰ Responding to his propaganda about the settlement with Parthia in 20 BCE, they needed to believe that the past disgrace had been liquidated by his supposed

⁴¹⁸ Justin 42.4.4.

⁴¹⁹ *Periochae* 106.5.

⁴²⁰ Ando 2000: 138-52.

victory against the Parthians.⁴²¹ The Augustan poets showed enthusiastic responses in particular.⁴²² Propaganda was crucial to Augustus' mode of operation and his need to maintain credibility. Under these circumstances, the enemy's military strength would be rarely cited or downplayed. Pompeius Trogus claims that: "Caesar (Augustus) achieved more by the grandeur of his name than any other general could have achieved by his arms".⁴²³

However, in his famous digression comparing Alexander the Great and the fourth-century BCE generals of the Roman Republic, Livy implies that it was the arrows of Parthian cavalry and the terrain that had destroyed Crassus' army:⁴²⁴

Proud words I would not speak, but never - and may civil wars be silent - never have we been beaten by infantry, never in open battle, never on even, or at all events on favourable ground: cavalry and arrows, impassable defiles, regions that afford no road to convoys, may well occasion fear in heavily armed soldiers.

The same interpretation is implicit in the brief reference by Velleius Paterculus, who had served in the eastern army in 1 CE as *tribunus militum* of Gaius at his negotiations with the Parthians: "Crassus had crossed the Euphrates and was now marching toward Seleucia when he was surrounded by the king Orodes with his innumerable bands of

⁴²¹ Brunt 1990a: 96-109.

⁴²² Horace, *Odes* 1.12; *Epistle* 1.18.56; *Satire* 2.1.15; Virgil, *Eclogues* 10.59-60; Propertius 3.4.1-22; 3.5.48.

⁴²³ Justin 42.5.12

⁴²⁴ Livy 9.19.15-6. *absit invidia verbo et civilia bella sileant: numquam ab equite hoste, numquam a pedite, numquam aperta acie, numquam aequis, utique numquam nostris locis laboravimus: equitem, sagittas, saltus impeditos, avia commeatibus loca gravis armis miles timere potest.* Oakley 2005: 258-60. For Livy's digression, see section 6.3.2 below.

cavalry, and perished together the greater part of his army’⁴²⁵.

Plutarch in the early second century provides the earliest detailed description of the ‘Parthian shot’ in his *Life of Crassus*. In narrating the entire process of Crassus’ campaign against Parthia, he first comments that Crassus’ neglect of taking more time to prepare and to collect intelligence, rather than the superiority of the Parthian military force, seems to have been crucial to his defeat.⁴²⁶ Later, however, Plutarch describes the ‘Parthian shot’, which he claims, played an important role in Crassus’ defeat:⁴²⁷

But the Parthians now stood at long intervals from one another and began to shoot their arrows from all sides at once, not with any accurate aim (for the dense formation of the Romans would not suffer an archer to miss even if he wished it), but making vigorous and powerful shots from bows which were large and mighty and curved so as to discharge their missiles with great force. At once, then, the plight of the Romans was a grievous one; for if they kept their ranks, they were wounded in great numbers, and if they tried to come to close quarters with the enemy, they were just as far from effecting anything and suffered just as much. For the Parthians shot as they fled, and next to the Scythians, they do this most effectively; and it is a very clever thing to seek safety while still fighting, and to take away the shame of flight.

The next account of the ‘Parthian shot’ is in Cassius Dio of the early third century. Before narrating the battle of Carrhae, he explicitly draws readers’ attention to Parthian military equipment and tactics, rather than to their race, country and customs,

⁴²⁵ Velleius 2.46.4. *transgressum Euphraten Crassum petentemque Seleuciam circumfusus inmanibus copiis equitum rex Orodes una cum parte maiore Romani exercitus interemit..* Velleius Paterculus was a *tribunus militum* in the Roman army with Gaius in 1 CE at his negotiations with the Parthians, see Velleius 2.101.3.

⁴²⁶ Plutarch, *Crassus* 17.4-5; 19.2; 20.2.

⁴²⁷ Plutarch, *Crassus* 24.5-6.

because “the examination of these details properly concerns the present narrative, since it has come to a point where this knowledge is needed”.⁴²⁸ Cassius Dio details the tactics of Parthian mounted archers and cataphracts, and the terrain favourable to the employment of them:⁴²⁹

The Parthians make no use of a shield, but their forces consist of mounted archers and pikemen (i.e. cataphracts), mostly in full armour. Their infantry is small, made up of the weaker men; but even these are all archers. They practise from boyhood, and the climate and the land combine to aid both horsemanship and archery. The land, being for the most part level, is excellent for raising horses and very suitable for riding about on horse-back; at any rate, even in war they lead about whole droves of horses, so that they can use different ones at different times, can ride up suddenly from a distance and also retire to a distance speedily; and the atmosphere there, which is very dry and does not contain the least moisture, keeps their bowstrings tense, except in the dead of winter. For that reason they make no campaigns anywhere during that season but the rest of the year they are almost invincible in their own country and in any that has similar characteristics.

Similarly, in recounting Severianus’ defeat in 161, Cassius Dio repeats his explanation that this Roman commander and his army were shot down by Parthian archers.⁴³⁰

Vologaesius, it seems, had begun the war by hemming in on all sides the Roman legion under Severianus that was stationed at Elegeia, a place in Armenia, and then shooting down and destroying the whole force, leaders and all; and he was now advancing, powerful and formidable, against the

⁴²⁸ Cassius Dio 40.15.1.

⁴²⁹ Cassius Dio 40.15.2-4.

⁴³⁰ Cassius Dio 71.2.1

cities of Syria.

By that time Roman armies had become accustomed to dealing with Parthian tactic, and had gained victories against it several times, especially in Trajan's campaigns half a century before. The 'Parthian shot' appears to be used as a cliché to explain this embarrassing defeat.

It is evident that the Parthian army was famous in the ancient Mediterranean world for its mounted archers, but we may doubt whether the 'Parthian shot' was always a crucial element in Roman defeats. Before thinking of the tactical advantage, it is necessary to compare the military strengths of both sides in the wars. Plutarch records that Crassus was leading about 43,000 soldiers (seven legions, 4,000 cavalry, and 4,000 light-armed infantry) when he attempted to invade Parthia, while the Parthian commander Surena had prepared only 1,000 cataphracts and 9,000 mounted archers to face the Roman general at Carrhae.⁴³¹ Plutarch hardly mentions the enemy's infantrymen or famous cataphracts, who were cavalymen in full armour to be employed as the main force in company with the mounted archers. However, by stressing the offer of the Armenian king to Crassus, he implies that the Roman army had insufficient cavalry and chose a route with unfavourable terrain.⁴³²

And most of all, Artabazes the king of Armenia gave him courage, for he came to his camp with 6,000 horsemen. These were said to be the king's guards and couriers; but he promised 10,000 mail-clad cavalry besides, and 30,000 infantry, to be maintained at his own cost. And he tried to persuade Crassus to invade Parthia by way of Armenia, for thus he would not only lead his forces along in the midst of plenty, which the king himself would provide, but would also proceed with safety, confronting

⁴³¹ Plutarch, *Crassus* 20.1; 21.6.

⁴³² Plutarch, *Crassus* 19.1-2.

the cavalry of the Parthians, in which lay their sole strength, with many mountains, and continuous crests, and regions where the horse could not well serve.

Crassus refused the offer from the Armenian king, and then carried out his invasion with a force of only 4,000 cavalrymen, less than half the number of the Parthian mounted soldiers. 20,000 Roman soldiers were killed, 10,000 captured, and 10,000 barely escaped with their commander.⁴³³ Two centuries after, Severianus' army, presumably a legion with some auxiliary units only, was obviously outnumbered by the Parthian force in Armenia, and probably again lacking in the cavalry.

It must be considered how many soldiers Trajan, Lucius Verus, and Septimius Severus had to mobilise for their successful campaigns to advance on the Parthian capital city, Ctesiphon. They were able to employ more than 90,000-11,000 troops: at least nine legions, auxiliaries (mostly *alae* and *cohortes equitatae*) of equivalent number to the legionaries, and additional vexillations.⁴³⁴ The total number of the troops is more than twice as many as Crassus' army, and the number of cavalrymen is nearly ten times greater. Thus the defeats of Crassus and Severianus were inevitable consequences caused by their strategic incompetence and smaller military strengths, especially in cavalry, not by the mythical tactic of their enemies.

Although the tradition of the 'Parthian shot' seems to have begun under Augustus, the two main extant accounts of it come from Plutarch and Cassius Dio. Both were Greek authors writing under Roman emperors, Trajan and Severus Alexander respectively, who led large military expeditions against Arsacid - Sassanid empire. Our two authors reflect the spirit of the times in which they lived, and their accounts of the Parthian threat would have suggested to their readers in the Greek East, that these

⁴³³ Plutarch, *Crassus* 31.7.

⁴³⁴ See chapter 2, Table 4-5.

emperors' campaigns, which required immense manpower and resources from the eastern provinces, were justified by the past record of the Parthian threat.

There was the one-way threat from Rome to Parthia. As Cornell suggests, the Parthians had a Roman problem: by nature the Romans were very aggressive, and they contributed to the weakening of the Parthian dynasty, which led to it being overthrown by the Sassanid dynasty.⁴³⁵ The defensive attitude of the Parthians appears clearer when we compare its foreign policy with that of the Sassanids, which did represent a real threat to the Romans. However, the image of a Parthian threat against Romans is just as strongly represented in our Roman sources as the Sassanid threat, which implies that the Roman authorities deliberately exploited this image of a threat to achieving a propaganda purpose. Part of that propaganda, as we have seen, was the myth of the 'Parthian shot'. The next section looks in more detail at Roman propaganda with regard to Parthia.

6.3: Propaganda

6.3.1: The importance of crowning the Armenian king

The Armenian problem, as we have seen above, was the main cause of confrontations between Rome and Parthia throughout the period from Augustus to the Antonines. It is thus necessary to investigate the reason why the Romans wanted to control appointments to the Armenian throne, while conceding that its candidates should come from the Arsacid dynasty of Parthia. The position of Armenia between the Roman empire and the Parthian empire has been regarded simply as a 'buffer state', reminding us of the Korean peninsula between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War, and of Ukraine between Western Europe and Russia these days. However, it would be more sensible to consider the

⁴³⁵ Cornell 1993: 143-5.

questions of Armenia and the system of choosing its king from contemporary perspectives rather than applying the concept of ‘buffer states’, which is part of the modern theory to explain the balance of powers in international relations.

The system of appointing kings of Armenia seems to have been begun when Augustus made the diplomatic agreement with Phraates IV in 20 BCE. Augustus sent Tiberius to Armenia to crown Tigranes V as king of Armenia, who was related to the royal families of Parthia by blood, but had spent his teenage years in Rome.⁴³⁶ A few years after the agreement, Phraates sent four sons as hostages to Augustus. At that time the Parthian king was worried about the potential risks that his sons might grow up to be political forces threatening his royal authority. Strabo explains the circumstances:⁴³⁷

Phraates, his successor, was so anxious to obtain the friendship of Augustus Caesar, that he even sent the trophies which the Parthians had set up as memorials of the defeat of the Romans. He also invited Titius to a conference, who was at that time governor of Syria, and delivered into his hands, as hostages, four of his legitimate sons, Seraspadaes, Rhodaspes, Phraates, and Bonones, with two of their wives and four of their sons; for he was apprehensive of conspiracy and attempts on his life. He knew that no one could prevail against him, unless he was opposed by one of the Arsacid family, to which race the Parthians were strongly attached. He therefore removed the sons out of his way, with a view to annihilating the hopes of the disaffected. The surviving sons, who live at Rome, are entertained as princes at the public expense. The other kings (his successors) have continued to send ambassadors (to Rome), and to hold conferences (with the Roman governors).

After Phraates’ death, Augustus wielded diplomatic leverage over both the Parthian and

⁴³⁶ Tacitus, *Annals* 2.3; Suetonius, *Tiberius* 9.1; Cassius Dio 54.9.4-5.

⁴³⁷ Strabo 16.1.28.

Armenian thrones. He managed to appoint Parthian hostages, who had been educated at Rome, to both the Parthian and Armenian thrones. In 8 CE, supported by Augustus, the Parthian hostage Vonones became king of Parthia, but he was soon expelled from Parthia by his opponents under Artabanus III. Augustus allocated the Armenian throne to Vonones instead, and his reign continued until Germanicus, on behalf of Tiberius, crowned Artaxias the new king of Armenia in 18.⁴³⁸

It is noticeable that ambassadors and hostages from Parthia and Armenia were constantly travelling to Rome during the early Principate.⁴³⁹ The Roman emperors carefully arranged them to be seen in public places as evidence to prove the propaganda of the subjugation of Parthia and Armenia. Augustus intentionally displayed Parthian hostages like exotic animals:⁴⁴⁰

He did however on the day of one of the shows make a display of the first Parthian hostages that had ever been sent to Rome, by leading them through the middle of the arena and placing them in the second row above his own seat. Furthermore, if anything rare and worth seeing was ever brought to the city, it was his habit to make a special exhibit of it in any convenient place on days when no shows were appointed.

Claudius also made a special effort to display envoys from Parthia and Armenia by giving them seats, next to those of the Senate, in the theatre. This arrangement unexpectedly aroused complaints from some other envoys:⁴⁴¹

He allowed the envoys of the Germans to sit in the orchestra, led by their

⁴³⁸ Tacitus, *Annals* 2.56.

⁴³⁹ Campbell (2001: 15-6) understands this diplomatic contact with a principle of diplomacy that entails “formal meetings which relied on protocol and clearly defined procedures”.

⁴⁴⁰ Suetonius, *Augustus* 43.4.

⁴⁴¹ Suetonius, *Claudius* 25.4.

naive self-confidence; for when they had been taken to the seats occupied by the common people and saw the Parthian and Armenian envoys sitting with the senate, they moved of their own accord to the same part of the theatre, protesting that their merits and rank were no whit inferior.

Hostages and ambassadors from Parthia and Armenia could not reach Rome without using the road system in the provinces of Cappadocia and Syria. It is not known which routes they used to take, but they probably travelled through principal cities (Melitene, Samosata and Antioch), and then from Antioch continued their journey by sea, probably stopping at several ports en route to Italy. They were normally accompanied by an entourage which made them conspicuous to the provincials by its scale and exotic appearance, and an escort of Roman soldiers.⁴⁴² Thus the diplomatic travel of Parthian and Armenian envoys itself would be a useful event to manipulate public opinion in the provinces (or at least their major cities), which can be considered as kind of propaganda to show the military strength of Rome and its influence over the ‘eastern barbarians’.

The most impressive recorded diplomatic event in Rome is when the Armenian king Tiridates I was crowned by Nero in 66. Clearly, Nero had invested heavily in the preparations for this ceremony, and expected some benefit from it. Cassius Dio describes Tiridates’ journey to Rome:⁴⁴³

On the other hand, Tiridates presented himself in Rome, bringing with him not only his own sons but also those of Vologaesius, of Pacorus, and of Monobazus. Their progress all the way from the Euphrates was like a triumphal procession. Tiridates himself was at the height of his reputation by reason of his age, beauty, family, and intelligence; and his whole

⁴⁴² Tacitus, *Annals* 14.25; 15.25, 27.

⁴⁴³ Cassius Dio 63.1.2-63.2.2.

retinue of servants together with all his royal paraphernalia accompanied him. Three thousand Parthian horsemen and numerous Romans besides followed in his train. They were received by gaily decorated cities and by peoples who shouted many compliments. Provisions were furnished them free of cost, a daily expenditure of 800,000 sesterces for their support being thus charged to the public treasury. This went on without change for the nine months occupied in their journey.

The ‘numerous Romans’ presumably indicates the Roman soldiers who escorted the train of Tiridates. Vologaeses I of Parthia had been concerned that his brother Tiridates should not be seen as a prisoner, and therefore he carefully required several conditions from Corbulo to prevent his brother from any kind of dishonour.⁴⁴⁴ As Cassius Dio put it above, the Armenian king’s train might be seen like a triumphal procession, but it was also a way of showing Roman clemency to those who accepted Roman hegemony. In his account of the background to this event, Tacitus points out that the Romans still would see Tiridates as “a spectacle to the world, little better than a captive”, and they also would “value the reality of their empire and disregard its empty show”.⁴⁴⁵ Thus, in this way, eastern kings, envoys and hostages were used by the Roman emperors as means of propaganda to persuade their subjects of their military and diplomatic successes and the unchallengeable might of Rome.

The system of appointing kings of Armenia was not a uniquely Roman foreign relationship or system of world order. The imperial tributary system of ancient China (朝貢冊封) also had a similar structure. 朝貢冊封 is a compound word formed from tribute (朝貢, *chaogong*) and installation (冊封, *cefeng*). Based on Sino-centric ideology,

⁴⁴⁴ Tacitus, *Annals* 15.31.

⁴⁴⁵ Tacitus, *Annals* 15.29-31. *iturum Tiridaten ostentui gentibus, quanto minus quam captivum? ... scilicet externae superbiae sueto non inerat notitia nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania tramittuntur.* Campbell 1993: 231-2.

the Chinese authorities categorised neighbouring nations into four barbarian groups (四夷, *siyi*) in four main directions: the east (東夷, *dongyi*), west (西戎, *xirong*), south (南蠻, *nanman*), and north (北狄, *beidi*), and tried to oblige all the barbarian kings to send delegations to offer hostages and tribute in return for the appointment as king.⁴⁴⁶ In the early Han dynasty, when the system was instituted, it did not mean *de facto* control over the kings, who governed their subjects independently and sometimes even threatened the frontiers of China. The meaning of 冊封 (installation) here was closer to approbation in practice because the Chinese emperor approved the kings, who had been independently chosen according to their own national laws (like a *rex et amicus populi Romani*). However, as the Han dynasty expanded its imperial power, neighbouring nations became more subject to Chinese control and tribute.

The Chinese authorities constantly emphasised how many and distant nations had sent envoys to offer tribute in order to receive an appointment. Thus the tributary system functioned as a diplomatic tool to pacify the frontiers and at the same time as propaganda to unify the various ethnic groups inside China by displaying its imperial hegemony. A history written by a Chinese official reports that even the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius sent envoys to offer tribute to the Chinese emperor in 166, and complains that “the tribute brought was neither precious nor rare, raising suspicion that the accounts [of the Roman empire (大秦, *daqin*)] might be exaggerated”.⁴⁴⁷ Of course, the tributary system of ancient China was not identical to the Roman practice of appointing Armenian kings, but the two systems aimed at the same propaganda

⁴⁴⁶ Yü 1967: 36-64; 1986: 379-83, 394-5; Di Cosmo 2002: 93-7; Huang 2013: 6-8. The Romano-centric ideology can be found in Strabo’s *Geography* (6.4.2; 17.3.24) and in Appian’s *Roman History* (preface 7).

⁴⁴⁷ Fan Ye, *Book of the Later Han* 88. 至桓帝延熹九年，大秦王安敦遣使自日南徼外獻象牙·犀角·玳瑁，始乃一通焉。其所表貢，並無珍異，疑傳者過焉。

purpose.⁴⁴⁸

6.3.2: The legacy of Alexander the Great

Even under Roman rule, Greek authors maintained a certain critical independence. There was marked scepticism about Augustan propaganda among contemporary Greek elites and authors. They seem to have detected the difference between diplomacy and military might - a distinction Augustus sought to blur. They did this by comparing the claimed Parthian success of Augustus with the great victories of Alexander against the Achaemenid empire in 334-330 BCE, and believed that the military strength of Parthia was superior to that of Rome. Rome might have conquered the Greeks, it was implied, but even its emperors were not the military equals of Alexander. This was the main reason for Livy, writing under Augustus, to digress from his narration of the Samnite wars with this question, “What would have been the results for Rome if she had been engaged in war with Alexander?”.⁴⁴⁹

Enumerating the reasons why Alexander would have found it impossible to overcome contemporary Roman commanders, Livy admonishes the Greeks for thinking of the Macedonian king as the superior general. He even tries to set Alexander apart from the Greeks, and reminds them of the time when Greeks showed enmity toward the Macedonian invader:⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁸ The natures of foreign relations of the two empires, based on tribute and appointment, have rarely been studied comparatively; refer to Scheidel 2009 and 2015. Among the contributions to these books, Bang (2009: 100-120) deals with the tributary system of Han dynasty as a comparative target from the economic point of view.

⁴⁴⁹ Livy 9.17.2. Between the first and second Samnite wars, Alexander of Epirus, uncle of Alexander the Great, invaded Italy and died there (in 334-1 BCE). Livy also dealt this event in his previous volume (8.24.1-18). For more explanations for the purpose of Livy’s digression, refer to Oakley 2005: 192-9

⁴⁵⁰ Livy 9.18.6-8; cf. Florus, *Epitome of Roman History* 2.8.

I am only stating facts about which there is no dispute. Are we to regard none of these things as serious drawbacks to his merits as a commander? Or was there any danger of that happening which the most frivolous of the Greeks, who actually extol the Parthians at the expense of the Romans, are so constantly harping upon, namely, that the Roman people must have bowed before the greatness of Alexander's name - though I do not think they had even heard of him - and that not one out of all the Roman chiefs would have uttered his true sentiments about him, though men dared to attack him in Athens, the very city which had been shattered by Macedonian arms and almost well in sight of the smoking ruins of Thebes, and the speeches of his assailants are still extant to prove this?

Greeks frequently compared leading Romans to their own historical figures. At the end of 40s BCE the Athenians had voted Brutus and Cassius bronze images to stand beside those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, to intimate that these Roman generals, in killing Caesar, had emulated the tyrant killers of archaic Athens.⁴⁵¹ The prime extant example is Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* of Greek and Roman leaders. He narrates a Greek leader's achievements first and then deals with a Roman counterpart, followed by a comparative treatment of the two characters. The comparison generally argues for the superiority of the Greek over the Roman. As the Roman pair for his biography of Alexander the Great, Plutarch chose Julius Caesar, who was a good match (both were skilled generals, and both died leaving unfinished plans), and politically safer than choosing Augustus. Cautiously, Plutarch did not publish a comparison of this pair, ostensibly because neither finished their plans for the conquest. But Plutarch relates an anecdote about Caesar's quaestorship in Spain (in 69 BCE), and his readers will have known the pattern: the Greek would be judged superior.⁴⁵²

⁴⁵¹ Cassius Dio 47.20.4.

⁴⁵² Plutarch, *Caesar* 11.4-6; Suetonius, *Caesar* 7.1-2; Cassius Dio 37.52.2.

Whereupon Caesar said to them in all seriousness, “I would rather be first here than second at Rome.” In like manner we are told again that, in Spain, when he was at leisure and was reading from the history of Alexander, he was lost in thought for a long time, and then burst into tears. His friends were astonished, and asked the reason for his tears. “Do you not think,” said he, “it is matter for sorrow that while Alexander, at my age, was already king of so many peoples, I have as yet achieved no brilliant success?”

Plutarch’s attitude seems to be that of all the Romans only the emperors could be compared with Alexander, and Caesar was the adoptive father of the first emperor, Augustus. Given the Parthian threat, Greeks readily compared the Roman emperor to Alexander the Great, especially in the context of his military response to the barbarians from the East. Matching the achievement of the Macedonian king became an important task for the Roman emperor who saw himself as responsible for reinforcing imperial ideology in the Greek East.

The Julio-Claudian emperors appear to have invested in propaganda to convince the population of the eastern provinces that the presence of Roman emperor and his army were keeping them safe from the Parthian threat. This was more feasible than promoting the idea of conquering Parthia. After Augustus’ death in 14 CE, the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* is said to have been disseminated throughout the empire in the form of stone inscriptions in the Latin and Greek languages.⁴⁵³ The four known cases of inscribed versions in the Greek translation (and the Latin original) are all in Asia Minor: Sardis, Ancyra, Pisidian Antioch and Apollonia.⁴⁵⁴ In the *Res Gestae* military success is a recurrent theme, and every diplomatic success to do with Parthian is carefully

⁴⁵³ Rubin (2002: 267-97) argues that Shapur I intended his inscription in *Ka’ba-ye Zartosht*, which was engraved in three languages: Middel Persian, Parthian and Greek, to be propaganda against the Roman empire.

⁴⁵⁴ Thonemann 2012: 282-8.

itemised.⁴⁵⁵

(26) I extended the boundaries of all the provinces which were bordered by races not yet subject to our empire. ...

(29) ... The Parthians I compelled to restore to me the spoils and standards of three Roman armies, and to seek as suppliants the friendship of the Roman people. These standards I deposited in the inner shrine which is in the temple of Mars Ultor.

(32) Kings of the Parthians, Tiridates, and later Phrates, the son of king Phrates, took refuge with me as supplicants; of the Medes, Artavasdes; of the Adiabeni, Artaxares; of the Britons, Dumnobellaunus and Tincommius; of the Sugambri, Maelo; of the Marcomanni and Suevi, ... rus. Phrates, son of Orodes, king of the Parthians, sent all his sons and grandsons to me in Italy, not because he had been conquered in war, but rather seeking our friendship by means of his own children as pledges. And a large number of other nations experienced the good faith of the Roman people during my principate who never before had had any interchange of embassies or of friendship with the Roman people.

(33) From me the peoples of the Parthians and of the Medes received the kings for whom they asked through ambassadors, the chief men of those peoples; the Parthians Vonones, son of king Phrates, grandson of king Orodes; the Medes Ariobarzanes, the son of king Artavazdes, grandson of king Aiobarzanes.

After the death of Augustus and accession of Tiberius, Germanicus took on the mantle of a possible 'Roman Alexander'. He was Tiberius' nephew, adoptive son and expected successor, and also a popular commander. In 18 Germanicus was sent to the East by Tiberius, apparently to mount a show of force against Parthia.⁴⁵⁶ He spent part of the following year in Egypt. A papyrus fragment, found at Oxyrhynchus in 1959 and

⁴⁵⁵ *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 26-33.

⁴⁵⁶ Tacitus, *Annals* 2.42-3, 56, 58.

written in Greek, contains his speech in response to the presentation of decrees in his honour at Alexandria.⁴⁵⁷ Along with Germanicus' edict forbidding unauthorised *hospitium* in Egypt (cited in chapter 4), this illustrates his attempt to gain the hearts and minds of the Alexandrians, by claiming that the Romans, in common with the Alexandrians, share the legacy of Alexander. After prefatory remarks about difficulty of coming to Alexandria, Germanicus (called 'the emperor') continues his speech:

The emperor: "I already imagined it to be a very splendid sight, in the first place because of your hero and founder (i.e. Alexander the Great), to whom a sort of debt is jointly owed by those who aspire to the same things (τοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντηχομενός), and then because of the benefactions made by my grandfather Augustus and my father (*unclear passage*)."

In fact Germanicus was a great-nephew of Augustus and his maternal grandfather was Mark Antony, the last Roman general to invade Parthia, as the Alexandrians knew full well. Thus, viewed in the context of Germanicus' mission, τοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντηχομενός probably means championing the freedom of the Greek world against the threat of Persia/Parthia.

Germanicus died young at Antioch in Syria in 19. Contemporary rumour had it that the emperor Tiberius, motivated by jealousy, had secretly ordered Piso, governor of Syria, to poison Germanicus.⁴⁵⁸ In his narrative of the funeral of Germanicus in Antioch, Tacitus reports some of the speeches praising the dead man. Apparently Germanicus was compared to Alexander and, in the Roman style, preferred for his

⁴⁵⁷ *P. Oxy.* 25.2435; <http://www.world-archaeology.com/features/oxyrnchus.htm> (16/07/2015)

⁴⁵⁸ Tacitus, *Annals* 2.43, 69, 73; Suetonius, *Tiberius* 52.3.

personal morality, which was necessary because his conquests had been limited.⁴⁵⁹

His funeral, devoid of ancestral effigies or procession, was distinguished by eulogies and recollections of his virtues. There were those who, considering his personal appearance, his early age, and the circumstances of his death, to which they added the proximity of the region where he perished, compared his decease with that of Alexander the Great: “Each eminently handsome, of famous lineage, and in years not much exceeding thirty, had fallen among alien races by the treason of their countrymen. But the Roman had borne himself as one gentle to his friends, moderate in his pleasures, content with a single wife and the children of lawful wedlock. Nor was he less a man of the sword; though he lacked the other’s temerity, and, when his numerous victories had beaten down the Germans, was prohibited from making fast their bondage. But had he been the sole arbiter of affairs, of kingly authority and title, he would have overtaken the Greek in military fame with an ease proportioned to his superiority in clemency, self-command, and all other good qualities”.

Although Tacitus only reports hearsay, and is using Germanicus to criticise Tiberius, this fits the evidence that Germanicus himself had tried to exploit the legacy of Alexander as propaganda.

Nero was a grandson of Germanicus and the last emperor of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. After years of operations by his general Corbulo against Armenia and Parthia (see section 6.2.2), Nero also planned an eastern expedition in his later years, and in his preparations for the war he presented himself as Alexander. Suetonius reports that “Nero prepared for an expedition to the Caspian Gates, after enrolling a new legion of raw recruits of Italian birth, each six feet tall, which he called the “phalanx of Alexander the

⁴⁵⁹ Tacitus, *Annals* 2.73.

Great”.⁴⁶⁰ Nero might have been influenced by the views of expansionists like Curtius Rufus, who is believed to have written his *Histories of Alexander the Great* in the reign of Claudius, and was probably the Roman senator Curtius Rufus of that period.⁴⁶¹

After the Flavians’ consolidation of the eastern frontier, Trajan became the next Roman emperor overtly to rival Alexander the Great. He invaded Parthia in 114-7, and tried to establish three new provinces there (see section 6.2.2). Trajan had a clear agenda for propaganda about his achievements, as emerges from Cassius Dio’s description of his aspirations during the Parthian war:⁴⁶²

Then he came to the ocean itself, and when he had learned its nature and had seen a ship sailing to India, he said: “I should certainly have crossed over to the Indi, too, if I were still young”. For he began to think about the Indians and was curious about their affairs, and he counted Alexander a lucky man. Yet he would declare that he himself had advanced farther than Alexander, and would so write to the senate, although he was unable to preserve even the territory that he had subdued. For this achievement he obtained among other honours the privilege of celebrating a triumph for as many nations as he pleased; for by reason of the large number of the peoples of whom he was constantly writing to them they were unable in some cases to follow him intelligently or even to use the names correctly.

Cassius Dio took a negative view of Trajan’s propaganda, and even mocked it. His opinion is part of general Greek denigration of the Severan emperors for their continuous attacks on the Parthian and Sassanid empires (see below).

Arrian, a Roman senator and Greek historian, probably served in Trajan’s Parthian wars in his twenties, and was governor of Cappadocia under Hadrian from 131

⁴⁶⁰ Suetonius, *Nero* 19.2.

⁴⁶¹ Atkinson and Yardley 2009: 2-14.

⁴⁶² Cassius Dio 68.29.1-2.

to 137.⁴⁶³ He showed special interest in the eastern frontier, and during his governorship wrote some books suggesting ways of dealing with various eastern problems. In his *Periplus of the Euxine Sea*, Arrian provides geographical knowledge of the area surrounding the Black Sea, including forts, ports and cities with strategic importance. Shortly after this, he completed a *Tactical Handbook* and the *Expedition against the Alans*, both based on his operation against the Alans. In these books Arrian wrote in the third person, referring to himself as Xenophon, and described the Roman tactics, especially those concerning cavalry units and military formation, in Greek style. Serving a Roman emperor, Arrian was aware of his position as a governor and commander, and had to be satisfied with the role of Roman Xenophon.

Arrian also dealt with Trajan's Parthian wars in his *Parthica*, probably written after the campaigns, and spent his later years, under Antoninus Pius, in writing the *Anabasis of Alexander* (with his *Indica*) and *Events after Alexander*, although accurate dating his works remains problematic.⁴⁶⁴ Arrian's view of Alexander has two contrasting themes: panegyric of the king's military achievements, and moral criticism of his personal errors. However, he ends his book by using an apology for Alexander's faults as a rhetoric device to reinforce his eulogy to the greatest conqueror of history.⁴⁶⁵ Arrian was probably conscious of the criticism of Alexander under the peaceful eastern policy of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, but he evidently stood for Trajan's expansionist policy rather than his successors' non-confrontational policy toward Parthia. What he wanted to see from the eastern policy of the Roman emperor appears to be Alexander's spirit of harmony and blending between Macedonians and Persians, now between Romans and Greeks, in order to carry out further conquests, as he implies in his account

⁴⁶³ For Arrian's life and works, refer to Bosworth 1980: 1-7; 1988: 16-37; Stadter 1980: 1-18; Syme 1982: 181-211.

⁴⁶⁴ For discussions about dating Arrian's works, see Stadter 1980: 179-87.

⁴⁶⁵ Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander* 29-30; Bosworth 1988: 135-36.

of Alexander's banquet for his army at Opis.⁴⁶⁶

But when the news was reported to them about the Persians and Medes, that the military commands were being given to Persians, that the foreign soldiers were being selected and divided into companies, that a Persian foot-guard, Persian foot Companions, a Persian regiment of men with silver-shields, as well as the cavalry Companions, and another royal regiment of cavalry distinct from these, were being called by Macedonian names, they were no longer able to restrain themselves; but running in a body to the palace, they cast their weapons there in front of the gates as a sign of supplication to the king. ... Then they took up their weapons and returned to the camp, shouting and singing a song of thanksgiving to Apollo. After this Alexander offered sacrifice to the gods to whom it was his custom to sacrifice, and gave a public banquet, over which he himself presided, with the Macedonians sitting around him; and next to them the Persians; after whom came the men of the other nations, honoured for their personal rank or for some meritorious action. The king and his guests drew wine from the same bowl and poured out the same libations, both the Grecian prophets and the Magians commencing the ceremony. He prayed for other blessings, and especially that harmony and community of rule might exist between the Macedonians and Persians.

After the peaceful relation with Parthia under Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, military conflict recommenced in 161 (see section 6.2.2). The Greek author Polyaeus collected examples of strategic and tactical devices used by Macedonian leaders from king Philip and Alexander to the Diadochi, and compiled them in a handbook under the title of *Stratagems*. This book was dedicated to Lucius Verus before he was leaving for his Parthian campaign. Polyaeus' tone is polite but maintains the spirit of instructing, personifying himself a teacher - and a Macedonian as he stresses - giving a lesson to his

⁴⁶⁶ Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander* 11.

student.⁴⁶⁷

The gods, your own virtue, and the Roman bravery, that have always before crowned with victory the arms of your sacred majesties, Antoninus and Verus, will also now attend with success the expedition which you have undertaken against Persia and the Parthians. I, who am by birth a Macedonian, and have therefore, as it were, a national right to victory over the Persians, have determined not to be entirely useless to you in the present circumstances; and if my constitution were as robust and hale as it used to be, you should not lack in me convincing proof of the a Macedonian spirit. Nor, advanced as I am in years, can I bear to be left behind without some efforts of service. Accept therefore, illustrious chiefs, in a collection of stratagems employed by the most distinguished generals, this small aid to military science; which, by exhibiting as in a picture the bravery and experience of former commanders, their conduct and operations, and the various successes that they achieved, may in some instances possibly be of service to yourselves, your polemarchs, our generals, the commanders of troops of ten thousand, or one thousand, or six hundred men, and whoever you may think fit to invest with military command.

Lucius Verus asked his tutor Marcus Cornelius Fronto to write a history of his Parthian campaign. In a letter to his teacher, the emperor expresses his strong wish that Fronto should advertise his military successes, and indeed embellish them with dramatic and rhetorical effects:⁴⁶⁸

One thing I wish not indeed to point out to you - the pupil to his master - but to offer for your consideration, that you should dwell at length on the causes and early stages of the war, and especially our ill success in my

⁴⁶⁷ Polyaeus, *Stratagems* preface.

⁴⁶⁸ Fronto, *Correspondence* 194-7.

absence. Do not be in a hurry to come to my share. Further, I think it essential to make quite clear the great superiority of the Parthians before my arrival, that the magnitude of my achievements may be manifest. ... In short, my achievements, whatsoever their character, are no greater, of course, than they actually are, but they can be made to seem as great as you would have them seem.

Lucius Verus' general, Avidius Cassius, halted the invasion at Ctesiphon, but the emperor presented this as if he had conquered the whole of Parthia. There appear to have been many authors who wrote panegyric accounts of this campaign. In his *How to Write History*, Lucian of Samosata satirises the trend: "No, ever since the present situation arose - the war against the barbarians, the disaster in Armenia and the run of victories - every single person is writing history; nay more, they are all Thucydideses, Herodotuses and Xenophons to us, and very true, it seems, is the saying that "War is the father of all things" since at one stroke it has begotten so many historians".⁴⁶⁹ He starts his criticism of the historians who "neglect to record the events and spend their time lauding rulers and generals, extolling their own to the skies and slandering the enemy's beyond all reserve".⁴⁷⁰ After Verus died from the plague, however, his co-emperor Marcus Aurelius tried to 'inherit' Verus' military achievements by intimating that the strategic plans for the Parthian war had primarily been made by himself.⁴⁷¹ This again illustrates the importance of triumphs over Parthia to the Roman emperor.

The emperors of the Severan dynasty made more vigorous use of the image of a Roman Alexander as a propaganda measure to justify their invasions of the Arsacid - Sassanid empire. Our main sources are Cassius Dio and Herodian, who were sceptical of the Severan propaganda. Cassius Dio reports an interesting anecdote about Severus

⁴⁶⁹ Lucian, *How to Write History* 2.

⁴⁷⁰ Lucian, *How to Write History* 7-13.

⁴⁷¹ *Augustan History* (Marcus Aurelius) 20.1-2.

relating to Alexander, when this emperor visited in Egypt:⁴⁷²

Accordingly, he took away from practically all the sanctuaries all the books that he could find containing any secret lore, and he locked up the tomb of Alexander; this was in order that no one in future should either view Alexander's body or read what was written in the above-mentioned books.

Septimius Severus had become the emperor after he defeated and eliminated a number of rivals. It was necessary for him to monopolise the legacy of Alexander to prevent a future challenger from exploiting Alexander's name under the period of political instability. This implies that professing to follow the legacy of Alexander the Great was still an effective way of drawing popular support, although some Greek elites had had negative views of it.

This propaganda was continued by Caracalla, the son and successor of Septimius Severus. He even decorated Rome, the heart of the empire, with statues and paintings of Alexander, and introduced himself as the second Alexander. Herodian derides the emperor's aspirations:⁴⁷³

Caracalla, after attending to matters in the garrison camps along the Danube River, went down into Thrace at the Macedonian border, and immediately he became Alexander the Great. To revive the memory of the Macedonian in every possible way, he ordered statues and paintings of his hero to be put on public display in all cities. He filled the Capitol, the rest of the temples, indeed, all Rome, with statues and paintings designed to suggest that he was a second Alexander. At times we saw ridiculous portraits, statues with one body which had on each side of a single head

⁴⁷² Cassius Dio 76.13.1.

⁴⁷³ Herodian 4.8.1-2.

the faces of Alexander and the emperor. Caracalla himself went about in Macedonian dress, affecting especially the broad sun hat and short boots. He enrolled picked youths in a unit which he labelled his Macedonian phalanx; its officers bore the names of Alexander's generals.

Herodian continues his account of Caracalla's imitation of Greek heroes in some Greek cities: the emperor acted as Achilles at Troy, and as Alexander at Alexandria. The local people are said to have been pleased or enthusiastic when he worshipped and emulated the deified Greek heroes.⁴⁷⁴ But the performance at Alexandria ended in a bizarre disaster with the slaughter of local youths.⁴⁷⁵

Caracalla also waged a war against Parthia in 216-7 (see section 6.2.3), and tried to exaggerate his victory. Herodian reports that the Roman authorities, probably together with Greek elites, had to collaborate with the propaganda manufactured by the emperor, although they realised he was giving false information.⁴⁷⁶

From there he sent word to the senate and the Roman people that the entire East was subdued and that all the kingdoms in that region had submitted to him. The senators were not unaware of what had actually happened (for it is impossible to conceal an emperor's acts); nevertheless, fear and the desire to flatter led them to vote the emperor all the triumphal honours. Thereafter, Caracalla spent some time in Mesopotamia, where he devoted himself to chariot-driving and to fighting all kinds of wild animals.

Caracalla was preparing another Parthian war in 217, but was stopped by his assassination, which triggered the civil war between Macrinus and Elagabalus.

⁴⁷⁴ Herodian 4.8.3-9, 4.9.3-4.

⁴⁷⁵ Herodian 4.9.5-8.

⁴⁷⁶ Herodian 4.11.8-9.

Supported by his grandmother and Caracalla's aunt Julia Maesa, Elagabalus became the victor in 218. In 221, Elagabalus adopted his cousin and named him 'Alexander', who became the emperor Severus Alexander the following year. Herodian adds that Septimius Severus was also referred as Alexander the Great. But, along with Cassius Dio, Herodian maintains a critical tone:⁴⁷⁷

He (Elagabalus) said that Elagabalus (Syro-Roman sun god) had ordered him to do this (adoption) and further to call his son's name Alexander. And I (Dio), for my part, am persuaded that all this did come about in very truth by some divine arrangement; though I infer this, not from what he said, but from the statement made to him by someone else, to the effect that an Alexander should come from Emesa to succeed him, ...

It was then that the name of Alexianus was changed to Alexander; the name of his grandfather (Septimius Severus) became Alexander the Great, since the Macedonian was very famous and was held in high esteem by the alleged father of them both. Maesa's daughters, and the old woman too, boasted of their adultery with Caracalla, son of Severus, in order to increase the soldiers' love for the youths (Elagabalus and Alexander), who thus appeared to be Caracalla's sons.

The Roman emperors evidently knew that creating the image of a threat from Parthian and Sassanid Persia would be helpful to unify the Greeks of the eastern provinces under Roman rule. The anti-Persian tradition and sentiment of the Greeks could be exploited as a practical means of attaining the emperor's aim. This was made even stronger by the legacy of Alexander the Great, because other subject nations in the East had recognised him as one of their historic heroes, which fostered the popular

⁴⁷⁷ Cassius Dio 80.17.3-18.1; Herodian 5.7.3.

enthusiasm evident in the so-called Alexander ‘romance’ of the third century.⁴⁷⁸ The Roman emperor could be usefully positioned as a natural successor to Alexander against the Persian power.

The Greek elites like Cassius Dio and Herodian were critical of this Roman propaganda and the reality of the professed intention of imperial expansion to the East. These historians probably reflected the feelings of contemporary society, tired of constant warfare in the final years of the Severan dynasty.⁴⁷⁹ Perhaps they even hoped that the Roman emperors would *not* surpass Alexander the Great. However, eventually, the propaganda was working in the ways that Roman authorities had intended - exerting a strong influence on the people in the eastern provinces. They were induced to be part of a Roman East, presented as an ‘anti-Parthian’ east.

6.4: Conclusions

The purpose of the current chapter has been to examine the role of propaganda as part of the military strategy for the eastern frontiers of the Roman empire under the Principate. To attain this aim, this chapter has explored whether the existence of the Arsacid - Sassanid empire constituted a real threat to the Romans, and whether the Roman authorities deliberately exploited the image of a threat as propaganda to manipulate their subjects in the eastern provinces. This chapter has also examined the effectiveness of the propaganda.

In the history of the relations between the Roman empire and the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, we have seen that the Parthians and Sassanids rarely showed any intention of invading the Roman empire, while the Romans periodically did invade and seek to control Parthian territory, primarily Armenia and Mesopotamia. The imperial

⁴⁷⁸ Stoneman 1991: 1-17. For the Persian tradition of Alexander legend, refer to Stoneman 2012: 3-18.

⁴⁷⁹ Kemezis 2014: 273-80.

expansion of Rome stagnated after the death of Augustus, but the East was still open for further opportunities. In contrast to the other frontiers, the eastern frontier still had a distinct value of further territorial extension. However, it was impossible to undertake without the support of subjects in the eastern provinces. The Roman authorities were able to nurture this perception of eastern threat in the eastern provinces where the Greeks had shared the victorious tradition against their Persian enemy. Roman historiography consistently harped on the eastern threat, and invented motifs such as the 'Parthian shot'.

The role of the Roman emperors was particularly important in creating this propaganda. They carefully exploited Parthian and Armenian ambassadors, and forced Parthia to concede that the Armenian king should be confirmed by Rome. Emulating or excelling Alexander the Great became an ideology to consolidate the various ethnic groups in the eastern provinces under Roman rule, and to justify the presence of the Roman army. This propaganda, a Roman Alexander against the Parthian/Persian threat, was, in general, effective among the ruling class of the Roman East, mostly Greeks, because they had to find a way to espouse imperial ideology and at the same time to maintain their historical pride, although some were critical of its supposed implementation by some emperors. The Roman propaganda was manufactured by the Roman authorities to justify their military strategy in the east, and, despite some elite scepticism and the resistance of the Jews, it seems to have had considerable widespread and long-term success in uniting the eastern provincials in support of Rome's military domination of their territories.

Ch. 7: Conclusions

In this thesis, I have argued that in the eastern provinces the Roman authorities of the Principate had a conscious policy of trying to deploy and employ their armed forces in order to win the hearts and minds of the local populations. I have also suggested that this formed part of a military strategy to exploiting local human and material resources to confront the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, not dissimilar to the purpose of the 'hearts and minds' policy in modern military strategy (see chapter 1). Through a mixture of practical measures to make their military occupation acceptable and of anti-Persian propaganda, the Romans tried to incorporate the eastern provincial communities into the *imperium populi Romani* and to promote social integration between soldiers and provincials. Indeed, this strategy was a success in that it laid the groundwork for the restoration of the frontier zones in the late third century.

In chapter 2, I have argued that the hypothesis of 'localisation', meaning an increasing trend towards 'local' recruitment of soldiers *e castris*, which led to the formation of a separate caste of soldiers outside of provincial society, is simply wrong. During the three hundred years of the Principate, the Roman armed forces in the eastern provinces increased from at least six legions, thirteen *alae*, eleven *cohortes* and one fleet under Augustus to Gaius to at least twelve legions, twenty *alae*, some seventy *cohortes* and three fleets under Severus Alexander. The number of soldiers increased from 47,000 to 127,500, which accounted for 17.4% and 31.5% respectively of the total military strength of the empire. The increasing demand for recruitment to the legions entailed the gradual change of recruiting pattern from the regional and provincial recruitment of the first century to the recruitment in the West (mainly Italy and Africa) and the Danube in the second and third centuries. However, the recruits *e castris*

comprised only 5 to 6% of the total recruits throughout the Principate. A fair number of auxiliary units were raised in the eastern provinces; some were deployed near where they had been formed and some were dispatched to other provinces. Presumably the recruitment to auxiliary units followed the same trends as of the recruitment of legionary units. Therefore, the pattern of military recruitment in the eastern provinces was never localised, but always depended largely on recruits from other provinces, which is significant in that the Roman armed forces therefore maintained their multi-cultural identity.

In chapter 3 I have studied the procedures for recruitment and veteran settlement, using epigraphic and papyrological evidence mainly from Asia Minor and Egypt respectively. I have argued for the strategic thinking behind the processes. The increasing demand for military recruits in the East inevitably required some conscription in addition to volunteering. However, conscription was conducted only when volunteers were not enough, and it seems that the Romans did not bother to maintain full strength in peacetime. The plague under Marcus Aurelius probably made normal recruitment more difficult, but the Severans were able to increase the overall size of the army and wage numerous campaigns, so any problems were apparently short-term. A majority of recruits flowed from the Latin West and neighbouring provinces, and they will have influenced the thinking and behaviour of the local and provincial recruits. Under the same military law and discipline, they were trained as Roman soldiers and blended without distinction of citizens or non-citizens during the mandatory service of twenty-five years. After discharge, they could share with their family members the privileged status of Roman citizenship. The number of veterans was small compared to the total population, but their influence over urban areas was never small. They continued to maintain their connections with civilians which they had built up throughout their period of service. In the case of the Roman garrisons at Syene

in Egypt, the soldiers interacted with the civilians from 25 BCE to the reign of Diocletian, and seem to have formed close relationships with the local priests, an important element in the local elite.

In chapter 4 I have challenged the idea that the logistics system of Roman armed forces hindered the economic growth of the eastern provinces with the heavy burden of requisitions imposed on subjects. The *annona militaris*, *angareia* and *hospitium* were instituted as part of the general logistics system for military supply and transportation, and also the support of the Roman imperial administration. Irregular levies could be imposed in emergency situations, but the Roman government generally arranged cash compensation for compulsory requisitions. The abuse of requisitions was a chronic problem, common to all imperial powers, but the Roman authorities were ready to respond to the petitions of provincials, and issued and tried to implement protective regulations. On the local level, the military presence near or within cities has been considered to have stunted urban development. However, the Romans normally reused the military camps of the Hellenistic kingdoms and therefore their army camps did not encroach on civilian areas, while the soldiers were major consumers who revitalised the local economy. In fact, there is no good evidence to show that the presence of military camps stagnated the provincial economy of the eastern provinces.

In chapter 5 I have investigated the changing image of Roman soldiers from brutal invaders to reliable guardians in imperial Greek literature, including some Latin literature which is set in the Greek East. The works discussed include Petronius' *Satyricon*, Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon* with some Greek novels, Aelius Aristides' *Regarding Rome* and Arrian's *Array against the Alans*. As the Roman empire established its political stability, Greek elites began to accept themselves as part of it and consciously started to distinguish between outsiders as 'barbarians' and insiders, themselves included, as 'Romans'. Roman soldiers in Greek

novels are presented as the only effective and trustworthy police force, in contrast to municipal police forces, who were unwilling or unable to act against upper class criminality. From the mid-second century, Greek elites contributed to the imperial defence more actively than just commenting on it. Whereas Aelius Aristides delivered a panegyric on the beneficial function of the Roman military system, distributing citizenship through the processes of recruitment, Arrian served as a governor and led an expedition against a barbarian tribe, the Alans.

I have argued in chapter 6 that, as propaganda for their military strategy, the Roman authorities on one hand created a Parthian threat by continuing the image of the Persian threat, and on the other used the legacy of Alexander the Great to claim a role as defenders of the Greeks. The history of the relations between Rome and Parthia shows that the Romans continued to invade the western frontier of Parthia, while the Parthians rarely invaded the eastern provinces of Rome. But the Romans, also using the threatening myth of the 'Parthian shot', manipulated their subjects into agreeing to support their military operations in the frontier zones. The Roman emperors also tried to exploit embassies from the Armenian and Parthian kings to present a public image of the superiority of Roman power. The propaganda of the emperor as a Roman Alexander against the Persian-Parthian threat was crucial to justify Rome's military strategy on the eastern frontier. This was effective in uniting the various eastern nations to cooperate with and even serve in Rome's military domination of their territories.

In summary, through propaganda about its military power and policies to make their garrisoning of the provinces and their soldiers acceptable to the local populations, the Roman authorities promoted a beneficial image of their imperial rule and might, and eventually rooted it in the eastern provinces. Thus I argue that the Romans did have a deliberate policy of winning hearts and minds and that it was a success in that it helped them to maintain and expand the territorial integrity of the eastern provinces for over

three hundred years.

As a postscript, I note a couple of ways in which this thesis could be developed and improved. There are some topics which have only been touched on or not covered. One example is the issue of language, which comes up in Apuleius' story of the gardner and the soldier and in the case study of Syene. Whereas Latin was the official language of the Roman army (and central administration), there is much evidence that soldiers, like most of the populations of the eastern provinces, used Greek as their lingua franca. To what extent they knew and used local languages, such as Aramaic and Egyptian, is another matter. Second, I am (or we are) still stuck in the frame of post-colonial perspective. One of my intentions was to position this study between Ando's positive view of Roman imperialism and Mattingly's negative view. But in some parts of my thesis, I have found this difficult, perhaps because of my national background as a South Korean whose ancestors suffered terribly under Japanese imperialism from 1910 to 1945, and since have been sandwiched between the USSR/China and the USA. Nevertheless, we must be aware of the fact that the ideology of post-colonialism will also pass, as the imperial perspective has done over the last few centuries. Although this ideology has brought us to productive discussions about various aspects of the Roman world, sometimes it draws our attention away from what the Romans actually wrote, made and built. Thus, Roman sources and materials must be read and interpreted in a balanced perspective.

In 1987 the British historian Paul Kennedy wrote a book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, which was first translated into Chinese, *The Rise of the Great Powers* (大國崛起, *Daguo Jueqi*), in 2006-7, and then translated into many other Asian languages. This book presents all the types of western imperialisms in the early modern and modern periods. The modern imperialists tried to pick up useful ideas from Rome's

system of provincial administration and military strategy. Interestingly, a considerable number of Asian leaders now attempt to learn from those ideas in their dreams of national prosperity and military power. This implies that they are beginning to think of imperialism as a strategic system, rather judge how far it was bad or good to themselves. Thus, Rome's administrative system and military strategy in the provinces could continue to be full of suggestions ideas for us and future classicists.

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